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ABSTRACT 
In Part 1, we examine the effects of an order cancellation fee on limit order behavior and execution 
quality on the NASDAQ OMX PHLX.  We find that the cancellation fee is effective in reducing 
the rate at which limit orders are submitted and subsequently deleted.  Order volume declines, 
however, the remaining displayed orders appear to constitute more genuine liquidity, as the 
duration of canceled orders lengthens.  The reduction in order cancellation activity is associated 
with lower effective spreads and higher order fill rates.  We also find that differences in trading 
venues and option characteristics are important determinants of order cancellations in options 
markets.  Overall, our results suggest that reducing excessive order cancellation activity may 
improve the quality of liquidity provision and, consequently, enhance order execution quality.  In 
Part 2, we examine if the priority rules, such as price-time or pro-rata, which govern the order 
matching process on an exchange, affect limit order quality and transaction outcomes.  Our 
multivariate tests show that the probability of execution is higher in the price-time model, while 
time-to-execution is significantly shorter in the pro-rata model.  We also provide evidence that 
traders risk overtrading in the pro-rata model by submitting large order sizes to achieve a desire 
fill amount and then cancel the remaining contracts.  In Part 3, we examine the impact of option 
quote stuffing and trading spikes on market quality.  We find that quote stuffing and trading spikes 
in U.S. equity options are more frequently observed on exchanges using price-time priority, 
relative to exchanges using pro-rata priority.  Our multivariate analysis shows that quote stuffing 
reduces the probability of execution and lengthens the time-to-execution on option orders.  We 
also find that both quote stuffing and trading spikes are associated with transitory frictions in 
option order execution prices.  In addition, we find that bid-ask spreads in the underlying securities 
increase, with a one-minute lag, around option quote stuffing episodes.  Overall, our analysis 
provides evidence that quote stuffing and trade spikes reduce both liquidity and order execution 
quality in securities markets. 
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PART 1: ORDER CANCELLATIONS FEES, AND EXECUTION QUALITY IN U.S. EQUITY 
OPTIONS
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PART 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Limit orders play a pivotal role in both equities and options markets (Berkman, 1996 and 
Chung, Van Ness, and Van Ness, 1999).  The traditional view is that limit order traders patiently 
supply liquidity (Seppi, 1997 and Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel, 2005).  This perspective often 
characterizes limit order traders as functional equivalents to dealers, who are modeled as risk-
neutral liquidity providers, and are indifferent as to whether or not their orders execute.1  
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) question this view of limit order traders as patient providers of 
liquidity, as they find that nearly one-third of all nonmarketable limit orders in equity securities on 
NASDAQ are canceled within two seconds of submission.2  Excessive order cancellation activity 
also occurs in options markets, as the quotes for SPY options exceeded one billion on June 5, 2013, 
nearly 15 times greater than on the day of the flash crash, with a quote-to-trade ratio of 11,254.3         
 Technology has changed financial markets, altering the behavior of limit order traders.4  
High-speed computerized trading strategies, and electronic order-driven trading platforms, enable 
limit order traders to better monitor their orders and make faster, more accurate decisions.5  
                                                          
1 See Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Easley and O’Hara (1987) for the modeling of 
dealers as risk-neutral traders subject to adverse selection.  Glosten (1994) and Sandas (2001) model limit order books 
in a similar fashion.   
2 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) documents that over 96 percent of orders placed in the equities 
market in the second quarter of 2013 are canceled (See “Trade to Order Volume Ratios” market structure research 
from the U.S. SEC released on October 9, 2013).   
3 See the research analysis posted by Nanex, LLC at http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4308.html  
4 See O’Hara (2015) for a discussion on how technology has changed financial markets and Boehmer, Saar, and Yu 
(2005) for a review of the literature on the evolution of limit order trading strategies.     
5 See Goldstein, Kumar, and Graves (2014) for a brief overview of the evolution of computerized trading.  
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Trading in financial markets has entered the nanosecond age, where liquidity is added and 
subtracted in billionths of a second.  The increase in trading speed coincides with an explosion in 
order cancellation activity (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009, 2013).6  Therefore, technology and 
computerized trading has ultimately changed the way liquidity is supplied and demanded, raising 
concerns about the effect of excessive order cancellations on the trading welfare of market 
participants.  
 The issue of traders who cancel a lot of their orders has drawn significant attention from 
the popular press, regulators, and exchange officials, each of whom propose potential solutions.  
For instance, former U.S. Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton proposes a tax on 
high-frequency trading (HFT), targeting securities transactions with excessive levels of order 
cancellations, under the presumption that such trading strategies are abusive and detrimental to 
financial markets.7  In response to the flash crash on May 6, 2010, the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) and the U.S. SEC recommend a uniform fee across all exchanges to fairly 
allocate the costs imposed by high levels of order cancellations.8 Exchange officials also believe 
that curbing excessive order cancellations will improve trading for their market participants.  For 
example, The NASDAQ proposed a “minimum life” order type on the NASDAQ OMX PSX 
(PSX) equities exchange, with the intent on encouraging longer-lived limit orders (Jones, 2013).  
In the purpose section of the proposed rule change (see SEC Release No. 34-65610), the exchange 
states:  
                                                          
6 Wall Street’s Need for Trading Speed: The Nanosecond Age.  The Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2011.  
7 The HFT-specific aspects of the broad proposals for the financial system provided by Hillary Clinton in an op-ed 
piece in The New York Times on December 7, 2015 entitled, “How I’d Rein in Wall Street.”   
8 Recommendations Regarding Regulatory Responses to the Market Events of May 6, 2010: Summary Report of the 
Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues, page 11.  
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“Today’s cash equities markets are characterized by high levels of automation and speed… 
In such an environment, the degree to which displayed orders reflect committed trading 
sentiment has become less predictable, because many entered orders are rapidly canceled.  
Market participants that seek to interact with orders that are canceled before they can 
execute may ultimately achieve less favorable executions than would have been the case if 
the order had not canceled.” 
 The primary purpose of this study is to examine the effect of an order cancellation fee on 
the NASDAQ OMX PHLX (PHLX) on limit order trading and execution quality.  Since the PHLX 
is one of few U.S. exchanges to enforce an order cancellation fee, our analysis has important policy 
implications.  To the extent the rule change improves execution quality, then competing options 
exchanges with similar market structures may consider enforcing an order cancellation fee.  
However, if the rule change is associated with deteriorating execution quality, then our results 
might discourage trading venues from adopting a cancellation fee.  Since trading in options is 
shown to contribute to price discovery in the underlying equities markets, the results of this paper 
may also apply to equities.9  
 On August 18, 2010, the PHLX filed a proposal with the U.S. SEC to assess a cancellation 
fee on electronically delivered all-or-none (AON) orders submitted by professional traders.  The 
purpose and statutory section of the rule filing (see SEC Release No. 34-62744, page 2) states: 
“The Exchange has observed that the number of canceled professional AON orders greatly 
exceeds the normal order cancellation activity on the Exchange for all other order types, 
and thus affects the automated order handling capacity of the Exchange’s systems… The 
Exchange believes that the proposed amendments are reasonable because they will ease 
                                                          
9 See Manaster and Rendleman (1982), Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), and Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew 
(2004) for a review of the finance literature on informed trading in stock and option markets.   
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system congestion and allow the Exchange to recover costs associated with excessive order 
cancellation activity.” 
 The change in fee policy serves as a natural environment to test our research questions.  
First, we examine the overall effectiveness of an order cancellation fee in reducing the level of 
cancellation activity on the PHLX.  In our difference-in-difference regressions, we find that that 
the average order cancellation rate declines by 26 percentage points more on the PHLX than on 
the NOM from the pre-fee period to the post-fee period.  The cancellation fee is associated with 
decreased order volume on the PHLX, however, the displayed limit orders that remain on the book 
appear to constitute more genuine liquidity (Friedrich and Payne, 2015).  For instance, we find that 
the order cancellation fee increases the duration, or time between order submission and 
cancellation, of resting limit orders.  Therefore, market participants might be less concerned with 
“fake depth,” as orders appear less likely to disappear before they are traded against (Angel, 2014).  
The increase in firm orders on the PHLX book seems to improve several aspects of execution 
quality.    
   The probability of order execution is 16.3 percentage points higher on the PHLX that on 
the Nasdaq Options Market (NOM) in the post-fee period, relative to the pre-fee period.10  
Therefore, limit order traders face less non-execution risk (Liu, 2009), which might increase their 
end-of-period wealth (Colliard and Foucault, 2012).  Holding constant known determinants of 
trading costs, we find that effective spreads are 20 bps lower on the PHLX following the 
implementation of the cancellation fee, which suggests that reducing excessive order cancellation 
activity improves execution quality by lowering transaction costs.  We also examine the relation 
                                                          
10 In Table A.2 we separate order volume into marketable and nonmarketable.  Consistent with Battalio, Corwin, and 
Jennings (2016), we find that the improvement in order fill rates is at least partially attributable to an increase in the 
arrival rate of marketable orders.   
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between cancellation activity and order fill speeds. In our difference in difference analysis, we do 
not find significant evidence that the change in cancellation fee significantly impacts order 
execution speeds.   
 In the last section of this paper, we attempt to identify the determinants of order 
cancellations in options markets.  Specifically, we study how order cancellation activity varies by 
option type (call or put), option moneyness, time-to-expiration, and across trading venues.  We 
find that order cancellation rates are 1.84 percentage points higher for put options, relative to call 
options.  We also show that order cancellation rates increase as an option becomes more in-the-
money.  Order cancellation activity is significantly higher on option expiration days than on non-
expiration days.   Interestingly, the probability of an order cancellation is roughly 32 percentage 
points lower on the PHLX, relative to the NOM.  This differential in order cancellations can be 
partially explained by the differences in order volume, order size, and order duration.  
 Policy-makers and exchange officials seem to believe that there must be something 
duplicitous in the submission of numerous orders that are almost immediately canceled (see 
Friederich and Payne, 2015).  Since exchange officials in both options and equities markets are 
addressing the problems associated with excessive limit order cancellations, our study has 
important policy implications.  The benefits of reducing excessive order cancellation activity on 
the PHLX seem to outweigh the costs, in terms of order execution quality.           
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PHLX ORDER CANCELLATION FEE POLICY 
 Effective August 18, 2010, the PHLX updated its cancellation fee policy to include a $1.10 
per order charge on each canceled electronically delivered all-or-none (AON) order submitted by 
a professional trader, in excess of the total number of orders submitted and executed by the 
“professional” in a given month.11  The order cancellation fee is only assessed in a month in which 
more than 500 electronically delivered orders are submitted and canceled by the same professional.  
The term professional refers to any person or entity that (1) is not a broker or dealer, and (2) 
submits more than 390 orders in listed options per day on average during a calendar month.  An 
AON order is a limit order that executes in entirety or not at all.   Electronic orders are delivered 
through the Exchange’s options trading platform.  The rule change applies to professional order 
flow only, however, the implications of such a fee change can affect all market participants on the 
exchange, as professionals both supply and demand liquidity in significant volume. 
 Since the majority of price changes on an exchange are made on monthly intervals, it is a 
rare occurrence for a fee change to publish and become effective mid-month.  The data seems to 
suggest that the “true” effective date was closer to the end of August, 2010. It could be that firms 
simply assumed that the change would go into effect the following month, similar to other price 
changes.  Alternatively, the exchange calculates the 500 order threshold in a particular calendar 
month and then assesses the per order fee.  Therefore, the fees for August would not be calculated 
                                                          
11 See the NASDAQ Options Trader Alert #2010 – 53 for a more detailed description of the updates to the cancellation 
fee assessment criteria effective August 18, 2010.  See also the SEC Release No. 34-62744 for the notice of filing and 
immediate effectiveness of the proposed rule change relating to the cancellation fee.   
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until the end of the month, which could have possibly delayed the reaction of traders to the new 
pricing policy.  We use August 30th, 2010 as the effective date in our pre-versus-post analyses.    
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HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 Limit orders play an important role in establishing the national best bid and offer in 
financial markets.  Chung, Van Ness, and Van Ness (1999) examine the role of limit orders in 
equities on the NYSE in the 1990’s when the market had both specialists and limit-order traders 
establishing prices, and find that a majority of the quotes that make up the NBBO originate from 
the limit order book.  The conventional view of limit order traders, is that they patiently supply 
liquidity (see Seppi, 1997 and Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel, 2005).  Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel 
develop a dynamic model of a limit order market, and show that in equilibrium, patient traders 
submit limit orders while impatient traders submit marketable orders. 
 However, a feature of modern equity markets is that submitting orders and quickly 
canceling those orders is common and frequent.  For instance, Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) 
investigate trading of 100 NASDAQ-listed equity securities on its INET platform, an electronic 
communications network organized as a limit order book, and find that over 35% of limit orders 
are canceled within two seconds of submission.  Hasbrouck and Saar find that traders implement 
“fleeting order” strategies to chase market prices or to search for latent liquidity.12  Ellul, Holden, 
Jain, and Jennings (2007) analyze a sample of NYSE securities during January of 2001, and 
document that over one-third of all order submissions are eventually canceled prior to execution.  
Van Ness, Van Ness, and Watson (2015) provide a time-trend analysis of cancellation activity in 
                                                          
12 Baruch and Glosten (2013) also examine fleeting orders, orders that are submitted and canceled within two seconds, 
and find that traders manage the risk of getting undercut while sitting on the limit order book by quickly canceling 
their limit orders.     
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the equity markets and find that order cancellation rates are increasing over time, starting at 35% 
in 2001, and reaching around 90% in 2010.       
 Liu (2009) contends that advancements in technology, and the transition of exchanges to 
electronic trading venues are convenient explanations for the high level of cancellation rates in the 
current marketplace (see also Goldstein, Kumar, and Graves, 2014).  In fact, Boehmer, Saar and 
Yu (2005) show that cancellation activity increases following the introduction of NYSE 
OpenBook, which lowered trading latency.  There are also more nefarious explanations for the 
excessive order cancellation rates observed in financial markets.  For example, there is evidence 
of order spoofing, in which large limit orders are entered far away from the bid-ask to create an 
illusion of demand, and are subsequently canceled.13  Lee, Eom, and Park (2013) show that traders 
in the Korea Exchange (KRX) strategically place orders with little chance of execution with the 
intent on misleading other market participants into thinking an order book imbalance exists, and 
capitalizing on subsequent price movements.  
 Order execution quality is important for all market participants.  Since limit orders impact 
both the supply of and demand for liquidity (see Chung, Van Ness, and Van Ness, 1999), it is 
important to understand the effect of order cancellation activity on execution quality.   
 Canceling limit orders does not necessarily have adverse effects on order execution quality.  
In fact, limit order traders mitigate non-execution risk by quickly canceling their orders and 
resubmitting new orders at prevailing bid and ask quotes (Liu, 2009).  In addition, market makers 
must continuously offer to buy and sell securities, which requires close monitoring of their 
inventory positions.  In current high-speed markets, high cancellation rates might simply be a result 
                                                          
13 Navinder Singh Sarao was imprisoned in 2010 for creating a spoofing algorithm trading E-mini S&P 500 future 
contracts, suspiciously close to the May 6, 2010 flash crash.  The day-trader allegedly canceled more than 99 percent 
of orders being submitted.  In addition, on October 8, 2015 the Securities Exchange Commission (Sec) settled spoofing 
charges with Briargate Trading for over $1 million.       
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of the way the liquidity provision game is played (Baruch and Glosten, 2013).  Suppose that a 
market maker places an order to buy 100 shares for ACME common stock for $49.99, and 
contemporaneously places a sell order for 100 shares for the same stock at $50.01.  If someone 
decides to buy 100 shares at $50.01, then the market maker will cancel the sell order at $49.99 and 
enter a new buy order at $50.00 and a new sell order at $50.02.  Again, if someone decides to buy 
100 shares at $50.02, then the market maker will cancel the sell order at $50.00 and adjust it 
upward.  This simple example generates an order strategy whereby 50% of the orders are canceled 
without ever executing.  However, since limit orders are being canceled and resubmitted in 
response to shifts in supply and demand, there is no reason to believe that this strategy is harmful 
to execution quality.    
 If, however, order cancellations reduce the supply of liquidity, as is the case when orders 
are canceled and not resubmitted, then cancellation activity may have a negative impact on 
execution quality.  Market participants who seek to interact with orders that are canceled before 
their order arrives, may achieve less favorable executions.  Yeo (2005) examines the set of actions 
available to limit order traders following an order cancellation: complete withdrawal, resubmission 
of a marketable order, or resubmission of a more aggressive limit order.  Yeo (2005) finds that in 
most cases, limit order traders completely withdraw from trading after canceling a limit order, 
thereby reducing liquidity provisions.  Thus, it is not surprising that the issue of traders who cancel 
a lot of their orders has received significant attention and debate.  Regulatory agencies, such as the 
U.S. SEC, recommend a minimum duration on limit orders and/or fees on order cancellations.14  
                                                          
14 See page 47 of the January 14, 2010 SEC CFTC Concept Release on Equity Market Structure.  SEC and CFTC 
report on February 18, 2011, a discussion about a uniform cancellation fee across all exchange markets.  See also SEC 
May Ticket Speeding Traders: High-Frequency Firms Face Fees on Canceled Transactions. The Wall Street Journal, 
February 23, 2012.   
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For example, former U.S. SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro in an address given on September 7, 
2010, states: 
“A type of trading practice that has received recent attention involves submitting large 
volumes of orders into the markets, most of which are canceled…  There may, of course, 
be justifiable explanations for many canceled orders to reflect changing market 
conditions… But we also must understand the impact this activity has on price discovery, 
capital formation and the capital markets more generally, and consider whether additional 
steps such as registration and trading requirements are needed to foster – not undermine 
– fair and orderly markets.” 15   
 Exchange officials on the PHLX acknowledge the costs associated with excessive order 
cancellations.  Consequently, the exchange enforces an order cancellation fee to help monitor 
trading practices with high levels of order submissions and cancellations.16  The primary purpose 
of the cancellation fee is to reduce the number of canceled orders and improve the trading 
environment for all market participants.  A cancellation fee might discourage traders from 
implementing aggressive price-chasing order strategies that require numerous order revisions (see 
Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009).  If so, the rate at which orders are canceled might decline and displayed 
limit orders might remain standing on the order book for a longer period of time. We begin by 
examining whether the enforcement of a cancellation fee reduces order cancellation activity on the 
PHLX exchange.   
Hypothesis 1a: The probability of order cancellation is lower with the enforcement of a 
cancellation fee policy on the PHLX. 
                                                          
15 Speech by SEC Chairman: “Strengthening Our Equity Market Structure” by Mary L. Schapiro on September 7, 
2010. 
16 On the CHX, a $0.01 per order cancellation fee is assessed if a trader surpasses set criteria laid out in the fee 
schedule. 
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 Traders can be made better off ex ante if the order cancellation fee increases the probability 
of completing a trade, as the welfare of traders depends on the non-execution risk faced by liquidity 
suppliers (Colliard and Foucault, 2012).  Since limit orders are stored in the order book and do not 
demand immediacy, the execution of a limit order is not guaranteed (Hollifield, Miller, and Sandas, 
1996; Foucault, 1999; and Peterson and Sirri, 2002).  The probability that an order is filled may 
depend on a number of factors including prevailing market conditions, stock characteristics, and 
exchange fee structures (see Colliard and Foucault, 2012 and Brolley and Malinova, 2013).  
Battalio, Corwin, and Jennings (2016) document that take fees, which are assessed on marketable 
orders accessing liquidity, can reduce the arrival rate of marketable orders and, consequently, 
negatively affect order execution quality.  In contrast, a cancellation fee might induce liquidity 
suppliers to post ‘firm’ orders (Angel, 2014), giving traders more confidence in the displayed 
depth, which can increase marketable order arrival rates.  Since order fill rates depend on the arrival 
of marketable orders and the stock of standing limit orders, and we anticipate, a priori, an increase 
in marketable orders and an increase in ‘firm’ limit orders post cancellation fee, we expect the 
following hypothesis to hold.   
Hypothesis 1b: The probability of order execution is higher with the enforcement of a 
cancellation fee policy on the PHLX.  
 Limit orders are not only exposed to the risk of non-execution, but also to the uncertainty 
in time-to-execution.  Speed of order execution has grown in importance since the proliferation of 
automated and computerized trading (see Boehmer, 2005).  In fact, Boehmer, Jennings, and Wei 
(2007) show that exchanges receive more order flow when execution speeds increase.  Time-to-
execution is a random function of several variables including order price, order size, and market 
conditions (Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang, 2002).   
14 
 
 We examine if a cancellation fee impacts time-to-completion.  Prior to the fee change, 
traders could cancel innumerous orders without penalty.  Hence, many submitted orders may lack 
committed trading sentiment.  In fact, traders have been shown to intentionally flood markets with 
order submissions and cancellations in an attempt to create arbitrage opportunities (Egginton, Van 
Ness, and Van Ness, 2015; and Biais and Woolley, 2011).  For example, the NASDAQ disciplined 
Citadel Securities LLC on June 16, 2014 for sending millions of orders to the exchange with few 
or no executions.17   
 A cancellation fee might encourage traders to display orders that reflect committed trading 
sentiment, because there is a potential cost associated with submitting frivolous orders.  
Consequently, traders may be more willing to submit marketable orders, quickening the speed with 
which a liquidity-supplying trader finds a ready counterparty (Battalio, Corwin, and Jennings, 
2016), which motivates our second testable hypothesis.   
Hypothesis 2: Order fill speeds are faster following the enforcement of the cancellation fee 
policy.   
 Features unique to the options market give rise to several interesting questions with regards 
to order cancellations.  First, options are negotiable contracts in which investors have the right, but 
not the obligation, to trade securities at a predetermined price, within a certain period of time.  A 
call option gives the buyer the option to purchase, while a put option gives the buyer the option to 
sell.  In this study, we examine if cancellation activity differs between puts and calls.  
 Trading volume for equity options is generally higher for calls, relative to puts (see Pan 
and Poteshman, 2006).  In fact, the average put/call ratio for equity options volume on the PHLX 
                                                          
17 See the letter of acceptance, waiver and consent no. 20100223345-02 posted on June 16, 2014, page 6.  On February 
13, 2014 between 13:32:53:029 and 13:33:00:998 Citadel transmitted over 65,000 orders for 100 shares per order to 
buy Penn National Gaming, Inc. with zero executions.   
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has historically remained below one.18  Biais and Weill (2009) develop a model showing that as 
the market approaches continuous trading, order cancellations increase monotonically.  Therefore, 
as trading volume increases, so does order cancellation activity.  Since trading volume is typically 
higher for calls than for puts, we might expect cancellation rates to be higher for calls compared 
to puts.          
 On the contrary, research also shows that trading costs, approximated by bid-ask spreads, 
are higher for call options than for put options.  For instance, Battalio, Shkilko, and Van Ness 
(2016) find that effective spreads are higher for call options than for put options, in an analysis of 
eight option exchanges.  Liu (2009) develops a model that predicts a negative relation between 
cancellation activity and spreads.  Liu argues that as spreads widen, the marginal benefit of 
monitoring limit orders declines, thereby decreasing cancellation activity.  To the extent that 
spreads are higher for calls than for puts, and spreads are inversely related with cancellation 
activity, we expect order cancellation rates to be higher for puts than for calls.  This leads to our 
third testable hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3: Cancellation rates are higher for put options, relative to call options.   
 Second, the value of an option contract if it were exercised immediately (i.e. intrinsic value) 
is often determined by the difference between the underlying stock price and the option strike 
price.  Option contracts are often separated into moneyness categories: at-the-money, in-the-
money, and out-of-the-money.  If the strike price for a call option is less (greater) than the 
underlying stock price, then the option is in-the-money (out-of-the-money).  The opposite is true 
for put options.  If the strike price is equal to the underlying stock price, then the option is at-the-
money.  In this study, we examine how cancellation activity differs by option moneyness.   
                                                          
18 Historical options data, including put-call ratios, for each option exchange are available at the following website: 
http://www.optionsclearing.com/webapps/put-call-ratio   
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 Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, and Poteshman (2007) show that open volume in equity options, 
for both puts and calls, is concentrated in near-the-money options.  In addition, volatility is shown 
to increase as options becomes more in-the-money (Rubinstein, 1994 and Jackwerth and 
Rubinstein, 1996).  Since both trading volume and volatility are shown to have positive relations 
with order cancellation activity (see Biais and Weill, 2009 and Van Ness, Van Ness, and Watson, 
2015), and option volume and volatility are greater for in-the-money options, we expect order 
cancellation rates to be higher for in-the-money options, relative to out-of-the-money options.  This 
leads to our fourth testable hypothesis.     
Hypothesis 4: Order cancellation rates are higher for options in-the-money, relative to 
options out-of-the-money.     
 Third, equity option contracts expire on the third Friday of every month.  Research shows 
that both trading volume and volatility increase on and around option expiration days (see Stoll 
and Whaley, 1987 and Stephan and Whaley, 1990).  For example, Day and Lewis (1988) provide 
evidence that market volatility is increasing around expiration days in index futures contracts.  
Large (2004) predicts a positive relation between order cancellation activity and market 
uncertainty.  Since market volatility is increasing, it seems reasonable to assume that market 
uncertainty is also increasing.  Therefore, we might expect to find an influx of canceled orders on 
option expiration days, as traders are less certain about the committed trading sentiment of 
displayed orders.     
 In addition, arbitrageurs and market makers often unwind positions around expiration days, 
forcing them to submit and cancel a large amount of orders as they move in and out of positions 
(see Ni, Pearson, and Poteshman, 2005).  As option traders attempt to rebalance, a natural 
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consequence might be an increase in both limit order submissions and cancellations.  Therefore, 
we expect the following hypothesis to hold.      
Hypothesis 5: Order cancellation rates are higher on expiration days, relative to non-
expiration days. 
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DATA DESCRIPTION 
 The NASDAQ OMX PHLX market data feed provides the current state of simple and 
complex orders on the PHLX book.  This includes nanosecond information on orders added and 
changes made to orders to option series on the PHLX limit order book.19 The PHLX reports a 
simple order message when a single order is received or any change is made to an order.  “Simple 
order” messages include the following fields: nanosecond time stamp, day-unique order id, market 
side (buy or sell), underlying security symbol, expiration date, explicit strike price, option type 
(call or put), original order volume, executable order volume (can increase or decrease as the size 
available for trading changes due to away exchange routing), order status (open, filled, or 
canceled), limit price, time in force (day order or good till canceled), and customer/firm identifier 
(customer, firm, market maker, broker/dealer, or professional).  We eliminate orders reported 
before 9:45 a.m. and after 3:50 p.m. from our sample because the opening and closing rotations 
impede option series from trading freely.  Complex orders, such as spreads and straddles, are priced 
as a package, so we remove them from the sample.    
 In an attempt to control for unobserved macroeconomic trends that might affect order 
behavior and execution quality, we obtain order level data for a competing exchange, the 
NASDAQ Options Market (NOM).  The NASDAQ Historical TotalView-ITCH to Trade Options 
(ITTO) is a direct data feed that provides millisecond view of simple equity options on the 
NASDAQ Options Exchange (NOM).  This includes orders added and changes made to orders 
                                                          
19 An option series is defined as a particular underlying stock, call or put, strike price, and expiration date. 
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resting on the NOM limit order book.  We download several different types of messages that are 
linked by a unique order reference number.  “Add order” messages are time stamped records for 
new orders added to the book, including order time (stamped to the millisecond), market side (buy 
or sell), order size (# of contracts), option type (call or put), expiration date, explicit strike price, 
and order price.  “Executed order” modification messages are time stamped records generated by 
(partial) executions and report executed contracts and execution price (when the execution price 
differs from the add order price).20  “Order cancel” messages are time stamped records generated 
by partial cancellations and report the number of contracts canceled.  “Replace” messages are time 
stamped records that report the new order reference number, new order price, and new order size.  
“Delete” messages are time stamped records that report when an order is deleted from the NOM 
order book. 
 We focus on a 56-day sample period from July 26, 2010 to October 15, 2010. The initial 
sample consists of 2,249 option classes and 139,525 option series. 21  To concentrate on the most 
active options, we exclude classes with less than one filled order each day, which reduces the 
sample to 296 option classes and 53,495 option series.  We then exclude option series with fewer 
than five orders in a day, which reduces the sample to 25,727 option series on 296 underlying 
assets.  We merge these data with closing prices and shares outstanding from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and retain options on common stocks and ETFs.  To ensure 
accurate comparisons among exchanges, we conduct a daily match between options series 
originating on the PHLX with those originating on the NOM by option series.   
                                                          
20 Since the analysis involves examining execution quality around extreme quote stuffing episodes and trade spikes, 
we ignore “trade” messages that report executions involving non-displayed order types.   
21 A single underlying stock will have both puts and calls with perhaps ten or more strike prices and five expiration 
dates, giving a total of 100 option series per stock.   
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 As part of the analysis investigates how an order cancellation fee affects execution quality, 
we obtain price and volume information on trades and on current bids and offers from a data 
technology company LiveVol.  Options exchanges report both trade and quote data to the Options 
Price Reporting Authority (OPRA) and LiveVol creates historical data files that include trade price 
and size, the exchange (eight trading venues during our sample period) where the trade prints, the 
NBBO quote and depth, the underlying bid and ask, implied volatility, and calculated delta.  We 
follow Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings (2004) and combine multiple executions in the same option 
series, executing on the same exchange at the same price at the same time with the same trade 
condition identifier into a single trade.  We also eliminate NBBOs that are either locked or crossed 
(see Battalio, Shkilko, and Van Ness, 2016).  After merging our order data with the OPRA files 
we are left with 8,908 unique option series on 133 underlying assets.  Due to data corruption issues 
in the OPRA feed, we drop August 13th, August 19th, and September 2nd.  We find that our final 
sample accounts for around 50% of total order volume on the PHLX over our sample time period.  
 Table 2 shows the distribution of trading activity among the eight option trading venues.  
The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) is the most dominant exchange, executing 23.5% 
of trades for 25.7% of trade volume.  The PHLX has the second highest market share, accounting 
for 25% of volume.  The sample exchanges, PHLX and NOM, execute roughly a quarter of all 
trades for just under 30% of trade volume.  In addition, we find that the 113 option classes (8,908 
option series) examined in this study account for 40% of all trade volume across the eight option 
exchanges during our sample period. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
ORDER CANCELLATIONS AND EXECUTION QUALITY 
 The costs associated with excessive order cancellations has forced exchange officials to 
take corrective action.  Hence, the primary purpose of the cancellation fee policy on the PHLX is 
to discourage traders from submitting frivolous orders that are immediately canceled.  The 
exchange anticipates that the removal of excessive order cancellations will improve the trading 
process for all market participants (see SEC Release No. 34-62744).  In this section, we examine 
the effectiveness of the cancellation fee policy in both deterring excessive order cancellations and 
improving execution quality for market participants.  We focus on a 55-day event window, the 23 
days before the adjusted effective date (August 30, 2010) and the 32 days after.     
 To determine if a cancellation fee deters traders from canceling orders, we estimate order 
cancel rates as the number of orders canceled divided by the total number of orders added to the 
book.  Figure 1 provides a visual representation of how the order cancellation fee on the PHLX 
impacts cancellation activity.  We plot average cancellation rates on the PHLX (solid dark line) 
and the NOM (dotted light line) in event time.  We show that average order cancellation rates for 
options on the PHLX decline substantially around the fee change, and remain at a lower rate in the 
32 days following the effective date.22  In contrast, the average order cancellation rate on the NOM 
has no distinct pattern over the sample time period.  
                                                          
22 Table A.1 reports average market quality measures in event time for the 10 days before and after the cancellation 
fee was introduced on the PHLX.     
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 Table 3 shows that the average order cancellation rate on the PHLX prior to the fee is 
73.64%, which decreases to 62.31% following the fee.  The decrease in order cancellation rates is 
significant at the 0.01 level and economically meaningful as it represents a 15% decline.  Over the 
same time period, the average order cancellation rate on the NOM remains constant at 99.7%.  
Therefore, the difference in average order cancellation rates between the PHLX and the NOM 
increases from 26.05% in the pre-event period to 37.38% in the post-event period.  The order 
cancellation fee appears effective in removing a portion of limit orders that do not constitute 
genuine liquidity (see Angel, 2014) and provides support for our first hypothesis, which states that 
the probability of order cancellation is lower following the implementation of a cancellation fee 
on the PHLX.     
 Similar to Hasbrouck and Saar (2001) and Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang (2002), we estimate 
the duration between when an order is submitted and subsequently canceled.  Market participants 
complain about “phantom liquidity” in which liquidity disappears when they attempt to trade 
against it (Angel, 2014).  Traders may be unable to distinguish between a “firm” quote that can be 
traded upon and a “fake” quote.  An order cancellation fee should discourage traders from 
submitting frivolous orders and, therefore, increase the duration between order submission and 
cancellation.  Figure 2 shows that order duration increases substantially around the enforcement 
of a cancellation fee on the PHLX.  Specifically, Table 3 reports that the average number of 
seconds between order submission and cancellation on the PHLX increases from 683 in the pre-
fee period to 891 in the post-fee period.  This difference of 208 seconds is significant at the 0.01 
level, and represents a 30.5% increase.  In contrast, the duration of orders on the NOM increase 
by only 10.6% from the pre-fee period to the post-fee period.  Thus, limit order traders appear to 
be more patient when supplying liquidity in the post-fee trading environment. 
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 Next, we examine what happens to overall order flow following the enforcement of a 
cancellation fee by the PHLX.  Table 3 shows that the average daily number of orders submitted 
for an option series decreases from 483 in the pre-fee period to 163 in the post-fee period, a decline 
of over 66%.  We also find a significant decline in order volume on the NOM over the sample 
period.  However, Figure 3 shows that the decline in order volume on the PHLX is more abrupt 
around the change in fee policy, whereas the decline in order volume on the NOM is more gradual 
over the sample period.  We note that during the sample period, the NOM is a pure order-driven 
market, where all participants trade in limit orders.  This includes quotations entered by market 
makers.  In comparison, the PHLX is both quote driven and order driven.  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that we find such a large difference in order volume, in terms of number of orders, 
between the two exchanges.  We control for this difference in order volume between the two 
exchanges in our multivariate tests.  
 Order volume does not appear to move from the PHLX to the NOM following the 
cancellation fee change.  In fact, there appears to be more of a contagion effect, likely due to the 
fact the two venues operate under the NASDAQ OMX Group.  The change in cancellation fee 
might cause some market participants to route their order flow to exchanges away from the 
NASDAQ entirely.   
 Since the order cancellation fee on the PHLX appears to impact the behavior of limit order 
traders, it might also impact the execution quality of orders.  Similar to Foucault (1999), we 
estimate the likelihood of complete execution using daily fill rates, or the ratio of the number of 
orders filled divided by the total number of orders submitted for an option series.  Table 3 shows 
that the average order fill rate on the PHLX increases by 8.57 percentage points from the pre-fee 
period to the post-fee period.  In comparison, the average fill rate for orders that execute on the 
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NOM does not significantly change over the sample period.  Specifically, in the pre-fee period we 
find that the mean fill rate for orders on the PHLX is 16.6%, compared to 0.3% on the NOM.  In 
the post-fee period, the average fill rate for orders on the PHLX is 25.16%, relative to 0.29% for 
orders on the NOM.  We find that these differences are significant at the 0.01 level and suggest 
that the order cancellation fee is associated with a significant increase in the probability of 
execution on the PHLX.  
 Figure 4 plots average fill rates on the PHLX (solid dark line) and NOM (dotted light line) 
over the sample period.  We show that order fill rates on the PHLX increase substantially around 
the introduction of the order cancellation fee and remain elevated in the 32 days after.  This 
indicates that the cancellation fee has a positive long-term effect on order fill rates.  Thus, the 
reduction in order cancellation activity leads to an improvement in one of the most important areas 
of execution quality (see Battalio, Corwin and Jennings, 2015), the probability of execution, which 
provides support our first hypothesis that the probability of order execution is higher with the 
enforcement of a cancellation fee on the PHLX.          
 We also examine how limit order fill speeds change around the introduction of the order 
cancellation fee on the PHLX.  Figure 5 plots average order fill speeds in event time for orders 
that execute on the PHLX (solid dark line) and NOM (dotted light line).  Unlike our previous 
measures, there does not appear to be a clear jump in fill speeds around the event date.  In fact, 
Table 3 reports that the average order fill speed on the PHLX increases from 1,026 seconds in the 
pre-fee period to 1,016 seconds in the post-fee period.  However, this difference of 10.2 seconds 
is not significant.  Similar to the PHLX, we do not find a significant change in average order fill 
speeds on the NOM over the sample period.  Therefore, our univariate tests lead us to reject our 
second hypothesis that fill speeds are faster post-cancellation fee.             
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 An important aspect of execution quality is the estimated transaction cost of a trade, which 
we measure using percentage effective spreads, or twice the absolute difference between the trade 
price and the execution time NBBO midpoint divided by the midpoint (see Battalio, Shkilko, and 
Van Ness, 2016).  Table 3 shows that the average percentage effective spread on the PHLX 
decreases from 0.043 in the pre-fee period to 0.039 in the post-fee period.  This decline of 40 bps 
is significant at the 0.01 level.  Our difference-in-difference shows a marginal decrease in 
transaction costs on the PHLX after the introduction of a cancellation fee.  Liu (2009) argues that 
patient liquidity traders reduce the risk of being picked off by widening bid-ask spreads.  
Therefore, one interpretation of our results is that limit order traders’ risk appears to be less in the 
post-fee trading environment. 
 We also examine average trading volume around the enforcement of a cancellation fee by 
the PHLX.  Consistent with the notion that traders are more confident in the displayed limit orders 
post cancellation fee, we find a significant increase in the number of trades on the PHLX.  Table 
3 shows that the average daily number of trades for an option on the PHLX increases from 13.51 
in the pre-fee period to 17.14 in the post-fee period.  However, we find a similar increase in trading 
volume on the NOM.  Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that trading volume is simply 
increasing across all exchanges over the sample period.23       
 Overall, the results from these univariate tests suggest that the enforcement of a 
cancellation fee is effective in reducing cancellation rates and lengthening the amount of time a 
displayed order rests on the book.  In addition, the cancellation fee is associated with an increase 
in the probability of a complete order execution and a decrease in average trading costs.  Our 
results show that order volume is declining over the sample period, while trading volume is 
                                                          
23 In unreported tests, we use OPRA data and find that trading volume is in fact increasing for all exchanges over the 
sample period.   
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increasing.  Therefore, it appears that the order cancellation fee is effective in reducing the number 
of “noise” orders submitted to the PHLX.   
 We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to control for other macroeconomic and firm-
specific factors that could affect order behavior and execution quality.  We analyze three order 
behavior dependent variables (order cancel rates, order duration, and # of orders) and four 
execution quality dependent variables (order fill rates, order fill speeds, % effective spreads, and 
# of trades).  We contend that the relevant regressors are option and stock attributes, order 
characteristics, and venue traits (see Battalio, Corwin, and Jennings, 2015; and Battalio, Shkilko, 
and Van Ness, 2016).  The unit of measurement is option series/day and the general specification 
for our models is outlined as follows: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑇𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆/𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖
+ 𝛽10𝑈𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑂 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
(1) 
where Post equals one during the 33-day post cancellation fee period and zero otherwise; Penny 
equals one if the option is traded and quoted in pennies and zero otherwise; ETF equals one if the 
option class is an ETF and zero if it is a common stock; Expiration equals one if the order is 
submitted on an expiration Friday (August 20, September 17, and October 15) and zero otherwise; 
Price is the average NBBO midpoint; IVOL equals the option’s implied volatility at the time of 
the trade; Order Size equals the average order size; S/X equals the underlying stock price divided 
by the strike price; Call equals one for call options and zero for put options; UNBBO Midpoint 
equals the prevailing underlying asset’s NBBO midpoint at the time of the trade; Underlying 
Volume equals the underlying asset’s average daily share volume; and Underlying MCAP is the 
underlying asset’s average daily market capitalization, measured in $billions.  We also include 
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option class fixed effects, 𝜏𝑗, that control for unobservable asset characteristics.  We exclude the 
event date in our regression analysis and, therefore, we do not include a pre-event categorical 
variable as to avoid violating the full column rank assumption for consistent estimation.  We report 
t-statistics in parentheses obtained from standard errors clustered at the option class level.       
 Table 4 reports the results of estimating eq. (1).  Column [1] of Panel A shows that the 
average order cancellation rate for options on the PHLX is 10.9 percentage points (t-value = -
2.789) lower following the cancellation fee, other factors held constant.  When we estimate the 
model including option class fixed effects, we find that our results continue to hold.  For instance, 
the average order cancellation rate for an option on the PHLX decreases by 9.1 percentage points 
from the pre-fee period to the post-fee period.  These results are consistent with our univariate tests 
and support Hypothesis 1a, which states that an order cancellation fee will reduce cancellation 
rates.   
 Traders allow their orders to sit on the PHLX book for longer period of time before 
canceling them following the cancellation fee.  Columns [3] and [4] of Panel A show that the 
duration of canceled limit orders is between 163 and 192 seconds longer following the cancellation 
fee.  Therefore, the displayed limit orders in the post-fee period appear to be more static and less 
fleeting. 
 We also analyze the impact of the cancellation fee on order flow.  We find that the PHLX 
loses order volume around the enforcement of a cancellation fee.  The average number of orders 
for an option series decreases by at least 247 from the pre-fee period to the post-fee period, other 
factors held constant.  This decline is both significant and economically meaningful, as it 
represents approximately 50% of the pre-fee period average number of orders on the PHLX.  
Although we find a decrease in the number of orders added to the PHLX book following the 
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enforcement of a cancellation fee, it does not translate into fewer executions.  In fact, we find a 
significant increase in the number of trades on the PHLX post cancellation fee.  The average 
number of trades for an option series on the PHLX is between 3.4 and 3.9 higher in the post-fee 
period than the pre-fee period.           
 The reduction in order cancellation activity on the PHLX has a direct impact on the 
probability of completing an order.  Columns [1] and [2] of Panel B show that the average order 
fill rate on the PHLX is between 6.6 and 8.4 percentage point higher in the post-fee period, relative 
to the pre-fee period.  Thus, reducing order cancellations coincides with a significant improvement 
in execution probability.  To the extent that trader welfare depends on the non-execution risk faced 
by liquidity suppliers (Colliard and Foucault, 2012), our results suggest that reducing order 
cancellations makes limit order traders on the PHLX better off ex ante.  These results provide 
support for our first hypothesis, which states that order fill rates increase following the change in 
cancellation fee policy.       
 Next, we examine the impact of the cancellation fee on order fill speeds and trading costs.  
We fail to find support for Hypothesis 2, as average order fill speeds are not significantly different 
in the post-fee period, relative to the pre-fee period.  When we control for potential trading cost 
determinants, we find that effective spreads are between 20 and 30 bps lower on the PHLX in the 
post-fee period, relative to the pre-fee period.  The narrowing of effective spreads indicates that 
the order cancellation fee on the PHLX lowers execution costs for limit order traders.    
 To more accurately control for option characteristics and unobservable macroeconomic 
factors, we perform a daily match of option series between the PHLX and the NOM.  We then 
estimate a series of OLS regressions using a difference-in-difference approach.  The dependent 
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variables are the same as those used in eq. (1).  We estimate the following general model using the 
sample of option series trading on both the PHLX and the NOM.   
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑃ℎ𝑙𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃ℎ𝑙𝑥 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑇𝐹𝑖
+ 𝛽6𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆/𝑋𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑈𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑂 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽14𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
(2) 
where Phlx equals one if the order originated on the PHLX and zero for an order on the NOM.  
Post equals one if the order is submitted in the post-fee period and zero otherwise.  We exclude 
the event date in the analysis and, therefore, we do not include a pre-event dummy variable as to 
avoid violating the full column rank assumption for consistent OLS estimation.  The interaction 
term between Phlx and Post is our difference-in-difference test, which captures the marginal 
impact of the cancellation fee on order behavior and execution quality.  We include option class 
fixed effects and cluster standard errors by underlying asset. 
 Table 5 reports the results of estimating eq. (2).  Panel A shows that the average order 
cancellation rate declines by 26 percentage points more on the PHLX than on the NOM from the 
pre-fee period to the post-fee period.  After controlling for firm-specific factors and other 
macroeconomic trends, we continue to find support for Hypothesis 1a, which states that the 
probability of cancellation is lower on the PHLX following the implementation of a cancellation 
fee.   
 The cancellation fee has a strong marginal impact on order duration.  For instance, the time 
between order submission and cancellation is 600 seconds longer on the PHLX than on the NOM 
in the post-fee period, relative to the pre-fee period.  This decrease in average order cancellation 
speed provides support for the conjecture that limit orders are more “firm” post cancellation fee 
(Angel, 2014).  Even though the average number of orders submitted to the PHLX is significantly 
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lower post-fee, the remaining limit orders seem to better reflect committed trading sentiment.  The 
decline in professional order cancellations increases the likelihood of a complete order fill (16.3%) 
and decreases trading costs (20 bps).  Since we fail to find evidence of a marginal impact of 
declining order cancellations on fill speeds, we reject Hypothesis 2, which states the time-to-
complete fill is faster after the implementation of the cancellation fee on the PHLX.    
 The implications of our results are broad, as they suggest that the PHLX was able to 
improve order execution quality for its liquidity demanders by enforcing a fee on excessive order 
cancellations by professional traders.  Fewer limit orders are canceled, and displayed orders remain 
on the PHLX book for longer durations following the cancellation fee, which seems to improve 
the probability of execution and reduce trading costs.  The probability of completing a trade and 
the cost to transact are both in the SEC’s definition of order execution quality (see Battalio, 
Corwin, and Jennings, 2016).  Exchanges with similar market structures to that of the PHLX, might 
consider adopting an order cancellation fee.     
ORDER CANCELLATIONS AND OPTION CHARACTERISTICS 
 A noted feature of today’s equity markets, is that orders are submitted and then quickly 
canceled (see Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009 and Baruch and Glosten, 2013).  However, much less is 
known about order behavior in options markets, particularly order cancellation activity.  Therefore, 
in the following section we provide a more in-depth analysis of limit order cancellation activity in 
two equity options markets, the PHLX and the NOM.  To ensure that the following results are not 
biased due the structural change on the PHLX discussed above, we perform our tests using the 
time period, September 15, 2010 and October 15, 2010, to avoid the initial effects of the 
cancellation fee on the PHLX.  We can see from Figure 1 that the initial effects of the cancellation 
fee stabilize by mid-September. 
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 An important decision traders make each time they submit a limit order, is how long they 
allow that order to remain on the order book.  Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) show that nearly one 
third of limit orders on INET are canceled within two seconds of submission.  We examine the 
pattern of cancellation rates by the time elapsed between order submission and deletion.  Figure 6 
plots order cancellation rates on both the PHLX and the NOM against the time from order 
submission to cancellation.  For options on both exchanges, as more time passes following the 
submission of a limit order, the probability of cancellation declines.  We find a near monotonic 
decrease in cancellation rates as the time between order submission and cancellation lengthens.  
For instance, the probability of an order being canceled is highest, 86.69% (99.93%), when an 
order is sitting on the PHLX (NOM) order book for less than ten seconds.  The average cancellation 
rate for an option on the PHLX (NOM) reaches a minimum of 47.43% (94.91%) when the order 
sits on the book for more than 1,000 seconds, or 16½ minutes.   
 Table 6 reports mean order cancellation rates for options submitted to both the PHLX and 
the NOM disaggregated by time to cancellation.  In unreported results, we find similar patterns in 
the standard deviations of cancellation rates between the two exchanges.  There appears to be more 
dispersion in cancellation rates for options that sit on the book longer.  We find that as the time-
to-cancellation lengthens, the difference between order cancellation rates between the PHLX and 
the NOM increases.  Specifically, for orders that sit on the book for more than 1,000 seconds, we 
find that that the average cancellation rate is 47.49 percentage points lower on the PHLX, relative 
to the NOM.  This difference is significant at the 0.01 level.  In contrast, when an order is on the 
book for less than a second, the difference in cancellation rates between the two exchanges is only 
13.24 percentage points.       
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 Prior research highlights important differences between call options and put options, such 
as trading costs (Battalio, Shkilko, and Van Ness, 2016), open interest (Lakonishok et al. 2007), 
and trading volume (Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam, 2010).  In this section, we examine how 
order cancellation activity differs between calls and puts.  Panel A of Table 7 reports the results of 
our univariate tests on order cancellation rates between call options and put options.  The average 
order cancellation rate for call options on the PHLX is 60.23%, which is 5.6 percentage points less 
than for put options.  Similarly on the NOM, average order cancellation rates are higher for put 
options (99.75%), relative to call options (99.65%).  We find that the average cancellation rate for 
PHLX call options is significantly less than that for NOM call options (difference = 39.42%).  We 
also report that the average cancellation rate for PHLX put options is 33.92 percentage points less 
than that for NOM put options.   
 In unreported results, we find that the put-to-call ratio on the PHLX exchange is 0.97, 
suggesting that order volume is slightly greater for call options, relative to put options.  Similarly, 
the put/call ratio on the NOM is 0.68, which is consistent with the average sentiment in the market 
being more bullish than bearish.  To the extent that order volume is a key driver behind order 
cancellation activity, our results suggest that the difference in cancellation rates between puts and 
calls is at least partially attributable to order flow.  Overall, the results from these simple univariate 
tests support our third hypothesis, in which cancellation rates appear higher for put options, relative 
to call options. 
 Option contracts are often sorted into moneyness categories, based on the difference 
between the underlying stock price and option strike price.  This value represents the profit that 
the option holder would receive if he or she exercised the option immediately.  Lakonishok et al. 
(2007) show that open volume is concentrated in options that are near-the-money.  Since order 
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volume and cancellation rates are positively related, we expect cancellations to be increasing with 
option moneyness.   
 We separate observations by option type (put or call) and option moneyness.  Similar to 
Lakonishok et al. (2007), we focus on three different ranges of option moneyness.  For call (put) 
options, an S/X ratio of less than 0.9 represents options out-of-the-money (in-the-money).  An S/X 
range between 0.9 and 1.1 represents options near-the-money for both puts and calls.  For call (put) 
options, an S/X ratio of greater than 1.1 identifies options in-the-money (out-of-the-money).   
 For both exchanges, we find that orders for options in-the-money are canceled more 
frequently than any other option series.  Specifically, Panel B of Table 7 shows that the average 
order cancellation rate for in-the-money call (put) options on the PHLX is 2.53 (9.19) percentage 
points higher than the average cancellation rate for out-of-the-money call (put) options.  Although 
smaller in magnitude, we find similar results for option orders submitted to the NOM.  Our results 
suggest that the probability of order cancellation is highest for options in-the-money than for those 
out-of-the-money.  Therefore, market participants are more likely to observe flickering orders in 
the more valuable options.     
 In Figure 7, we plot order cancellation rates on both exchanges by option moneyness 
categories.  Cancellation rates are on the primary and secondary vertical axes, while S/X ranges 
for moneyness are on the horizontal axis.  We find that the plots are consistent with the findings 
in Panel B of Table 7.  The results from this analysis provide support for Hypothesis 4, at least for 
call options, as order cancellation activity is highest for options in-the-money, relative to options 
out-of-the-money.  Thus, limit order traders are less likely to remain at a position on the order 
book when the option is increasing in value.    
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 Prior research shows differences in trading behavior on, and around expiration days, 
relative to non-expiration days (see Stoll and Whaley, 1987 and Stephan and Whaley, 1990).  In 
this section, we test our fifth hypothesis that order cancellation rates are higher on option expiration 
days than non-expiration days.  Panel C of Table 7 reports the results of our univariate analysis on 
mean cancellation rates on option expiration Fridays, relative to non-expiration days.  Order 
cancellation rates on the PHLX and NOM are neither higher nor lower on option expiration days, 
relative to non-expiration days. The results in Table 7 lead us to reject Hypothesis 5, which states 
that order cancellation rates are higher on option expiration days, relative to non-expiration days.      
 Figure 8 plots mean cancellation rates on the vertical axes and days-to-expiration on the 
horizontal axis.  The dark solid line illustrates average order cancellation rates for options on the 
PHLX, whereas the light dotted line represents cancellation rates for options on the NOM.  We 
find that order cancellation rates are highest when the option is between 25 to 50 days to expiration 
and lowest when the option has over 125 days to expiration.  As we expect, order cancellation rates 
continue to decline as the number of days to expiration increase.  
 We test the relation between order cancellation rates and option characteristics further in a 
multivariate setting, where we control for other factors that may affect the probability of 
cancellation.  The sample consists of 113 option classes during the period September 15, 2010 to 
October 15, 2010.   We use OLS to estimate the following regression equation:  
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜏𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑃ℎ𝑙𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑛 − 𝑡ℎ𝑒 − 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑈𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑂 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
(3) 
35 
 
where In-the-Money equals one if the option is in-the-money and zero if the option is out-of-the-
money.  The remaining independent variables have all been defined previously.  Since we are no 
longer performing an event study, it is important to control for time fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡, and option 
class fixed effects, 𝜏𝑗.  We cluster the standard errors by underlying asset.  The results of estimating 
eq. (3) are found in Table 8.   
 Consistent with our univariate tests, we find that order cancellation rates are inversely 
related with the speed of cancellation.  Columns [2] and [4] of Table 8 show that the average order 
cancellation rate is roughly 31.8 percentage points higher on the PHLX than on the NOM.  We 
find a negative and significant relation between the probability of order cancellation and the time-
to-cancellation (cancel speed).  Specifically, the coefficient on Cancel Speed is equal to a negative 
0.0001 in each of the regression specifications.  Since order cancellation speeds are measured in 
seconds, a one-minute increase in the speed of cancellation decreases the probability of order 
cancellation by 0.6 percentage points, other factors held constant.     
 In support of Hypothesis 3, we find that order cancellation rates are significantly higher for 
put options, relative to call options.  Columns [2] of Table 8 shows that the average order on a call 
option has a cancellation rate that is about 1.82 percentage points lower than the average order on 
a put option.  Therefore, marketable order traders are less (more) likely to receive a favorable 
execution when interacting with limit orders on put (call) options, as the displayed orders with 
which they seek to interact are more (less) likely to cancel before the arrival of their marketable 
order.   
 In addition, we find support for Hypotheses 4 and 5 in which order cancellation rates are 
significantly higher for in-the-money options and on option expiration days.  In the full model, 
which includes day-fixed effects, we show that order cancellation rates are 1.26 percentage points 
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higher on expiration days, relative to non-expiration days.  Order cancellation rates are 1.11 
percentage points higher for options in-the-money than for options out-of-the-money, which holds 
even after controlling for order/stock characteristics and exchange differences.  Option market 
makers unwind, or move in and out of position, on expiration days (see Ni, Pearson, and 
Poteshman, 2005), which might help explain the higher probability of order cancellation observed 
on option expiration days.    
 In an attempt to explain the difference in order cancellation rates between the PHLX and 
the NOM observed in the analysis above, we run the following regression model using data for 
our paired sample option series. 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑃𝐻𝐿𝑋 − 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑁𝑂𝑀
= 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖(𝑌𝑖
𝑃𝐻𝐿𝑋 − 𝑌𝑖
𝑁𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑗 + 𝜀 
(4) 
 The dependent variable is the difference in daily order cancellation rates between the 
PHLX and the NOM.  Yi (i = 1 to 5) represents one of five limit order characteristics: order 
duration, implied volatility, order size, # of trades and % effective spreads.  We include controls 
for option and underlying attributes.  We also include day fixed effects and option class fixed 
effects to control for time-series and cross-sectional variation.  Test-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and are obtained from standard errors clustered by underlying asset.     
 The results of estimating eq. (4) are reported in Table 9.  We find that the differential in 
order cancellation rates, which is substantially higher on the NOM than on the PHLX, is 
significantly and negatively related to the difference in order duration, order size, and trade 
volume.  This result suggests that the higher trade volume and order sizes on the PHLX at least 
partially explains the difference in order cancellation rates between the two exchanges.  Since the 
NOM is an all-electronic options market, it might attract more algorithmic-type traders that are 
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shown to cancel a substantial amount of their orders (see Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009), which can 
help explain the differential in cancellation activity between the two exchanges.  Table 3 shows 
that orders submitted to the NOM are canceled, on average, 802 seconds faster than those 
submitted to the PHLX.  Therefore, the results from Table 9 suggest that the speed with which 
limit orders are canceled on the NOM helps explain the higher probability of order cancellation.     
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ROBUSTNESS 
 In this section we report the results of a series of robustness tests that help validate our 
findings.  Since order cancellation rates, fill rates, and execution speeds remain constant for the 
sample of NOM orders, we are less concerned that our event study is biased due to the sample time 
period.  However, it is still possible that order execution quality changed significantly during our 
particular sample period.  Therefore, we perform a pseudo-event study, where we examine order 
execution quality for options on the PHLX around an alternative event date.  We select the calendar 
year immediately following the event date, August 18, 2011.     
 We estimate eq. (1) for each order execution quality measure for orders submitted to the 
PHLX.  Similar to our event study, we use a 50-day event window, the 25 days before the pseudo-
event date and the 25 days after.  We find that the coefficient on the categorical variable Post, is 
insignificant in each of the regressions, providing support for our main analysis.  Since we do not 
observe any significant change around the pseudo-event date, we are confident that the fee change 
had a causal impact on order execution quality.   
 In our final set of tests, we separate order flow on the PHLX into marketable and 
nonmarketable.  We approximate a marketable order as a limit order that fills within 500 
milliseconds of submission.24  Table A.2 reports the results of estimating eq. (1) on the partitioned 
sample.  We believe it is important to distinguish between marketable and nonmarketable orders 
when considering order fill speeds, as limit order traders submitting marketable orders are more 
                                                          
24 Our results are robust to different millisecond cutoff levels 50, 100, and 200.   
39 
 
concerned with fast executions, relative to those placing more passive nonmarketable orders.  
Consistent with our Hypothesis 2, we find that the speed of execution for marketable order flow is 
substantially faster in the post-fee period than in the pre-fee period.  The average marketable order 
executes roughly 5,000 microseconds (one millionth of a second) faster following the introduction 
of the cancellation fee.  In a trading environment where orders are submitted and revised in 
nanoseconds, 5,000 microseconds is an economically significant difference.  
 We find that the observed increase in order fill rates on the PHLX around the cancellation 
fee is at least partially attributable to the increase in marketable order flow.  Table A.2 shows that 
both raw marketable order flow and the arrival rate of marketable orders (marketable orders 
divided by total orders) increase in the post-fee period, relative to the pre-fee period, which is 
consistent with the notion that order fill rates depend on the arrival rate of marketable orders 
(Battalio, Corwin, and Jennings, 2016).     
  
40 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 Limit orders play a pivotal role in options markets (see Berkman, 1996).  The canceling of 
these limit orders has captured significant attention from exchange officials, the popular press, and 
regulators.  For instance, some trading venues believe that curbing excessive order cancellations 
might improve the overall trading environment for all market participants (see SEC Release No. 
34-62744, page 2).  In this study, we examine the effect of an order cancellation fee on limit order 
behavior and execution quality.  On August 18, 2010, the PHLX introduced a cancellation fee on 
professional orders.   
 We find that the cancellation fee causes a significant decline in average order cancellation 
rates.  In our difference-in-difference regression analysis, we find that the probability of 
cancellation is 26 percentage points lower on the PHLX than on the NOM in the post-fee period, 
relative to the pre-fee period.  Since we observe a shock to order cancellation rates, it allows us to 
test the relation between cancellation activity and other aspects of order behavior.   
 Some market participants are concerned with “phantom liquidity”, or quotes that disappear 
when they attempt to trade against them (see Angel, 2014).  We find that the order cancellation 
fee on the PHLX increases the duration of resting limit orders.  The increase in firm quotes seems 
to improve several aspects of execution quality.  For instance, we find that the probability of order 
execution is 16.3 percentage points higher on the PHLX that on the NOM in the post-fee period, 
relative to the pre-fee period.  In addition, the cancellation fee is associated with a decrease in 
effective spreads by roughly 20 bps.  We also find a decrease in what appears to be noisy 
nonmarketable order volume, and an increase in trading volume.  To the extent that limit order 
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traders are better off when facing less non-execution risk (Colliard and Foucault, 2012), lower 
cancellation activity seems to have a positive impact on overall trader welfare.   
 Our analysis also contributes to our understanding of limit order trading behavior in equity 
options markets.  We find that the probability of order cancellation is approximately 1.82 
percentage points higher for put options, relative to call options.  Orders submitted on option 
expiration days are 1.26 percentage points more likely to cancel than those submitted on non-
expiration days, other things held constant.  We also note that the probability of an order 
cancellation is roughly 32 percentage points lower on the PHLX, relative to the NOM.  This 
differential in order cancellations is partially explained by differences in trading volume, order 
size, and order duration.   
 Overall, the fee structure change on the PHLX significantly affects limit order behavior, 
which improves several aspects of execution quality.  Our results suggest that the benefits of 
reducing order cancellation rates seem to outweigh the perceived costs.  Limit order traders on the 
PHLX appear better off following the cancellation fee, as they face less non-execution risk (Liu, 
2009) and trade at lower costs.  Market participants criticize trading strategies that result in 
excessive order cancellations, as displayed liquidity might not reflect committed trading sentiment 
(Friederich and Payne, 2015).  The implications of our analysis are broad, as exchange officials in 
the equity options market might be encouraged to consider enforcing an order cancellation fee. 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
The table summarizes the sample selection process and reports the distribution of trading activity across the remaining option class contracts.  The sample period 
is the 56 trading days between July 26, 2010 and October 15, 2010.  Due to data corruption issues, we drop August 13, August 19, and September 2 trading days.   
 
Panel A. Sample filters 
  
# of remaining 
option classes 
# of remaining 
option series 
% of initial PHLX 
order volume 
Initial sample  2,249 139,525 100.00% 
    
Exclude option classes that have fewer than 1 order fill per day 296 53,495 85.80% 
Exclude option series with fewer than 5 orders in a day 296 25,727 83.87% 
Exclude option classes that are not on common stocks or on ETFs 231 20,788 68.85% 
Match PHLX with NOM by option series and merge with OPRA 133 8,908 48.33% 
    
Final Sample 133 8,908 48.33% 
    
Panel B. Distribution of option classes 
  # of option classes 
# of remaining 
option series % of sample orders 
Option classes on common stock that trade in pennies 70 5,433 72.74% 
Option classes on common stock that do not trade in pennies 47 1,695 7.20% 
Option classes on ETFs that trade in pennies 14 1,531 14.93% 
Option classes on ETFs that do not trade in pennies 2 249 5.14% 
 
   
Final Sample 133 8,908 100.00% 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Trading Activity across Option Exchanges 
We obtain historical Option Price Reporting Authority (OPRA) trade and quote data from a technology company 
LiveVol for the period June 26, 2010 to October 15, 2010.  Option exchanges report volume information on trades 
and on current bid and offers in eligible securities to OPRA.  We report the distribution of trading activity across eight 
option exchanges, in terms of volume and number of trades, for all eligible option classes and for our final sample of 
option classes.  We find that the 113 option classes observed in this study account for over 43% of trades and just 
under 40% of market volume during the sample period.   
  All Option Classes   Sample Option Classes 
 Classes = 3,417  Classes = 113 
  % of volume % of trades  % of volume % of trades 
NOM 4.14% 9.06%  5.86% 12.36% 
  
  
 
 
AMEX 12.44% 12.94%  14.28% 12.34% 
  
  
 
 
CBOE 25.69% 23.51%  19.80% 20.60% 
  
  
 
 
ISE 17.85% 20.60%  20.22% 20.79% 
  
  
  
NYSE ARCA 11.79% 13.49%  11.79% 13.39% 
  
  
  
PHLX 24.98% 14.18%  24.28% 13.47% 
  
  
  
BX 2.62% 5.00%  3.14% 5.42% 
  
  
  
BATS 0.49% 1.23%   0.63% 1.62% 
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Table 3 
Order Execution Quality around Introduction of PHLX Order Cancellation Fee 
The sample consists of orders in 113 option classes during the period July 26, 2010 to October 15, 2010.  We conduct univariate tests around the introduction of 
an order cancellation fee on the PHLX in August of 2010.  We use a 55-day event window, the 23 trading days before the adjusted effective date (August 30, 2010) 
and the 32 trading days after.  We exclude the event date in the analysis.  Simple t-tests are used to calculate differences in means.  ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
Event Window [-23, 32] 07/26/2010 - 10/15/2010 
 Pre  Post  
 Difference 
PHLX  
Difference 
NOM  Pre Difference  Post Difference 
  PHLX NOM   PHLX NOM   (Post - Pre)   (Post - Pre)   (PHLX - NOM)   (PHLX - NOM) 
Order Cancel Rate 73.64% 99.70%  62.31% 99.69%  -11.33%***  -0.01%  -26.05%***  -37.38%*** 
 
             
Order Duration (seconds) 683.0 80.8  891.4 89.4  208.3***  8.5994***  602.2***  802*** 
 
             
# of Orders 483 17,490  163 14,262  -321***  -3228***  -17,007***  -14,099*** 
 
             
Order Fill Rate 16.60% 0.30%  25.16% 0.29%  8.57%***  -0.02%  16.29%***  24.87%*** 
 
             
Order Fill Speed (seconds) 1026.6 793.5  1016.4 806.0  -10.2  12.5  233.1***  210.4*** 
              
% Effective Spreads 0.0430 0.0349  0.0390 0.0322  -0.0040***  -0.0027***  0.0081***  0.0068*** 
              
# of Trades 13.51 14.00  17.14 16.95  3.63***  2.9498***  -0.49  0.20 
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Table 4 
Impact of PHLX Order Cancellation Fee on Order Execution Quality 
The sample consists of orders in 113 equity and ETF option classes during July 26, 2010 to October 15, 2010.  We 
use Ordinary Least Squares to examine the impact of an order cancellation fee on order behavior.  Order Cancel Rate 
equals the number of canceled orders divided by the total number of order submitted.  Order Duration equals the 
number of seconds between order submission and cancellation.  # of Orders equals the total number of orders added 
to the book.  Post equals one during the period of August 13, 2010 to October 15, 2010 and zero otherwise.  We 
examine four measures of execution quality: Order Fill Rate, Order Fill Speed, % Effective Spreads, and # of Trades.  
Order Fill Rate equals the average number of orders completely filled.  Order Fill Speed equals the number of seconds 
between order submission and a complete fill.  # of Trades equals the total number of trades reported to OPRA.  Penny 
equals one if the option is traded and quoted in pennies and zero otherwise. ETF equals one if the option class is an 
ETF and zero if it is a common stock.  Expiration equals one on option expiration Fridays and zero otherwise.  Price 
is the average option NBBO midpoint.  IVOL is an option’s average daily implied volatility as computed by OPRA.  
Order Size is the average number of contracts attached to a particular order. S/X equals the underlying stock price 
divided by the strike price.  Call equals one if the order is for a call option and zero for a put option.  Underlying 
NBBO Midpoint is the underling stock’s NBBO midpoint as reported by OPRA.  Underlying Volume equal the 
underlying stock’s average daily share volume.  Underlying MCAP is the underlying stock’s average daily market 
capitalization, measured in $billions.  We include option class fixed effects.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses 
obtained from standard errors clustered by option class. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Panel A. Order Behavior – Event Window [-23, 32] 07/26/2010 - 10/15/2010 
 Order Cancel Rate  Order Duration (seconds)  # of Orders 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6] 
Post -0.109*** -0.091**  191.558** 163.125**  -313.871*** -247.277*** 
 (-2.789) (-2.567)  (2.249) (2.203)  (-3.130) (-3.495) 
Penny 0.009   -173.838**   132.511  
 (0.307)   (-2.132)   (1.502)  
ETF -0.008   -22.280   369.242  
 (-0.141)   (-0.133)   (1.347)  
Expiration -0.001 -0.006  -5.405 -9.921  -47.500* -61.644* 
 (-0.152) (-0.668)  (-0.134) (-0.267)  (-1.797) (-1.960) 
Price 0.000 -0.000  -4.556 -0.752  5.140 0.749 
 (0.280) (-0.184)  (-0.883) (-0.237)  (1.246) (0.373) 
IVOL 0.003 0.022***  130.403* -61.778*  -66.523 -37.284 
 (0.189) (3.184)  (1.904) (-1.661)  (-0.675) (-0.773) 
Order Size -0.000 -0.000  1.288*** 0.468***  -0.616* -0.409 
 (-1.566) (-1.592)  (5.707) (2.874)  (-1.764) (-1.368) 
S/X 0.043** 0.041*  -190.177* -168.320  -249.387** -260.572*** 
 (2.189) (1.976)  (-1.701) (-1.252)  (-2.279) (-2.628) 
Call -0.071*** -0.045***  204.688*** 121.379***  -144.859*** -55.129*** 
 (-8.661) (-6.085)  (6.530) (4.954)  (-3.737) (-3.023) 
Log(Underlying Volume) -0.038*** -0.028***  182.227*** -84.034***  -0.684 9.205 
 (-3.552) (-3.392)  (5.029) (-2.696)  (-0.018) (0.534) 
Underlying MCAP -0.000 -0.004***  0.473 9.618***  1.259 -11.982*** 
 (-0.616) (-4.309) 
 (0.862) (4.774)  (1.503) (-7.942) 
Constant 1.370*** 1.451***  -2200.724*** 1533.908***  588.592 1,457.832*** 
 (8.088) (9.427) 
 (-3.870) (2.875)  (1.025) (4.043)          
Option Class FE No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R2 0.092 0.062  0.044 0.009  0.063 0.038 
N 49,164 49,164   48,136 48,136   49,164 49,164 
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Panel B. Order Execution Quality – Event Window [-23, 32] 07/26/2010 - 10/15/2010 
 Order Fill Rate  Order Fill Speed (seconds)  % Effective Spread  # of Trades 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6]   [7] [8] 
Post 0.084*** 0.066**  -6.981 15.844  -0.003*** -0.002**  3.900** 3.399** 
 (2.982) (2.560)  (-0.227) (0.562)  (-3.427) (-2.002)  (2.184) (2.495) 
Penny -0.004   -227.357***   -0.019***   4.636  
 (-0.235)   (-2.682)   (-12.589)   (1.099)  
ETF 0.036   -244.518**   -0.011***   4.288  
 (1.103)   (-2.223)   (-7.091)   (1.108)  
Expiration 0.000 0.007  -121.220*** -141.443***  -0.003 -0.004*  -1.217* -0.425 
 (0.053) (0.952)  (-2.636) (-3.041)  (-1.343) (-1.754)  (-1.673) (-0.832) 
Price 0.001*** 0.001  -12.227*** -6.670***  -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.604*** -0.891*** 
 (4.294) (1.441)  (-2.663) (-3.007)  (-30.702) (-29.955)  (-3.310) (-9.145) 
IVOL -0.009 -0.011  82.560** -73.544  0.039*** 0.037***  1.901 -0.779 
 (-0.855) (-1.585)  (2.444) (-1.477)  (29.538) (18.392)  (1.197) (-0.209) 
Order Size 0.000 0.000  1.362*** 0.214  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000 0.010*** 
 (0.152) (1.013)  (3.140) (0.980)  (18.954) (16.039)  (0.053) (3.130) 
S/X -0.010 -0.007  -224.195 -259.116  -0.016*** -0.015***  -7.445*** -7.611*** 
 (-0.603) (-0.322)  (-1.217) (-1.310)  (-4.013) (-3.832)  (-2.958) (-3.446) 
Call 0.040*** 0.030***  87.545*** 25.257  0.001 0.001  2.835* 4.293*** 
 (9.597) (7.125)  (3.581) (1.063)  (1.323) (0.648)  (1.749) (2.870) 
Underlying NBBO Midpoint -0.000 0.000  -1.303** -0.190  0.000*** 0.000  0.062* 0.041 
 (-0.853) (0.249)  (-2.438) (-0.159)  (15.106) (0.812)  (1.796) (0.519) 
Log(Underlying Volume) 0.006 0.046***  160.387*** -177.010***  0.000 0.005***  2.088 7.358*** 
 (0.642) (7.129)  (3.198) (-5.673)  (0.093) (4.012)  (1.592) (8.225) 
Underlying MCAP 0.000 0.003**  1.526* 1.874  0.000*** -0.000  0.057 0.298*** 
 (0.716) (2.416)  (1.738) (0.805)  (2.815) (-1.357)  (1.356) (3.509) 
Constant 0.049 -0.802***  -1,217.726 4,135.199***  0.050*** -0.033  -28.609 -124.257*** 
 (0.323) (-6.466)  (-1.513) (6.960)  (4.883) (-1.537)  (-1.438) (-7.098)             
Option Class FE No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R2 0.054 0.060  0.046 0.004  0.052 0.033  0.073 0.063 
N 49,164 49,164   40,356 40,356   49,164 49,164   49,164 49,164 
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Table 5 
Marginal Impact of PHLX Order Cancellation Fee on Order Execution Quality 
The sample consists of orders in 113 equity and ETF option classes trading on the PHLX and NOM during July 26, 
2010 to October 15, 2010.  We use Ordinary Least Squares to examine the marginal impact of an order cancellation 
fee on order behavior and execution quality.  We analyze four order behavior measures: Order Cancel Rate, Order 
Duration, and # of Orders.  Order Cancel Rate equals the number of canceled orders divided by the total number of 
order submitted.  Order Duration equals the number of seconds between order submission and cancellation.  # of 
Orders equals the total number of orders added to the book.  We examine four measures of execution quality: Order 
Fill Rate, Order Fill Speed, % Effective Spreads, and # of Trades.  Order Fill Rate equals the average number of 
orders completely filled.  Order Fill Speed equals the number of seconds between order submission and a complete 
fill.  # of Trades equals the total number of trades reported to OPRA.   Phlx is an indicator variable set equal to one if 
the order originated on the PHLX and zero for orders on the NOM.  Post equals one during the period of August 13, 
2010 to October 15, 2010 and zero otherwise.  Penny equals one if the option is traded and quoted in pennies and zero 
otherwise. ETF equals one if the option class is an ETF and zero if it is a common stock.  Expiration equals one on 
option expiration Fridays and zero otherwise.  Price is the average option NBBO midpoint.  IVOL is an option’s 
average daily implied volatility as computed by OPRA.  Order Size is the average number of contracts attached to a 
particular order. S/X equals the underlying stock price divided by the strike price.  Call equals one if the order is for a 
call option and zero for a put option.  Underlying NBBO Mid is the underling stock’s NBBO midpoint as reported by 
OPRA.  Underlying Volume equal the underlying stock’s average daily share volume.  Underlying MCAP is the 
underlying stock’s average daily market capitalization, measured in $billions.  We include option class fixed effects.  
T-statistics are reported in parentheses obtained from standard errors clustered by option class. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Panel A. Order Behavior – Event Window [-23, 32] 07/26/2010 - 10/15/2010 
 Order Cancel Rate  Order Duration  # of Orders 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6] 
Phlx -0.260*** -0.260***  600.041*** 604.084***  -16,970.127*** -16,991.114*** 
 (-7.561) (-7.577)  (6.392) (6.486)  (-7.247) (-7.249) 
Post 0.002 0.011**  2.026 -13.134  -3,179.022*** -2,452.424*** 
 (0.969) (2.170)  (0.217) (-0.705)  (-3.728) (-3.580) 
Phlx * Post -0.113*** -0.113***  196.642** 198.473**  2,943.654*** 2,923.000*** 
 (-2.721) (-2.724)  (2.080) (2.104)  (3.590) (3.560) 
Penny 0.004   -100.815**   2421.950  
 (0.285)   (-2.339)   (1.600)  
ETF -0.004   -23.827   4,078.841**  
 (-0.143)   (-0.277)   (2.129)  
Expiration -0.001 -0.003  5.620 1.016  -2,232.912*** -1,954.556*** 
 (-0.145) (-0.657)  (0.281) (0.055)  (-4.359) (-4.208) 
Price 0.000 -0.000  -3.082 -0.888  256.490*** 148.002*** 
 (0.293) (-0.150)  (-1.120) (-0.548)  (3.135) (3.803) 
IVOL 0.000 0.014***  100.866*** -39.488  -1024.485 -617.356 
 (0.004) (3.198)  (3.044) (-0.977)  (-1.311) (-0.933) 
Order Size -0.000 -0.000  1.052*** 0.236  -13.178*** -5.564* 
 (-1.296) (-1.287)  (5.072) (1.488)  (-3.453) (-1.898) 
S/X 0.022** 0.019*  -93.854 -77.023  -4247.603* -4,898.065** 
 (2.233) (1.882)  (-1.365) (-0.896)  (-1.899) (-2.319) 
Call -0.036*** -0.023***  114.026*** 63.922***  -1,589.722*** -275.388 
 (-8.849) (-6.233)  (6.924) (4.869)  (-5.755) (-0.924) 
Log(Underlying Volume) -0.019*** -0.015***  90.469*** -46.112***  -696.200 1,387.278*** 
 (-3.259) (-3.578)  (4.560) (-3.001)  (-1.421) (5.435) 
Underlying MCAP -0.000 -0.002***  0.222 4.598***  30.446** -40.789* 
 (-0.615) (-4.345)  (0.766) (4.772)  (2.211) (-1.702) 
Constant 1.305*** 1.373***  -1,363.933*** 583.980**  29,106.617*** 2,042.590 
 (14.674) (16.533)  (-4.344) (2.127)  (3.402) (0.530)          
Option Class FE No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R2 0.412 0.428  0.117 0.103  0.207 0.185 
N 98,328 98,328   97,300 97,300   98,328 98,328 
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Panel B. Order Execution Quality – Event Window [-23, 32] 07/26/2010 - 10/15/2010 
 Order Fill Rate  Order Fill Speed (seconds)  % Effective Spread  # of Trades 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6]   [7] [8] 
Phlx 0.163*** 0.163***  204.383*** 194.110***  0.008*** 0.008***  -0.446 -0.491 
 (7.888) (7.869) 
 (7.851) (7.369)  (8.127) (8.204)  (-0.222) (-0.242) 
Post -0.001 -0.010**  9.848 44.053**  -0.002** -0.001  3.279** 3.236*** 
 (-1.381) (-2.411) 
 (0.496) (1.982)  (-2.005) (-0.780)  (2.188) (2.642) 
Phlx * Post 0.086*** 0.086***  -18.778 -8.086  -0.002** -0.002**  0.728 0.678 
 (2.953) (2.946) 
 (-0.697) (-0.308)  (-2.404) (-2.381)  (1.316) (1.249) 
Penny -0.003   -143.836**   -0.018***   7.412  
 (-0.313)  
 (-2.312)   (-18.745)   (1.567)  
ETF 0.018   -180.084*   -0.009***   3.700  
 (1.096)  
 (-1.720)   (-9.473)   (0.872)  
Expiration 0.000 0.003  -107.108*** -114.923***  -0.004*** -0.005***  -1.972*** -0.973* 
 (0.098) (0.956) 
 (-3.103) (-3.294)  (-2.723) (-3.114)  (-2.717) (-1.811) 
Price 0.001*** 0.000  -9.657** -5.183**  -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.652*** -1.011*** 
 (4.385) (1.448) 
 (-2.430) (-2.447)  (-45.767) (-44.403)  (-2.670) (-7.892) 
IVOL -0.004 -0.008*  51.984 -7.447  0.036*** 0.042***  2.471*** -2.007 
 (-0.621) (-1.901) 
 (1.208) (-0.199)  (42.474) (30.999)  (2.935) (-0.465) 
Order Size 0.000 0.000  2.675*** 0.815***  0.000*** 0.000***  -0.017* 0.001 
 (0.080) (1.089) 
 (4.959) (4.007)  (27.991) (22.720)  (-1.873) (0.271) 
S/X -0.005 -0.002  -93.204 -147.183  -0.011*** -0.014***  -7.897** -7.783*** 
 (-0.632) (-0.204) 
 (-0.613) (-0.958)  (-4.736) (-5.510)  (-2.391) (-2.771) 
Call 0.020*** 0.016***  102.276*** 47.166**  0.001** 0.000  3.101 4.672** 
 (9.822) (7.416) 
 (4.210) (2.608)  (2.173) (0.709)  (1.560) (2.463) 
Underlying NBBO Midpoint -0.000 0.000  -1.445*** -0.142  0.000*** 0.000*  0.076* 0.063 
 (-0.886) (0.242) 
 (-3.182) (-0.106)  (22.167) (1.793)  (1.741) (0.625) 
Log(Underlying Volume) 0.003 0.024***  136.859*** -176.416***  -0.000 0.003***  1.759 8.038*** 
 (0.645) (7.251) 
 (3.172) (-6.280)  (-0.812) (4.185)  (1.109) (6.845) 
Underlying MCAP 0.000 0.001**  1.480** 0.156  0.000*** -0.000**  0.074 0.239** 
 (0.712) (2.433) 
 (1.995) (0.068)  (5.155) (-2.150)  (1.351) (2.307) 
Constant -0.055 -0.499***  -1,273.306* 3,840.092***  0.043*** -0.018  -26.855 -132.173*** 
 (-0.710) (-7.346) 
 (-1.767) (7.140)  (6.709) (-1.339)  (-1.090) (-6.437)             
Option Class FE No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R2 0.339 0.354  0.063 0.008  0.057 0.038  0.082 0.058 
N 98,328 98,328   88,056 88,056   98,328 98,328   98,328 98,328 
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics of Order Cancellation Rates by Order Duration 
This table provides the distribution of order cancellation rates on both the PHLX and the NOM by order duration, or 
the time between submission and cancellation.  The sample time period is taken after the structural change on the 
PHLX, i.e. September 15, 2010 to October 15, 2010.  We report mean cancellation rates for different order duration 
time buckets.  We test for differences in means using simple t-tests and find that all differences are significant at the 
0.01 level.   
Order Duration     
(seconds) 
Panel A. PHLX   Panel B. NOM   Panel C. Difference 
PHLX   NOM    (PHLX - NOM) 
0-1  83.24%  99.98%  -16.74% 
2-10 86.69%  99.93%  -13.24% 
11-40 81.15%  99.88%  -18.73% 
41-70 70.06%  99.79%  -29.73% 
71-100 64.23%  99.68%  -35.45% 
101-200 58.56%  99.52%  -40.96% 
201-300 56.67%  99.18%  -42.51% 
301-400 54.22%  98.77%  -44.55% 
401-500 54.66%  98.41%  -43.75% 
501-600 54.78%  98.07%  -43.29% 
601-700 52.65%  98.44%  -45.79% 
701-800 51.14%  97.62%  -46.48% 
801-900 52.90%  95.88%  -42.98% 
901-1000 53.33%  95.88%  -42.55% 
>1000 47.43%   94.91%   -47.49% 
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Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics of Order Cancellation Rates by Option Characteristics  
This table provides mean and median order cancellation rates disaggregated by option type, calls versus puts.  The sample time period is taken after the structural 
break on the PHLX, i.e. September 15, 2010 through October 15, 2010.  Panel A shows average daily order cancellation rates for options on both the PHLX and 
NOM.    Panel B shows order cancellation rates for three ranges of option moneyness, in-the-money, near-the-money, and out-of-the-money.  We define moneyness 
using the S/X ratio, which is the underlying stock price divided by the option strike price.  A call (put) option is said to be in-the-money (out-of-the-money) if the 
S/X ratio is greater (less) than one.  An option is said to be near-the-money if the S/X ratio is between 0.9 and 1.1.  Panel C reports differences in means for order 
cancellation rates on option expiration days, relative to those on non-expiration days.  Simple t-tests are used to calculate the difference in means. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Order Cancellation Rates by Option Type       
 Call Options  Put Options  
Difference          
(Call - Put)       
PHLX 60.23%  65.83%  -5.60%***       
      
      
NOM 99.65%  99.75%  -0.09%***       
      
      
Difference (PHLX - NOM) -39.42%***  -33.92%***         
                  
Panel B. Order Cancellation Rates by Option Moneyness 
 Call Options  Put Options 
 PHLX  NOM  
Difference       
(PHLX – NOM)  PHLX  NOM  
Difference 
(PHLX – NOM) 
[1]  S/X < 0.9 56.55%  99.30%  -42.75%  75.61%  99.67%  -24.06%*** 
            
[2]  0.9 <= S/X <= 1.1 60.93%  99.71%  -38.78%  65.36%  99.82%  -34.46%*** 
            
[3]  S/X > 1.1 59.08%  99.66%  -40.57%  66.42%  99.48%  -33.06%*** 
        
 
 
 
 
Difference [1] - [2] -4.38%***  -0.40%***    10.26%***  -0.15%***   
        
 
 
  
Difference [1] - [3] -2.53%***  -0.35%***    9.19%***  0.19%***   
        
 
 
  
Difference [2] - [3] 1.85%***  0.05%***    -1.06%***  0.34%***   
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Panel C. Order Cancellation Rates by Expiration Days and Non-Expiration Days 
 PHLX  NOM  
Difference                 
(PHLX - NOM) 
Expiration Days 63.120%  99.690%  -36.570%*** 
      
Non-Expiration Days 62.295%  99.689%  -37.394%*** 
      
Difference (Expiration - Non-Expiration) 0.825%  0.001%   
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Table 8 
Order Cancellation Rates – Option Characteristics 
The sample consists of orders in 113 equity and ETF option classes trading on the PHLX and NOM during September 
15, 2010 to October 15, 2010.  We use Ordinary Least Squares to examine the relations between order cancellation 
activity and various option characteristics.  The dependent variable is the average order cancellation rate, or number 
of orders canceled divided by total orders submitted.  In-the-Money equals one if the underlying stock price is greater 
(less) than the strike price for call (put) options and zero otherwise.  The control variables are defined in Table 4.  We 
include day fixed effects and option class fixed effects.  Test-statistics are reported in parentheses obtained from 
standard errors clustered by option class.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively.      
 
  [1]   [2] 
Phlx -0.3177***  -0.3178*** 
 (-16.169) 
 (-16.200) 
Order Duration -0.0001***  -0.0001*** 
 (-15.581) 
 (-15.721) 
Call -0.0184***  -0.0182*** 
 (-5.607) 
 (-5.528) 
In-the-Money 0.0111**  0.0114** 
 (2.372) 
 (2.500) 
Expiration 0.0126**  0.0052 
 (2.045) 
 (0.892) 
Price 0.0000  0.0000 
 (0.257) 
 (0.253) 
IVOL 0.0086  0.0084 
 (1.630) 
 (1.579) 
Order Size -0.0001*  -0.0001* 
 (-1.751) 
 (-1.756) 
UNBBO Midpoint 0.0009**  0.0010*** 
 (2.370) 
 (2.897) 
Log(Underlying Volume) -0.0150**  -0.0135** 
 (-2.485) 
 (-2.269) 
Underlying MCAP 0.0032***  0.0037*** 
 (3.588)  (4.581) 
Constant 0.9257***  0.8683*** 
 (8.681)  (8.845) 
Day FE No  Yes 
Option Class FE Yes  Yes 
R2 0.5520  0.5531 
N  40,771   40,771 
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Table 9 
Order Cancellation Rates – PHLX vs. NOM 
The sample consists of orders in 113 equity and ETF option classes trading on the PHLX and NOM during September 
15, 2010 to October 15, 2010.  We use Ordinary Least Squares to examine the difference in cancellation activity 
between the PHLX and the NOM.  The dependent variable is the difference in average cancellation rates, calculated 
as the ratio of number of orders canceled to orders submitted.  We include as regressors, the differences in order 
duration, implied volatility, order size, number of trades, and percent effective spreads between the PHLX and NOM 
in the same option series on the same day.  The control variables are defined in Table 4.  We include day fixed effects 
and option class fixed effects.  Test-statistics are reported in parentheses that are obtained from standard errors 
clustered by option class.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.     
  [1]   [2] 
D(Order Duration) -0.00004***  -0.00004*** 
 (-13.670) 
 (-13.757) 
D(IVOL) 0.0072  0.0070 
 (0.830) 
 (0.857) 
D(Order Size) -0.0001***  -0.0001*** 
 (-2.850) 
 (-2.719) 
D(# of Trades) -0.0004**  -0.0004** 
 (-2.129) 
 (-2.169) 
D(% Effective Spread) 0.0073  0.0077 
 (0.086) 
 (0.094) 
Call -0.0313***  -0.0307*** 
 (-4.526) 
 (-4.363) 
S/X 0.0445*  0.0467* 
 (1.725) 
 (1.784) 
Expiration 0.0255**  0.0151 
 (1.989) 
 (1.257) 
Underlying NBBO Mid 0.0017**  0.0018*** 
 (2.193) 
 (2.679) 
Log(Underlying Volume) -0.0239*  -0.0212* 
 (-1.956) 
 (-1.775) 
Underlying MCAP 0.0069***  0.0078*** 
 (3.993) 
 (4.713) 
Day FE No  Yes 
Option Class FE Yes  Yes 
R2 0.1105 
 0.1155 
N 20,142   20,142 
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Table A.1 
Event Statistics 
This table provides order statistics in event time for matched options series on the PHLX and the NOM.  We use 
August 30, 2010 as the event date as this seems to be the actual effective date of the fee policy.  We match option 
series (underlying symbol, option type, strike, expiration date) on the PHLX by day with the same option series on 
the NOM.  We examine the 10 days prior to the fee change and the 10 days following the rule change. 
Day 
Order Cancel 
Rate   Order Duration   # of Orders   Order Fill Rate   Order Fill Speed 
  PHLX NOM   PHLX NOM   PHLX NOM   PHLX NOM   PHLX NOM 
-10 73.92% 99.73%  597.4 75.1  621 17714  16.85% 0.27%  902.3 820.2 
-9 75.32% 99.74%  743.4 88.8  499 15681  14.74% 0.27%  1014.2 1136.6 
-8 72.06% 99.66%  709.3 93.0  333 12233  17.85% 0.35%  991.6 967.0 
-7 72.92% 99.67%  672.9 91.8  431 16825  16.78% 0.33%  933.2 841.9 
-6 72.18% 99.60%  752.1 99.1  349 10022  16.92% 0.40%  856.7 681.2 
-5 67.66% 99.75%  846.3 104.0  325 13347  18.76% 0.25%  1353.0 961.5 
-4 71.47% 99.75%  660.5 90.5  408 19819  17.83% 0.25%  924.1 774.9 
-3 73.80% 99.80%  696.9 66.5  429 18030  16.62% 0.20%  1038.3 694.5 
-2 75.65% 99.74%  699.0 78.7  443 18224  14.69% 0.26%  1007.1 784.2 
-1 71.40% 99.79%  684.4 66.2  467 19531  18.54% 0.21%  912.3 710.7 
               
1 59.04% 99.78%  1092.5 65.2  229 20145  26.12% 0.22%  1135.2 975.4 
2 59.39% 99.64%  976.9 87.3  143 14592  27.42% 0.36%  1044.8 974.8 
3 61.22% 99.66%  1088.0 90.8  70 13039  24.52% 0.34%  1192.0 822.2 
4 63.94% 99.79%  923.1 77.1  132 13558  22.62% 0.21%  1001.4 920.5 
5 61.29% 99.62%  853.2 102.8  150 14211  25.46% 0.38%  1008.8 714.5 
6 67.19% 99.80%  734.6 90.2  165 13406  19.71% 0.20%  998.7 756.7 
7 65.69% 99.73%  926.4 105.2  174 13119  20.92% 0.27%  1212.5 776.0 
8 58.04% 99.58%  1087.8 133.6  116 10362  26.42% 0.42%  916.0 1088.3 
9 64.25% 99.61%  784.7 88.2  120 12329  23.25% 0.39%  916.0 729.9 
10 63.69% 99.71%   868.1 98.9   146 12072   24.43% 0.29%   1011.0 754.0 
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Table A.2 
Order Execution Quality – Marketable vs. Nonmarketable 
This table reports the results of estimating eq. (1) separately for marketable orders and nonmarketable orders. The event window is the 55 trading days between 
July 26, 2010 and October 14, 2010.  The variable of interest, Post, is a categorical variable set equal to one if the observation is in the post-event period, and zero 
for the pre-event period. We exclude orders on the event date. All remaining independent variables are defined in Table 4. Test-statistics are reported in parentheses 
obtained from standard errors clustered by underlying stock.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Event Period [-23, 32] 07/26/2010 - 10/15/2010 
 Marketable 
Arrival Rate 
Nonmarketable 
Fill Rate 
 Fill Speed (seconds)  # Orders 
    Marketable Nonmarketable   Marketable Nonmarketable 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6] 
Post 0.017*** 0.055**  -0.005** 45.652  0.205** -252.257*** 
 (2.846) (2.466) 
 (-2.514) (1.461)  (2.349) (-3.375) 
Expiration 0.005** 0.003  -0.002 -138.100**  -0.011 -60.465** 
 (2.336) (0.429) 
 (-0.650) (-2.303)  (-0.343) (-1.983) 
Price 0.001*** 0.000  -0.000*** -6.627**  -0.026*** 0.736 
 (6.648) (0.551) 
 (-5.348) (-2.228)  (-13.546) (0.371) 
IVOL 0.001 -0.013*  -0.000 -87.307  -0.089 -37.775 
 (0.535) (-1.754) 
 (-0.317) (-1.325)  (-0.535) (-0.782) 
Order Size 0.000*** 0.000  -0.000 0.242  0.000** -0.408 
 (2.628) (0.413) 
 (-1.197) (1.006)  (1.990) (-1.367) 
S/X 0.002 -0.008  -0.012*** -206.309  -0.090 -260.132*** 
 (0.306) (-0.432) 
 (-3.318) (-0.926)  (-0.411) (-2.634) 
Call 0.003*** 0.028***  -0.003** 31.083  0.319** -55.219*** 
 (3.149) (7.017) 
 (-2.128) (1.095)  (2.397) (-3.049) 
Underlying NBBO Mid 0.000 0.000  -0.000 1.504  -0.001 1.244 
 (1.240) (0.056) 
 (-0.142) (1.172)  (-0.249) (0.520) 
Log(Underlying Volume) 0.012*** 0.039***  0.002 -208.123***  0.523*** 6.459 
 (5.851) (7.172) 
 (1.445) (-5.288)  (7.225) (0.440) 
Underlying MCAP 0.000 0.002**  -0.000 0.273  0.017*** -13.343*** 
 (1.456) (2.484) 
 (-1.055) (0.116)  (3.314) (-4.978) 
Constant -0.230*** -0.668***  0.023 4,760.737***  -8.914*** 1,475.172*** 
 (-6.071) (-6.369) 
 (0.992) (6.781)  (-8.531) (4.431)          
Option Class FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 0.026 0.048  0.004 0.003  0.016 0.038 
N 49,164 49,164   19,153 37,349   49,164 49,164 
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FIGURE 1: ORDER CANCELLATION FEE AND ORDER CANCELLATION RATES
 77 
 
Figure 1 
Order Cancellation Fee and Order Cancellation Rates 
Figure 1 plots average order cancellation rates, measured as the number of orders canceled divided by the total number 
of orders submitted for a particular options series, over a 56-day event window [-23, 32] around the introduction of 
an order cancellation fee on the PHLX.  The solid dark line represents orders on the PHLX, while the dotted light line 
represents orders on the NOM.  We perform a daily match between the PHLX and NOM by option series. 
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FIGURE 2: ORDER CANCELLATION FEE AND ORDER DURATION
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Figure 2 
Order Cancellation Fee and Order Duration 
Figure 2 plots average order duration, defined as the number of seconds between order submission and deletion, over 
a 56-day event window [-23, 32] around the introduction of an order cancellation fee on the PHLX.  The solid dark 
line represents orders on the PHLX, while the dotted light line represents orders on the NOM.  We perform a daily 
match between the PHLX and NOM by option series. 
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FIGURE 3: ORDER CANCELLATION FEE AND NUMBER OF ORDERS
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Figure 3 
Order Cancellation Fee and Number of Orders 
Figure 3 plots average # of orders submitted to the PHLX and NOM over a 56-day event window [-23, 32] around the 
introduction of an order cancellation fee on the PHLX.  The solid dark line represents orders on the PHLX, while the 
dotted light line represents orders on the NOM.  We perform a daily match between the PHLX and NOM by option 
series.     
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FIGURE 4: ORDER CANCELLATION FEE AND ORDER FILL RATES
 83 
 
Figure 4 
Order Cancellation Fee and Order Fill Rates 
Figure 4 plots average order fill rates on the PHLX and the NOM over a 56-day event window [-23, 32] around the 
introduction of an order cancellation fee on the PHLX.  The solid dark line represents orders on the PHLX, while the 
dotted light line represents orders on the NOM.  We perform a daily match between the PHLX and NOM by option 
series.     
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FIGURE 5: ORDER CANCELLATION FEE AND ORDER FILL SPEED
 85 
 
Figure 5 
Order Cancellation Fee and Order Fill Speed 
Figure 5 plots average order fill speeds, or the number of seconds between order submission and execution, over a 
56-day event window [-23, 32] around the introduction of an order cancellation fee on the PHLX.  The solid dark 
line represents orders on the PHLX, while the dotted light line represents orders on the NOM.  We perform a daily 
match between the PHLX and NOM by option series. 
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FIGURE 6: ORDER CANCELLATION RATES – ORDER DURATION
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Figure 6 
Order Cancellation Rates – Order Duration 
Figure 2 plots daily average order cancellation rates for options on both the PHLX and the NOM, disaggregated by 
the passage of clocktime from order submission to cancellation.  The time-to-cancellation is measured in seconds.  
The sample time period ranges from September 15, 2010 to October 15, 2010, as to avoid biasing the results due to 
the cancellation fee policy on the PHLX. The solid dark line represents cancellation rates for orders submitted to the 
PHLX, while the light dotted line represents cancellation rates for orders submitted to the NOM.  We perform a daily 
match between the PHLX and NOM by option series.   
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FIGURE 7: ORDER CANCELLATION RATES – OPTION MONEYNESS
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Figure 7 
Order Cancellation Rates – Option Moneyness 
Figure 3 plots daily average order cancellation rates for options on both the PHLX and the NOM, disaggregated by 
option type (call or put) and option moneyness.  Option moneyness is valued as the ratio of the underlying stock price 
to the option strike price, S/X.  A call (put) option is said to be in-the-money (out-of-the-money) if the S/X ratio is 
greater (less) than one.  An option is said to be near-the-money if the S/X ratio is between 0.9 and 1.1.  The sample 
time period ranges from September 15, 2010 to October 15, 2010.  The solid dark line represents cancellation rates 
for orders submitted to the PHLX, while the dotted light line represents cancellation rates for orders submitted to the 
NOM.  We perform a daily match between the PHLX and NOM by option series.  
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FIGURE 8: ORDER CANCELLATION RATES – TIME TO EXPIRATION
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Figure 8 
Order Cancellation Rates – Time to Expiration 
Figure 4 plots daily average order cancellation rates on the vertical axes and the days to option expiration on the 
horizontal axis.  Order cancellation rates are calculated as the total number of orders canceled divided by the number 
of orders submitted.  The number of days until expiration are calculated as the total number of weekdays from the date 
of order submission to the expiration date.  The sample time period ranges from September 15, 2010 to October 15, 
2010.  The solid dark line represents cancellation rates for orders submitted to the PHLX, while the dotted light line 
represents cancellation rates for orders submitted to the NOM.  We perform a daily match between the PHLX and 
NOM by option series. 
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PART 2: MARKET STRUCTURE RULES IN U.S. EQUITY OPTIONS 
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PART 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 Market structures are tailored to meet the particular needs of traders, which can impact 
order flow, trading strategies, and liquidity (see Parlour and Seppi, 2003 and O’Hara, 2015).25  An 
important market design affecting competition for order flow between trading venues, is the 
priority rules that govern the order matching process.  In a press release on April 16, 2015, BATS 
Global Markets states:  
“The launch of the new EDGX Options market will enable Bats to compete for a new 
segment of order flow that does not trade on the price-time markets that BZX Options 
currently operates… We see a big opportunity to bring our innovative technology, 
operating efficiency, market leading pricing, and first-class customer service to help make 
markets better for participants in this segment of the market.” (BATS to Launch Second 
U.S. Options Exchange – Targets November 2015 Launch for EDGX Options, page 1)26      
 Exchanges employ various trade execution rules to prioritize orders in the matching 
process.27  Most marketplaces grant price highest priority, but when two or more orders enter the 
limit order book at the same price, secondary priority rules, such as time or pro-rata, determine the 
                                                          
25 For example, Ho and Stoll (1983) investigate competition between dealer and auction markets.  Hendershott and 
Mendelson (2000) model competition between dealer and call markets.  Santos and Scheinkman (2001) analyze 
competition in margin requirements.  Foucault and Parlour (2000) examine competition in listing fees.  Parlour and 
Seppi (2003) develop a model of competition between exchanges based on liquidity provision.  Kwan, Masulis, and 
McInish (2014) examine the intermarket competition between dark trading venues and traditional stock exchanges.      
26 The press release can be found at http://www.bats.com/newsroom/press_releases/us_options/2015/ 
27 Domowitz (1993) analyzes over 50 automated market structures in 16 different countries and discusses the different 
trade execution priority rules found in these markets.    
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ordering in the queue.28  Limit order traders must balance the trade-off between the risks associated 
with delayed/non-execution with those of immediate execution (Harris and Hasbrouck, 1996; 
Handa and Schwartz, 1996; Parlour, 1998; Foucault, 1999).  Marketable orders execute at posted 
prices in the limit order book, whereas nonmarketable orders have the potential to improve upon 
execution price, but at the risk of not executing.29  Time priority allocates standing limit orders in 
sequence to marketable orders based on time of arrival in the book, whereas pro-rata priority 
allocates resting limit orders simultaneously to each countervailing marketable order in proportion 
to limit order size.30 Since priority rules determine the mechanics of the order matching process, 
they may significantly impact equilibrium selection, order flow, order submission/cancellation 
decisions, and market liquidity (Parlour and Seppi, 2003; Angel and Weaver, 1998; Bessembinder, 
2001; Field and Large, 2008; Lepone and Yang, 2012).31  
 In this paper, we investigate how order priority rules affect limit order quality and 
transaction outcomes in U.S. equity option markets.  We focus on option markets for two reasons.  
First, the exchanges observed in this study have similar pricing schedules and overall market 
structures, with the exception of secondary priority rules, which is particularly true of the two Bats’ 
exchanges.  This makes for a natural laboratory to test our research questions, holding other 
structural differences constant.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, both price-time and pro-
                                                          
28 Nonmarketable limit orders submitted to an exchange are stored in a queue in the order book and wait to execute 
against incoming marketable orders.  See section 2 for a more detailed discussion of the secondary precedence rules 
analyzed in this study.   
29 Liu (2009) discusses two types of risk that limit order traders face when unanticipated information arrives in the 
marketplace: picking-off risk and non-execution risk.  Picking-off risk is a result of limit orders providing others a 
free option to transact at a pre-specified limit price.  Non-execution risk arises when the market price diverges from 
the limit order price. 
30 Size priority is different than pro rata priority in that an entire incoming marketable order may execute against a 
single limit order as opposed to being shared. The pro-rata percentage is calculated by dividing the marketable order 
size by the total quantity at a given price.   
31 Frino et al. (2000) examine Eurodollar futures on the Globex2 system for after-hours trading by the CME and find 
little evidence of changes in bid-ask spreads or volatility after the switch from price-time to pro-rata priority.   
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rata priority are successful models in U.S. option markets.  With recent gains made by exchanges 
using price-time priority, slightly less than two-thirds of all trading volume executes on exchanges 
using pro-rata allocation.32  In contrast to U.S. option markets, the pro-rata model has been 
unsuccessful in U.S. equity exchanges.  For instance, the NASDAQ PSX was the first, and only, 
to attempt pro-rata allocation but failed to capture more than 1% market share in the first few years, 
resulting in the exchange relaunching in 2014 with a price-time model (see SEC Release No. 34-
69452).   
 We first examine if priority rules affect the probability of execution.  Price-time priority 
facilitates intense competition for queue position, as the first order to arrive at a particular price is 
given priority over all subsequent orders at the same price, even when the difference in arrival time 
is as short as a nanosecond (billionth of a second).33  A better order position means less waiting 
time and a greater likelihood of a complete fill (Guo, Ruan, and Zhu, 2015).  Pro-rata priority 
matches marketable orders at a price to all standing limit orders in proportion to order size, which 
might increase the likelihood of partial execution, but reduce the probability of a complete fill.  
We find that approximately 76% of the sample executions result in complete fills and average 
daily execution rates are between 2.09 and 2.22 percentage points higher in the price-time model, 
relative to the pro-rata model, other factors held constant.    
 Next, we analyze the effect of priority rules on the speed of order execution.  We separate 
time-to-completion from time-to-first-fill, as it may require multiple marketable orders to 
completely fill a single nonmarketable limit order.  For some traders, the uncertainty in time to 
                                                          
32 See statement from Bryan Harkins, executive vice president and head of U.S. markets at Bats in the Markets Media 
article entitled “Bats to Launch Pro Rata Options Exchange,” published on April 30, 2015.   
33 See, for example, the comments made in section five of the SEC memorandum on April 30, 2015 addressing the 
problems with Rule 611 of Regulation NMS, also known as the “Order Protection Rule” or “Trade-through Rule.”  
This is available at the web site https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/emsac/memo-rule-611-regulation-nms.pdf.  
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execution may not be important, but for others, the cost of waiting can be extremely high (see Lo, 
MacKinlay, and Zhang, 2002).  Our multivariate analysis shows that the average time-to-first-fill 
is between 212 and 240 seconds shorter on the Bats EDGX Options Exchange (EDGX), which 
employs pro-rata priority, relative to the Bats BZX Options Exchange (BZX) and the NASDAQ 
Options Market (NOM), which employ price-time priority.   
 Our last set of tests examine how priority rules influence order cancellation decisions.  The 
order strategy of submitting numerous orders, most of which are canceled, has received recent 
attention from policymakers, regulators, and exchange officials.34  For example, to reduce 
excessive order cancellation activity and ensure fair and orderly markets, former SEC Chairwoman 
Mary Schapiro recommends a minimum time-in-force for quotations.35   
 We expect traders in the price-time model to closely monitor their orders as the probability 
of obtaining best position at a particular price is relatively low.  In contrast, pro-rata priority gives 
traders less time to cancel orders before they face at least partial execution (Aldridge, 2013).  
Therefore, we expect order cancellation rates to be higher on exchanges using price-time priority, 
relative to exchanges using pro-rata priority, with one caveat.  Field and Large (2008) develop a 
theoretical model where the pro-rata priority rule encourages traders to submit oversized orders 
and cancel any surplus, i.e. “pad-the-books,” in attempt to realize a desired fill.36  Consequently, 
the percentage of orders canceled with only a partial fill may actually be higher on exchanges using 
pro-rata allocation.  We find that 88.72% of partial executions are subsequently canceled on the 
EDGX, relative to 61.63% on the BZX and 28.92% on the NOM.  In addition, average order size 
                                                          
34 Empirical research shows that a significant proportion of orders cancel prior to execution (Hasbrouck and Saar, 
2009, 2013; Van Ness, Van Ness, and Watson, 2015).   
35 Speech by SEC Chairman: “Strengthening Our Equity Market Structure” by Mary L. Schapiro on September 7, 
2010.   
36 See the Advantage Futures article, “Is Pro Rata an Accident Waiting to Happen,” written by Ginger Szala in June 
of 2015.  Also, see the Federal Reserve of Chicago 2014 paper, “Recommendations for Equitable Allocation of Trades 
in High Frequency Trading Environments,” by John McPartland.     
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is 7.6 contracts larger on the EDGX than on the BZX, and 3.7 contracts larger on the EDGX than 
on the NOM.  We argue that our results provide support for the notion that traders risk overtrading 
in the pro-rata model by submitting unrealistic quantities most of which are eventually canceled. 
 Overall, we document that neither price-time nor pro-rata priority dominate in all facets of 
execution quality.  Based on this evidence, we conclude that priority rules matter, but they can be 
viewed as complements rather than substitutes.  Thus, consistent with the argument of O’Hara 
(2015), market structures seem to meet the needs of different customers.   
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PRIORITY RULES: PRICE-TIME VS. PRO-RATA 
 Figure 1 illustrates the price-time and pro-rata matching processes in an example.  For 
simplicity, we consider only the bid-side of the limit order book where the current highest price is 
$10.00, where there are four limit orders resting in the top of the book queue each for 1,000 
contracts.  If a market sell order for 2,000 contracts arrives, the price-time algorithm will allocate 
the contracts to the first two limit orders in the queue, which arrived earliest.  The remaining two 
limit orders will remain on the book and must wait for the next incoming marketable order.  In 
contrast, the pro-rata algorithm will distribute the shares proportionally among the limit orders at 
$10.00.  In this example, the pro-rata percentage is 50% (2,000/4,000).  Therefore, each limit order 
will execute against 500 contracts of the arriving market sell order, and the remaining contracts 
will be left on the book.   
 
Figure 1.  Price-Time and Pro-Rata matching algorithms, an illustration. 
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HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 The U.S. equity options exchanges analyzed in this study operate as electronic limit order 
books: the NASDAQ Options Market, Bats BZX Options Exchange, and Bats EDGX Options 
Exchange.  There is substantial theoretical literature that considers the role of limit orders in the 
price discovery process (e.g. Glosten, 1994; Seppi, 1997; Parlour, 1998; Lo, MacKinlay, and 
Zhang, 2002; Parlour and Seppi, 2003; Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel, 2005).  When a limit order 
is submitted to an exchange, it enters the order book or the queue.  The queue then prioritizes the 
limit orders based upon the rules established by the exchange.  In a competitive order-driven 
market, secondary priority rules, such as time and pro-rata, ultimately govern the mechanics of the 
matching process.  Thus, priority rules can directly impact order placement strategies and, 
consequently, how liquidity is supplied on an exchange (Angel and Weaver, 1998; Bessembinder, 
2001; Field and Large, 2008). 
 Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb (1981) show that a trader’s expected end-of-
period wealth is an increasing function of order execution probability.  Traders can achieve better 
execution prices by submitting more passive limit orders, but face the risk of non-execution (see 
Angel, 1994; Hollifield, Miller, and Sandas, 1996; Foucault, 1999; Peterson and Sirri, 2002).  Non-
execution risk increases as the market price moves further away from the order price (Liu, 2009).  
Nonmarketable orders are stored in the order book queue and must wait the arrival of marketable 
orders to execute. Therefore, the execution of a nonmarketable order is not guaranteed.    
Alternatively, traders have the option to achieve immediacy by submitting more aggressive 
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marketable orders, but at the risk the market price will move in an unfavorable direction prior to 
execution.   
 Market structure rules that prioritize orders can directly impact the probability of order 
execution, a risk inherent in limit order placement.  In the pro-rata model, a marketable order is 
distributed to all competitively-priced nonmarketable orders in proportion to order size.  This may 
increase the probability of at least a partial execution.  However, theory also predicts that traders 
will risk overtrading in the pro-rata model, and cancel any remaining contracts that go unexecuted 
(Angel and Weaver, 1998; Field and Large, 2008).  Therefore, the probability of a complete fill 
might be relatively low on exchanges using pro-rata priority.   
 The price-time model, in contrast, matches marketable orders to the most competitively-
priced nonmarketable order(s) that arrived in the queue first.  Depending on the size of the 
marketable order, only one nonmarketable order may fill, while the remaining orders will sit on 
the book.  As new information enters the market, standing limit orders face greater risk of being 
“picked off”, as the value of the asset rises above (good news) or drops below (bad news) the 
current market price (see Stoll, 1992; Berkman, 1996; Handa and Schwartz, 1996; Foucault, 1999).  
Liu (2009) shows that limit order traders reduce the risk of being picked off by widening the limit 
order spread, which in turn, reduces the likelihood of an order filling.    
 To the extent that the pro-rata model increases the probability of partial executions, and the 
price-time model reduces the chance of an order filling, we expect the following hypothesis to 
hold.    
Hypothesis 1: The probability of order execution is higher on exchanges with pro-rata 
priority, relative to exchanges with price-time priority.           
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 Priority rules that govern the matching process between buyers and sellers can directly 
impact the time-to-execution.  The uncertainty in execution time may not be important for all 
traders, but for some, the cost of waiting can be quite significant (see Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang, 
2002; Garvey and Wu, 2010).  Exchanges that enforce price-time priority ultimately facilitate a 
race to the top of the order book queue, as orders execute on a first-come, first-serve basis.  In 
price-time models, queue positioning is crucial, as a better order position means less waiting time 
and a higher probability of execution (Guo, Ruan, and Zhu, 2015).  Hence, time priority encourages 
traders to place orders quickly to achieve faster execution at a desired price, which can shorten the 
time-to-completion, as long as those orders remain on the book.     
 In an article entitled “Size Matters” in Marketview magazine, Brian Hyndman, Senior Vice 
President of NASDAQ OMX, explains:  
“The price-time priority model benefits market participants who have the fastest 
technology, which allows their orders to rapidly reach the front of the line.  With a price-
size priority model, speed is de-emphasized with the objective of providing incentives for 
traders to send in sizable orders.”   
 Time, however, is not granted precedence on exchanges operating under a pro-rata model.  
Rather, all limit orders in the queue execute simultaneously against an incoming marketable order 
in proportion to size.  Queue position is, therefore, less important in a pure pro-rata model.  A limit 
order will not completely fill in this model, unless the arriving marketable order(s) is (are) 
sufficiently large to fill all limit orders at a particular price.  For this reason, limit orders submitted 
to an exchange using pro-rata rules may sit longer in the queue before realizing a complete fill.  
Thus, we expect the following hypothesis to hold.   
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Hypothesis 2: Time-to-completion is shorter on exchanges using price-time priority, 
relative to exchanges using pro-rata priority.   
 Similar to Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang (2002), we distinguish between the time-to-
completion and time-to-first-fill, which is an important contrast when considering the effect of 
priority rules on order execution speed.  In the pro-rata model, each order entered at a price is 
given priority based on size.  Therefore, regardless of when the limit order entered the order book, 
it will at least partially execute when a marketable order arrives.  In the price-time model, however, 
only the first nonmarketable order to arrive at a price may execute, while all remaining limit orders 
must wait for the next marketable order.  Thus, we might expect the time-to-first fill to be shorter 
on exchanges using pro-rata priority than those using price-time priority.     
Hypothesis 3: Time-to-first-fill is shorter on exchanges using pro-rata priority, relative to 
exchanges using price-time priority.    
 Advances in technology have changed financial markets by altering the trading behavior 
of limit order traders, who are now better able to monitor orders and make faster, more precise 
decisions (Goldstein, Kumar, and Graves, 2014).37  The increase in high-speed computerized 
trading coincides with an increase in order cancelations (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009).  Van Ness, 
Van Ness, and Watson (2015) show that order cancellation rates in the U.S. equities markets are 
increasing over time, starting at 35% in 2001, and reaching above 90% in 2010.  Hence, it is not 
surprising that order cancellation activity has drawn significant attention from the popular press, 
regulators, and exchange officials.  For instance, in a policy proposal submitted by the NASDAQ 
to the SEC (see SEC Release No. 34-65610), the exchange states: 
                                                          
37 See also Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005) for a review of the evolution of limit order trading strategies.  O’Hara (2015) 
also discusses how high-frequency trading has changed financial markets.   
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“Today’s cash equities markets are characterized by high levels of automation and speed…  
In such an environment, the degree to which displayed orders reflect committed trading 
sentiment has become less predictable, because many entered orders are rapidly 
canceled.”    
Thus, exchange operators are concerned with cancellation activity, and secondary precedence rules 
can have a direct impact on order cancellation rates. 
 Reducing low latency in trading and competing for order position are key drivers behind 
the technological race among high-speed trading firms (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013 and Guo, Ruan, 
and Zhu, 2015).  The price-time model favors speed, as faster traders receive the bids and offers 
first.  Aït-Sahalia and Saglam (2013) model a trader who submits orders on both sides of the market 
and cancels one of the existing orders when the signal changes.  Therefore, an order cancellation 
will occur when the signal received by the trader changes before a trade occurs.  As the latency of 
the trader decreases, the cancellation rate increases monotonically.  Since the price-time model 
prioritizes orders based on time of arrival, it might encourage higher cancellation rates as many of 
the orders submitted at a particular price will fall short of obtaining the best position and will 
subsequently be canceled.   
 Traders submitting orders to an exchange operating under the pro-rata model are likely to 
use a differing trading strategy, since jockeying for queue position is far less important.  Every 
order submitted to a pro-rata exchange faces a positive probability of fractional execution, which 
discourages traders from submitting frivolous orders that almost immediately cancel.  Since the 
pro-rata model gives priority to all orders at a particular price, it provides traders with less time to 
cancel orders prior to facing execution.  By contrast, the price-time priority model gives traders 
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more time to cancel orders before they face execution (Aldridge, 2013).  We, therefore, expect the 
following hypothesis to hold: 
Hypothesis 4: Order cancellation rates are higher in price-time exchanges than in pro-
rata exchanges.   
    Although we expect order cancellation rates to be lower in pro-rata exchanges, relative to 
those in price-time exchanges, the percentage of orders canceled with only a partial fill might 
actually be larger in pro-rata exchanges.  Since every order in a pro-rata model is executed in 
proportion to the total number of all orders in the top-of-the-book queue, to execute a desired order 
size in full, a trader must submit a larger-than-necessary order, and then cancel any surplus order 
once the desired execution size has been reached (Angel and Weaver, 1999 and Aldridge, 2013).  
Therefore, pro-rata priority incentivizes traders to inflate order size and cancel the remainder after 
a partial fill.   
 The public press has expressed concerns with the pro-rata model on this particular topic.  
A Federal Reserve of Chicago 2014 paper states:38 
“If there is a criticism of the Pro Rata trade allocation logic, it is that many market 
participants are constantly bidding or offering unrealistically large quantities, often far 
greater than they could likely absorb.”    
Field and Large (2008) develop a theoretical model where the pro-rata priority rule forces traders 
to risk overtrading by submitting over-sized limit orders, most of which eventually cancel.  In their 
model, the pro-rata algorithm matches limit orders to each countervailing marketable order in 
proportion to their sizes, which creates strategic ‘complementarities’ in the order-size decisions of 
traders.  In equilibrium, traders over-inflate order sizes in attempt to achieve a desired fill amount.  
                                                          
38 See the Federal Reserve of Chicago 2014 paper, “Recommendations for Equitable Allocation of Trades in High 
Frequency Trading Environments,” authored by John McPartland.   
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Field and Large (2008) argue that this type of order-size competition is absent under the price-time 
rule.  Thus, we expect the following hypothesis to hold. 
Hypothesis 5: The percentage of partially filled orders canceled is higher in pro-rata 
exchanges, relative to that in price-time exchanges.     
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DATA DESCRIPTION 
 We use order-level data collected from three equity options exchanges: Bats BZX, Bats 
EDGX, and Nasdaq Options Market.39  We receive depth of book quotations and execution 
information from the Bats historical Multicast PITCH.  BATS uses a symbol mapping mechanism 
for the options Multicast PITCH to reduce the size of the feed.  The day-specific mappings include 
unique identifiers and information on the option symbol, strike price, expiration date, and option 
type (call or put).  The following messages are time stamped to the nanosecond and linked by a 
day-specific order id number.  “Add order” message represents a new displayed order on the BATS 
book, which includes a side indicator (buy order or sell order), quantity (# of contracts), security 
mapping symbol, and limit order price.  “Order executed” messages are sent when a visible order 
on the BATS book executes in whole or in part and includes the executed quantity and price (if 
different from the add order price).  “Reduce size” messages are sent when a visible order is 
partially reduced.  “Modify order” message is sent whenever an add order message is visibly (price 
and/or quantity) modified.  “Delete order” message is sent when an open order is completely 
removed from the BATS book.   
 We combine the BATS information with order and trade data from the NASDAQ ITCH to 
Trade Options (ITTO) direct feed.  We download several different message types that are linked 
by a unique order reference number.  “Option directory” messages contain information for the 
                                                          
39 These three exchanges are the only U.S. equity options markets for which we have both order and trade data.  We 
do not view this as a limitation as these three venues operate under various priority models and capture one-quarter 
market share.     
 107 
 
security symbol, expiration date, strike price, and option type (call or put).  “Add order” messages 
are time stamped records for new orders added to the book, including order time (stamped to the 
nanosecond), market side (buy or sell), order price, and order size (# of contracts).  “Executed 
order” modification messages are time stamped records generated by (partial) executions and 
report executed contracts and execution price (if the execution price differs from the add order 
price).40  “Order cancel” messages are time stamped records generated by partial cancellations and 
report the number of contracts canceled.  “Replace” messages are time stamped records that report 
the new order reference number, new order price, and new order size.  “Delete” messages are time 
stamped records that report when an order is deleted from the NOM order book.   
 To supplement the order data, we obtain end-of-day market price and volume information 
on trades and quotes, as well as greek values, from the Options Price Reporting Authority (OPRA).   
In addition to options data, we acquire CRSP data to compute independent variables for the 
multivariate tests.  We analyze the 21 trading days between October 3, 2016 and October 31, 2016.  
Using statistics from the Options Clearing Corporation, we find that these three exchanges account 
for nearly a quarter of all equity option trading volume.   
 Table 1 describes our sample selection process.  The initial sample contains trade and 
matched order data for 3,232 option classes.  We focus on orders during regular trading hours 9:30 
a.m. to 4:00 pm and we remove complex orders, such as spreads and straddles, as they are priced 
as a package.41 The initial sample consists of billions of orders submitted to the three options 
exchanges, of which 4.2 million execute for a total of 50.68 million option contracts.  Since we 
are comparing execution quality across exchanges, we restrict the sample to options classes that 
                                                          
40 Since the analysis involves examining limit order execution quality between order allocation models, we ignore 
“trade” messages that report executions involving non-displayed order types.   
41 For robustness, we exclude order messages transmitted before 9:45 am and after 3:50 pm to avoid the opening and 
closing rotations, and our results are qualitatively similar.    
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trade on all three exchanges, which reduces the sample to 2,476 option classes.  These option 
classes account for 98.91% of trades and 98.97% of contract volume.  Similar to Battalio, Shkilko, 
and Van Ness (2016) we eliminate option classes that have fewer than 10 trades per day.  This 
screen reduces the sample to 472 option classes, which account for 87.56% of trades and 89.25% 
of contract volume.  We next exclude options on foreign stocks, ADRs, and REITs.  The final 
sample consists of 390 option classes of which 333 are on common stocks and 57 are on ETFs.  
We also report that 186 (41) of the 333 (57) option classes on common stocks (ETFs) trade in 
pennies, while 147 (16) do not trade in pennies.  Out of the initial sample trades and volume, the 
390 option classes account for 77% of trades and 79% of contract volume. 
 Next, we describe the distribution of sample trading activity across exchanges.  Panel A of 
Table 2 shows that the BZX captures the largest sample market share, executing 60.12% of trades 
and 63.06% of trading volume across all option classes.  The NOM executes 31.5% of trades and 
31.43% of trading volume, while the EDGX executes 8.38% of trades and 5.51% of trading 
volume.  The EDGX captures more sample market share in options on ETFs.  Specifically, the 
EDGX accounts for 16.34% of trades and 9.08% of trading volume in options on ETFs.   
 On January 26th, 2007, the options exchanges commenced a pilot to quote and trade options 
in one-cent increments.  The penny pilot program initially included options on 13 stocks and ETFs, 
but has expanded the program to options on 363 securities.  Pilot stock and ETFs are quoted and 
traded in penny increments for options trading at less than $3.00, and increments of five-cents for 
options trading at or above $3.00.42   Panel B of Table 2 shows that grouping option classes into 
penny-pilot and non-penny pilot yields slightly different sample market share results.  For instance, 
the BZX executes 61.78% of trades in penny options, while only 49.98% of trades in non-penny 
                                                          
42 Options on QQQ trade and quote in one-cent increments at all price levels.   
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options.  The NOM executes only 29.22% of trades in penny options but 45.42% of trading in non-
penny options.  The EDGX executes the least amount of trades in penny options and non-penny 
options, 9% and 4.6%, respectively.   
 Panel A of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the 333 option classes on common 
stocks.  The average option class has a strike price of $80.72, with a corresponding underlying 
closing price of $81.09.  We estimate option moneyness, or value of an option contract, as the ratio 
of the underlying stock price to strike price.  Since equity option open interest is concentrated in 
options near the money (Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, and Poteshman, 2007), it is not unexpected to 
find a mean S/X ratio of 1.03.  Since information is shown to flow from equity to options markets 
(Chen, Lung, and Tay, 2005), we observe underlying characteristics such as volume and market 
capitalization.  The mean daily trading volume for an underlying common stock is 6.3 million 
shares and a market capitalization of $44.98 billion.  Panel B of Table 3 displays option class 
statistics on the 57 ETFs in the sample.  The average option class on an ETF has a strike price of 
$63.67, 54 days to expiration, and an S/X ratio of 1.024.  The average trading volume on an ETF 
is 12.3 million shares. 
 Since the primary purpose of this study is to compare the difference in execution quality 
between the price-time and pro-rata priority models, we obtain information on the allocation 
models and fees for each exchange.  Panel A of Table 4 shows that the BZX and the NOM use the 
price-time model, which allocates marketable orders to standing limit orders at a price in sequence 
based on time of arrival.  The EDGX uses a pro-rata model that fills standing limit orders at a price 
in proportion to order size. 
 Each of the three exchanges use maker-taker pricing.  A maker rebate is paid to standing 
limit orders when they provide liquidity to a marketable order, whereas a taker fee is paid by 
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marketable orders when they access liquidity.  Battalio et al. (2015) document a negative relation 
between take fees and several aspects of order execution quality.  Panel B of Table 4 shows that 
the average take fee on the BZX is $0.46, on the EDGX is $0.32, and on the NOM is $0.50.  To 
the extent the relation between take fees and limit order execution quality holds in equity option 
markets, we might expect (a priori) fill rates to be lower on the BZX and NOM, relative to the 
EDGX.     
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 To examine the differences, if any, in order execution quality between the price-time and 
pro-rata matching models, we estimate the following six measures: probability of order execution, 
time-to-complete fill, time-to-first fill, probability of order cancellation, proportion of partially 
executed orders canceled, and order size (see Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang, 2002; and Battalio, 
Corwin, and Jennings, 2015).   
 To approximate the probability of order execution, we follow Foucault (1999) and estimate 
daily execution rates by option class as the ratio of the number of executed orders divided by the 
total number of orders submitted.  Table 5 shows that the average execution rate is 2.98% on the 
BZX, 1.17% on the EDGX, and 4.98% on the NOM.  We test for differences in mean execution 
rates between pro-rata and price-time priority using simple test-statistics.  We find that the average 
execution rate is 1.8 percentage points lower on the EDGX, relative to the BZX.  In addition, 
average execution rates are 3.8 percentage points lower on the EDGX than on the NOM.  These 
results indicate that the probability of execution is significantly higher in the price-time model, 
relative to the pro-rata model, which leads us to reject our first hypothesis.   
 In an attempt to explain this result, we separate executions into complete fills and partial 
fills and report the statistics in the appendix (see Table A.1).  We find that out of the 3.25 million 
orders that execute across the three exchanges during the sample period, 2.47 million are complete 
fills and only 0.78 million are partial fills.  Since Field and Large (2008) predict that traders submit 
unrealistic quantities in the pro-rata model with the intention of cancelling unexecuted contracts, 
we might expect the proportion of partial fills to total executions to be relatively high in the pro-
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rata model, while the ratio of complete fills to total executions to be relatively low.  We find as the 
percentage of partial orders to executions is highest on the EDGX, 35.9%, compared to 25.06% 
on the BZX and 19.38% on the NOM.  The percentage of complete fills to total executions is, 
therefore, lowest on the EDGX, 64.15%, relative to 74.94% on the BZX and 80.62% on the NOM. 
Two-sample t-tests between proportions are performed to determine that there are significant 
differences in the percentage of partial/complete executions between the exchanges. The 
proportion of partial execution on the EDGX is significantly higher than on the BZX (difference 
= 10.80%; t-stat = 119.88) and the NOM (difference = 16.48%; t-stat = 182.19).  Since the majority 
of executions are complete fills across all three exchanges, and we find a lower order completion 
rate in the pro-rata model, our finding that the probability of execution is lower on the EDGX is 
supported.  
 Our next measure of execution quality is limit order execution time.  We follow Lo, 
MacKinlay, and Zhang (2002) and separate the time-to-completion from the time-to-first-fill.  We 
estimate execution times using order data, which is time-stamped to the nanosecond (one billionth 
of a second).  Time-to-complete fill is measured as the passage of time from initial order 
submission to complete execution.  It is possible for the same limit order to execute in several 
parts, therefore, we estimate time-to-completion using the difference between the time of the initial 
display order message and the time of the last executed message that fills the original order.  For 
ease of interpretation, we calculate execution times in seconds.   
 Table 5 shows that the average (median) time-to-completion for an order submitted to the 
EDGX is roughly 586 (333) seconds.  In comparison, the average (median) time-to-completion on 
the BZX is 708 (644) seconds and 921 (819) seconds on the NOM.  We find that the mean time-
to-completion is approximately 122 seconds faster on the EDGX than on the BZX and 371 seconds 
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faster on the EDGX than on the NOM.  These differences are significant at the 0.01 level and 
economically meaningful.  Our results suggest that the time-to-completion is faster on exchanges 
using pro-rata priority than price-time priority, and so we reject our second hypothesis. 
 We estimate the time-to-first-fill as the number of seconds between initial order submission 
and first execution.  Table 5 shows that the average time-to-first-fill is 693 seconds on the BZX, 
544 seconds on the EDGX, and 921 seconds on the NOM.  The difference in mean time-to-first 
fill between the EDGX and BZX (NOM) is -148.398 (-377) seconds.  Our univariate tests provide 
evidence to support our third hypothesis, which states that the time-to-first-fill is shorter on 
exchanges using pro-rata priority than exchanges using price-time priority. 
 To test our fourth hypothesis, which states that order cancellation activity is higher in price-
time exchanges than in pro-rata exchanges, we estimate the probability of order cancellation for 
each option class as the ratio of the total number of orders canceled to the total number of orders 
submitted on a particular trading day.  Table 5 reports that the average order cancellation rate on 
the BZX is 96.91%, relative to 96.9% on the EDGX.  The difference in mean cancellation activity 
between the BZX and EDGX is insignificant.  We do, however, find that the average probability 
of cancellation is significantly higher on the EDGX, relative to the NOM (difference = 0.0688, t-
stat = 10.74).  Thus, we find conflicting evidence for the difference in cancellation activity between 
exchanges using pro-rata and price-time priority.   
  Our last set of tests in this section examine if traders might risk overtrading, submit larger 
orders than they intend to execute, in the pro-rata model.  A consequence of submitting oversized 
orders in hopes of achieving a desired fill amount, is that once a desired execution size is reached 
the remaining contracts will be canceled (Angel and Weaver, 1999 and Aldridge, 2013).43  We 
                                                          
43 We analyze only partial executions that are then canceled by a delete order message, and thus avoid day orders that 
cancel at the end of the trading session.    
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first measure the proportion of partially executed orders that are subsequently canceled.  Table 5 
shows that 88.72% of partially executed orders on the EDGX are canceled, whereas this ratio is 
only 61.63% on the BZX and 28.92% on the NOM.  Our results indicate that the percentage of 
partially filled orders canceled is significantly higher on the exchange allocating orders on a pro-
rata bases, relative to exchanges using price-time matching, which supports our last hypothesis 
that states the percentage of partially filled orders canceled is higher in pro-rata exchanges than in 
price-time exchanges.       
 We also analyze differences in mean order sizes across the sample exchanges.  To the 
extent traders risk overtrading in the pro-rata model, we expect to find larger order sizes on the 
EDGX, relative to the BZX and NOM.  Table 5 shows that the average order size on the EDGX is 
23.84 contracts, relative to 16.22 contracts on the BZX and 20.14 contracts on the NOM.  We find 
that average order size is significantly higher on the EDGX, relative to the BZX (difference = 
7.6232; t-stat = 3.85) and NOM (difference = 3.7020; t-stat = 2.00).  Therefore, average order size 
is significantly higher in the pro-rata model than in the price-time model, which provides further 
support for the notion that traders may submit unrealistic quantities in the pro-rata model to achieve 
a desired fill amount.                 
 In this section, we examine if the differences in execution quality between the pro-rata and 
price-time matching models observed in the univariate tests hold in a multivariate setting.  
Presumably, a trader’s limit order placement decisions and the quality of his/her executions are 
conditional on several factors including option and stock characteristics, market conditions, and 
priority rules.  To address this concern, we conduct multivariate analyses to examine the 
determinants of execution quality. 
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 We use OLS and quantile median regressions to analyze five dependent variables.  First, 
% execution rates, defined as the ratio of executions (complete or partial) to total orders.  Second, 
time-to-completion, calculated as the number of seconds between order time and a complete fill.  
Third, time-to-first-fill, measured as the number of seconds between order time and first fill time 
conditional on at least a partial fill.  Fourth, % order cancellation rates, defined as the percentage 
of total orders canceled.  Last, we examine the % of partial executions canceled.  We contend that 
the relevant independent variables are option and stock attributes, order characteristics, venue 
traits, and trading day.  The unit of measurement is option class/day and the general specification 
for our models is outlined as follows: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑍𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑂𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐷𝐺𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆/𝑋𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑃𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽14𝑈𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑈𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽17𝐸𝑇𝐹𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
(1) 
where BZX, NOM, and EDGX are exchange-specific indicator variables equal to one if the 
order/execution occurs on that particular exchange and zero otherwise; S/X is the underlying stock 
price divided by the strike price; Days Expire is the number of days between order 
submission/update to option expiration; Call equals one if the option is a call option and zero for 
a put option; IVOL is an option’s average daily implied volatility as computed by OPRA; Spread 
equals an option’s average daily dollar quoted spread, or the difference between the ask price and 
bid price provided by OPRA; Order Size is the average number of contracts attached to a particular 
order; Cancel Speed is the number of seconds between order submission and cancellation 
conditional on a complete order deletion; Volume equals the option’s average daily contract 
volume in 10,000s; Price equals the option’s mean trade price; Pvolt equals the option’s average 
daily standard deviation in trade prices; UVolume equal the underlying stock’s average daily share 
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volume in 10,000s; UMCAP is the underlying stock’s average daily market capitalization, 
measured in $billions; Penny equals one if the option is traded and quoted in pennies and zero 
otherwise; and ETF equals one if the option class is an ETF and zero if it is a common stock.   
 We also include day dummy variables, 𝛿𝑡.  We estimate eq. (1) with and without option-
class fixed effects, 𝛾𝑖.  The option class fixed effects prevent us from estimating the coefficients 
on the Penny and ETF indicator variables, as these measure do not have within-class variation.  
Most of the results are virtually identical between the two estimation approaches, with or without 
option-class fixed effects, and we therefore focus on the results without fixed effects.  We do not 
include all exchange indicator variables in any of the model specifications as this would violate 
the full column rank assumption for consistent OLS estimation.    
 Table 6 reports the results of estimating eq. (1) inserting execution rates as the dependent 
variable.  Our results show that call options are more likely to execute than put options.  Also, we 
find a positive and significant coefficient on Cancel Speed, indicating that the probability of 
execution increases as the average order remains on the book for a longer period of time.  The 
positive and significant coefficient on UVolume suggests that as the average daily shares traded in 
the underlying stock increases, so does the probability of execution in the related options.     
 We first compare order execution rates between the EDGX and the BZX, by removing 
observations on the NOM and omitting the NOM and EDGX indicator variables from eq. (1).  
Column [1] of Table 6 shows that an order submitted to the BZX is 1.12 percentage points more 
likely to fill than an order submitted to the EDGX, other factors held constant.  We next compare 
execution rates between the EDGX and the NOM, by removing observations from the BZX and 
deleting the BZX and EDGX indicator variables from eq. (1).  Columns [3] and [4] of Table 6 
show that average daily execution rates are between 2.85 and 2.94 percentage points higher on the 
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NOM, relative to the EDGX.  Since the EDGX operates using pro-rata priority and the BZX and 
NOM use price-time priority, our results do not support our first hypothesis that the probability of 
execution is higher in the pro-rata model than in the price-time model.  In fact, we find the opposite, 
execution probability is higher in the price-time model, relative to the pro-rata model, which is 
consistent with our univariate tests. 
 Since execution time is uncertain when placing a limit order, traders must consider both 
the risk of non-execution and speed of execution.  We separate execution times into time-to-first-
fill and time-to-completion.  To control for potential outliers, as the standard deviation in execution 
times are wide, we estimate eq. (1) for both time-to-completion and time-to-first-fill using quantile 
median regressions.  Table 7 reports the results of estimating eq. (1) when time-to-completion is 
the dependent variable.  The control variables generate several interesting results.  As the 
underlying stock price increases relative to the option strike price, the time-to-completion 
lengthens.  The positive and significant coefficients on Days Expire suggest that orders on options 
further from expiration take longer to fill.  We also find that orders on call options take longer to 
fill than orders on put options, at both the mean and median. Similar to Battalio et al. (2015), time-
to-execution is decreasing in trading volume and increasing in volatility.  Last, orders submitted 
on options that trade in pennies fill faster than orders on options that do not trade in pennies.   
 To assess whether priority rules affect execution times, we focus on the exchange indicator 
variables.  In Column [2] of Table 7, we find that the median time-to-completion is 156.55 seconds 
faster on the EDGX than on the BZX, other factors held constant.  Column [4] of Table 7 shows 
that the time-to-completion is 412.18 seconds faster on the EDGX than on the NOM.  Counter to 
our second hypothesis, our multivariate analysis shows that the time-to-completion is shorter in 
the pro-rata model, relative to the price-time model. 
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 Table 8 reports the results of estimating eq. (1), inserting time-to-first-fill as the dependent 
variable.  The coefficients on the BZX indicator variable in Columns [1] and [2] are positive and 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that the time-to-first-fill is shorter on the EDGX than on the 
BZX.  In economic terms, the time-to-first-fill is between 97.8 and 149.6 seconds faster on the 
EDGX, relative to the BZX.  We find even stronger results when we compare time-to-first-fill 
between the EDGX and NOM.  For instance, the average (median) time-to-first-fill is 337 (384) 
seconds faster on the EDGX than on the NOM.  The results in Table 8 support our third hypothesis 
that the time-to-first-fill is shorter on exchanges using pro-rata priority than on exchanges using 
price-time priority. 
 Next, we examine if order cancellation activity differs between the pro-rata and price-time 
models.  We estimate eq. (1) using % order cancellation rates as the dependent variable and report 
the results in Panel A of Table 9.  We suppress the control variables for brevity and concentrate 
on the exchange indicator variables.  We find that, on average, the percentage of orders canceled 
is not significantly higher on the EDGX, relative to the BZX.  However, the average number of 
orders canceled is between 3.49 and 4.11 percentage points higher on the EDGX than on the NOM.  
Therefore, we reject our fourth hypothesis, which states that order cancellation rates are higher in 
price-time than in pro-rata.    
 Interestingly, Panel B of Table 9 shows that the time-to-cancellation is significantly longer 
on the BZX and NOM, relative to the EDGX.  Specifically, the average time-to-cancellation on 
the EDGX is 75.66 seconds faster than on the BZX and 363.74 seconds faster than on the NOM, 
other factors held constant, which suggests that the average limit order sits on the book for a shorter 
period of time on the EDGX than on the other two exchanges.  Our finding are consistent with the 
conjecture that the price-time priority model gives traders more time to cancel orders before facing 
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execution, relative to the pro-rata model (Aldridge, 2013), which might help explain why order 
cancellation activity is higher on the EDGX than on the NOM.   
 We also examine whether the percentage of partially filled orders canceled differs between 
the pro-rata and price-time models.  To test this hypothesis, we estimate eq. (1) with the % of 
partial executions canceled as the dependent variable and report the results in Panel C of Table 9.  
We find that orders that receive a partial fill are more frequently canceled in the pro-rata model, 
relative to the price-time model.  For instance, the percentage of executed orders canceled is 23.1 
percentage point higher on the EDGX than on the BZX.  Similarly, Panel C of Table 10 shows that 
the percentage of partial executions canceled is 64.21 percentage points higher on the EDGX than 
on the NOM.  The results in Table 9 provide support for our final hypothesis that the percentage 
of partially filled orders canceled is higher in pro-rata exchanges than in price-time exchanges.  
 We interpret the results in Table 9 as support for our final hypothesis that the proportion 
of partially filled orders canceled is higher in the pro-rata model than in the price-time model, and 
contend that traders seem to risk overtrading in the pro-rata model.  To further support this 
conclusion, we examine differences in order size across exchanges.  The results of this analysis 
are reported in Table A.2 of the appendix.  Consistent with our univariate tests, we find that average 
order size is significantly higher on the EDGX, relative to the BZX and NOM.  However, this 
result is primarily driven by the difference in order size between the EDGX and BZX.   
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 Most non-option trading venues work on some variation of price-time priority, whereby 
the first order to be executed at a price is the one that arrived at the exchange first.  But the needs 
of some customers, such as institutional traders who desire to submit large orders, might not be 
met by this one dominant model.  In an attempt to accommodate such traders, some exchanges 
employ a price-size (or pro-rata) priority model, which allocates all limit orders at a price 
simultaneously to each countervailing marketable order in proportion to order size.  U.S. option 
marketplaces compete for order flow by tailoring their priority rules to certain traders (Parlour and 
Seppi, 2003; and O’Hara, 2015).  Therefore, a natural question is, do priority rules matter? If so, 
how do they impact order execution quality?   
 In this paper, we provide evidence that priority rules affect order execution quality in 
options markets.  Our multivariate tests suggest that price-time priority facilitates higher execution 
rates and longer-lasting limit orders, relative to pro-rata priority. We do, however, show that pro-
rata allocation shortens the time between order submission and first execution.  Although price-
time model emphasizes speed, this does not seem to translate into faster executions.   
 Our last set of tests examine if traders risk overtrading in the pro-rata model in order to 
achieve a desired fill amount (Field and Large, 2008).  We find that the percentage of partially 
filled orders that are canceled is substantially higher in the pro-rata model, relative to the price-
time model.  In addition, average order size is significantly higher on exchanges using pro-rata 
matching than those using price-time.  Our findings suggest that traders in the pro-rata model 
submit unrealistic quantities with little intention on executing the entire order.  
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 To summarize, priority rules matter, but their impact on order execution quality is 
conditional on the measurement used.  Neither model appears superior to the other in overall 
quality of execution.  Thus as market structures evolve, the specific needs of customers may be 
better serviced by variation in priority models.   
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APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE SELECTION 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
The table summarizes the sample selection process and reports the distribution of trading activity across the remaining option class contracts.  The sample period 
is the 21 trading days between October 3, 2016 and October 31, 2016. 
Panel A. Sample filters 
  
# of remaining 
option classes % of initial trades 
% of initial trade 
volume  
Initial sample  3,232 100.00% 100.00% 
 
   
Exclude option classes that do not trade on each exchange 2,476 98.91% 98.97% 
Exclude option classes that have fewer than 10 trades per day 472 87.56% 89.25% 
Exclude option classes that are not on common stocks or on ETFs 390 77.08% 79.14% 
 
   
Final Sample 390 77.08% 79.14% 
    
Panel B. Distribution of option classes 
  # of option classes % of sample trades 
% of sample trade 
volume  
Option classes on common stock that trade in pennies 186 65.32% 53.10% 
Option classes on common stock that do not trade in pennies 147 12.20% 6.30% 
Option classes on ETFs that trade in pennies 41 20.62% 39.08% 
Option classes on ETFs that do not trade in pennies 16 1.86% 1.51% 
    
Final Sample 390 100.00% 100.00% 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Sample Trading Activity across Exchanges 
The table describes the distribution of trading activity for a sample of 390 option classes across three trading venues, 
the BZX, EDGX, and NOM.  Trading activity is measures as either the total number of order executions or total 
execution volume, in terms of the number of option contracts.  We separate the sample into options that trade on 
common stocks from those that trade on ETFs.  We also separate options that trade in pennies from those that do not.       
Panel A. Common stocks versus ETFs 
  All Classes   Common Stock   ETF 
  % trades % volume   % trades % volume   % trades % volume 
Bats BZX 60.12% 63.06%  61.17% 59.70%  56.50% 67.97% 
  
  
 
  
 
 
Bats EDGX 8.38% 5.51%  6.07% 3.08%  16.34% 9.08% 
  
  
 
  
 
 
Nasdaq Options Market 31.50% 31.43%  32.75% 37.22%  27.16% 22.95% 
                  
Panel B. Penny pilot versus non-penny 
 Penny  Non-Penny    
  % trades % volume   % trades % volume       
Bats BZX 61.78% 64.42%  49.98% 46.98%  
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
Bats EDGX 9.00% 5.76%  4.60% 2.63%  
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
Nasdaq Options Market 29.22% 29.82%  45.42% 50.39%  
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics – Option and Underlying Stock  
The table summarizes the option and underlying stock characteristics for a sample of 390 option classes.  Strike price 
is that average daily strike price for an option class.  Days-to-expiration is the number of days between the date of 
order submission and option expiration.  Underlying volume is the average daily number of shares traded in the 
underlying stock.  Underlying size is the average daily market capitalization of the underlying stock.  S/X equals the 
average daily underlying stock price divided by the average daily strike price.        
Panel A. Common stocks 
  N   Mean   Median   Std. Dev. 
Strike price 333  80.7244  52.9002  126.2416 
Days-to-expiration 333  58.5253  51.9416  23.9435 
Underlying volume 333  6,339,138  3,620,175  8,291,559 
Underlying close price 333  81.0852  52.2431  128.5050 
Underlying size ($ billions) 333  44.9758  20.0771  72.4472 
S/X 333   1.0304   0.9959   0.2505 
        
Panel B. ETFs 
      Mean   Median   Std. Dev. 
Strike price 57  63.6695  47.0096  51.1750 
Days-to-expiration 57  53.6170  53.0449  15.1803 
Underlying volume 57  12,298,179  6,207,758  17,378,057 
Underlying close price 57  63.3340  47.5377  51.3419 
Underlying size ($ billions) 57  10.8930  2.1787  27.7349 
S/X 57   1.0240   0.9981   0.0773 
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Table 4 
Priority Rules and Maker-Taker Fees 
The table summarizes the priority models and the maker-taker fees enforced on each exchange.  A maker rebate is 
paid to standing limit orders when they provide liquidity to a marketable order, whereas a taker fee is paid by 
marketable orders when they access liquidity.  
Panel A. Exchange pricing and allocation models 
Exchange Pricing Priority 
Bats BZX Options  Maker-Taker Price-Time 
Bats EDGX Options Maker-Taker Pro-rata 
Nasdaq Options Market Maker-Taker Price-Time 
   
 Panel B. Fees and rebates - penny pilot options 
Exchange  Customer Broker Dealer Market Maker Professional Proprietary 
BATS Make -0.30 -0.22 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 
 Take 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.47 
EDGX Make -0.05 0.48 0.19 0.48 0.48 
 Take -0.05 0.48 0.19 0.48 0.48 
NOM Make -0.26 -0.10 -0.20 -0.20 -0.10 
  Take 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
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Table 5 
Univariate Analysis – Order Execution Quality 
The table summarizes order characteristics for a sample of over a billion orders for 390 option classes trading on the BZX, EDGX, and NOM during the month of 
October, 2016.  We aggregate the order data to the daily level by option class.  We test for differences in means between exchanges using simple t-tests and report 
the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
  Pro-rata  Price-time  Difference in Means 
 Bats EDGX  Bats BZX  NOM  (pro-rata - price-time) 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  EDGX - BZX  EDGX - NOM 
Execution rate 0.0117 0.0056  0.0298 0.0203  0.0498 0.0253  -0.0180***  -0.0380*** 
         
 (-6.44)  (-10.61) 
Time-to-complete fill (seconds) 586.1386 333.2610  707.9585 644.1755  956.6489 859.6861  -121.8199***  -370.5104*** 
      
 
  
 (-2.75)  (-8.24) 
Time-to-first fill (seconds) 544.3850 340.6485  692.7830 630.3510  920.9167 818.7884  -148.3980***  -376.5317*** 
         
 (-3.72)  (-9.39) 
Cancellation rate - all orders 0.9690 0.9699  0.9691 0.9698  0.9003 0.9444  -0.0001  0.0688*** 
         
 (-0.20)  (10.74) 
Cancellation rate - partially executed orders 0.8872 0.9332  0.6163 0.6638  0.2892 0.2678  0.2709***  0.5980*** 
         
 (20.06)  (49.67) 
Order size (# of contracts) 23.8383 13.5827  16.2151 10.8994  20.1362 16.9853  7.6232***  3.7020** 
         
 (3.85)  (2.00) 
# of trades 32.6500 17.6667  125.9462 46.9143  69.8376 34.2061  -93.2962***  -37.1876*** 
         
 (-5.07)  (-3.74) 
Trade volume (# of contracts) 252.9408 87.5000  1606.8600 404.8810  858.2087 377.5054  -1,353.9192***  -605.2680*** 
                    (-2.79)   (-3.66) 
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Table 6 
Multivariate Analysis on the Probability of Order Execution 
The sample consists of orders in 390 equity and ETF option classes that average at least 10 executions per day during 
the month of October, 2016.  We use Ordinary Least Squares to examine the relation between priority rules and the 
rate at which limit orders execute.  We approximate the probability of execution using execution rates, or the number 
of executed orders to the total number of orders, expressed as a percentage. BZX, NOM, and EDGX equal one if the 
order/update message is sent to that particular exchange and zero otherwise. S/X equals the underlying stock price 
divided by the strike price. Days Expire is the number of days between order submission and option expiration. Call 
equals one if the order is for a call option and zero for a put option. IVOL is an option’s average daily implied volatility 
as computed by OPRA. Spread equals an option’s average daily dollar quoted spread, or the difference between the 
ask price and bid price provided by OPRA. Order Size is the average number of contracts attached to a particular 
order. Cancel Speed is the number of seconds between order submission and cancellation conditional on a complete 
order deletion. Volume equals the option’s average daily contract volume in 10,000s. Price equals the option’s mean 
trade price. Pvolt equals the option’s average daily standard deviation in trade prices. UVolume equal the underlying 
stock’s average daily share volume in 10,000s. UMCAP is the underlying stock’s average daily market capitalization, 
measured in $billions. Penny equals one if the option is traded and quoted in pennies and zero otherwise. ETF equals 
one if the option class is an ETF and zero if it is a common stock.  We include both day and option-class fixed effects.  
T-statistics are reported in parentheses obtained from standard errors clustered by option class. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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  EDGX vs. BZX   EDGX vs. NOM   EDGX vs. BZX and NOM 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6] 
BZX 1.1227*** 1.2388***       
 (4.62) (8.69)       
NOM    2.8485*** 2.9366***    
    (9.29) (8.32)    
EDGX       -2.0921*** -2.2165*** 
       (-12.41) (-11.58) 
S/X 5.6625*** -7.5323**  -1.3883 -3.4427**  3.5002** -4.5247** 
 (5.45) (-2.42)  (-1.50) (-2.54)  (2.42) (-2.21) 
Days expire 0.0200*** 0.0046  0.0011 -0.0015  0.0030 -0.0051** 
 (3.21) (1.07)  (0.50) (-0.57)  (1.30) (-1.99) 
Call 0.7951*** -0.0952  0.0524 0.1070  0.3277*** 0.1865** 
 (6.99) (-0.51)  (0.54) (1.01)  (3.89) (2.35) 
IVOL 0.3923 1.3683**  3.3497*** 0.4967  2.2005*** 0.7981** 
 (0.89) (2.19)  (5.58) (1.17)  (5.06) (2.31) 
Spread  -0.1505 0.6334***  4.1770*** 0.8264**  2.1518*** 0.8034*** 
 (-0.54) (3.23)  (8.98) (2.33)  (6.33) (3.44) 
Order size -0.0156 -0.0225***  -0.0027 0.0003  -0.0031 0.0004 
 (-1.37) (-4.99)  (-1.50) (0.11)  (-1.36) (0.17) 
Cancel speed 0.0050*** 0.0045**  0.0029*** 0.0028***  0.0032*** 0.0030*** 
 (2.92) (2.37)  (9.52) (10.61)  (9.91) (10.93) 
Volume 0.3039 0.3959  0.4730 2.4131*  0.1911 0.4533 
 (1.03) (1.12)  (0.49) (1.86)  (0.62) (1.16) 
Price -0.0191 -0.0497***  0.0202 -0.0014  0.0471*** 0.0317** 
 (-0.40) (-3.14)  (1.33) (-0.12)  (2.93) (2.44) 
Pvolt 0.0087 0.0161**  -0.0020 -0.0002  -0.0020 -0.0005 
 (0.67) (2.49)  (-1.21) (-0.16)  (-0.66) (-0.17) 
UVolume 0.0003*** 0.0005***  -0.0000 0.0004***  0.0001* 0.0006*** 
 (3.84) (4.40)  (-0.49) (4.12)  (1.88) (6.50) 
UMCAP 0.0020* -0.0243**  0.0053*** 0.0129  0.0041*** 0.0040 
 (1.78) (-1.98)  (2.90) (0.44)  (3.69) (0.20) 
Penny 0.7150   -0.8015**   -0.5643**  
 (1.07)   (-2.32)   (-2.26)  
ETF -0.9050***   3.5376***   1.3868***  
 (-4.11) 
  (6.28)   (4.05)  
Constant -8.3885*** 7.5161***  0.2687 3.6460*  -2.6956* 6.3611** 
 (-3.93) (2.70) 
 (0.28) (1.73)  (-1.68) (2.50) 
Day FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Option class FE No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R2 0.2336 0.1217  0.4525 0.3172  0.3169 0.2153 
N 17,134 17,134   16,806 16,806   29,487 29,487 
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Table 7 
Multivariate Analysis on the Time-to-Complete-Fill 
The sample consists of orders in 390 common stock and ETF option classes during the month of October, 2016.  We 
use Ordinary Least Squares and Quantile Median regressions to analyze the relation between priority rules and the 
time-to-complete-fill, defined as the number of seconds between initial order submission and complete fill. BZX, 
NOM, and EDGX equal one if the order/update message is sent to that particular exchange and zero otherwise. The 
remaining control variables are defined in Table 6. T-statistics are reported in parentheses obtained from standard 
errors clustered by option class. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively.     
  EDGX vs. BZX 
 EDGX vs. NOM  EDGX vs. BZX and NOM 
  [1] OLS [2] Median  [3] OLS [4] Median  [5] OLS [6] Median 
BZX 58.7544 156.5530***       
 (0.94) (4.72)       
NOM    323.5339*** 412.1783***    
    (5.05) (12.00)    
EDGX       -182.3858*** -251.3029*** 
       (-2.97) (-7.01) 
S/X 182.8250*** 168.7216***  419.7944*** 178.4106  249.5901*** 214.6552* 
 (3.27) (12.92)  (2.62) (0.59)  (6.06) (1.91) 
Days Expire 1.7881*** 1.1023***  1.1218*** 0.6912**  1.1516*** 0.7135*** 
 (2.91) (2.60)  (3.89) (2.37)  (4.03) (2.97) 
Call 78.2319*** 60.3773***  91.5314*** 62.7027***  99.7003*** 78.6749*** 
 (5.86) (6.88)  (6.18) (5.28)  (8.28) (8.63) 
IVOL 78.5982 88.8899**  201.4485** 144.0347***  212.4906*** 160.6979*** 
 (1.05) (2.24)  (2.28) (2.63)  (2.90) (3.73) 
Spread -62.5537 -36.2868  -129.6381** -98.9061***  -86.1747* -48.5840* 
 (-1.01) (-1.35)  (-2.48) (-3.18)  (-1.69) (-1.65) 
Order size 2.8722** 1.5330  0.0835 -0.1580  1.4864*** 1.4130 
 (2.17) (0.81)  (0.29) (-1.57)  (2.65) (1.54) 
Volume -24.7601** -11.9498*  -176.0000*** -81.1651**  -57.6079*** -32.7108** 
 (-2.05) (-1.65)  (-3.69) (-2.05)  (-2.61) (-2.16) 
Price -18.3914 -34.6966***  -6.4935** -7.2657***  -4.7369* -10.4139 
 (-0.69) (-3.34)  (-2.44) (-5.80)  (-1.72) (-1.52) 
PVOLT 12.5396 17.4507***  0.4234 0.6266***  0.5557 3.0565 
 (1.35) (3.58)  (1.54) (5.87)  (1.59) (1.24) 
UVolume -0.0235 -0.0078  0.0137 0.0082  0.0046 0.0069 
 (-1.30) (-1.00)  (0.61) (0.46)  (0.24) (0.51) 
UMCAP -0.2308 0.1404  -0.0692 0.0613  -0.0178 0.1993* 
 (-0.95) (0.87)  (-0.35) (0.58)  (-0.10) (1.88) 
Penny -197.4571*** -267.3907***  -170.6690*** -172.1938***  -204.4049*** -222.8597*** 
 (-4.34) (-9.13)  (-3.93) (-5.17)  (-5.25) (-8.06) 
ETF 110.2442 51.7880  -28.6754 -70.0748  70.0300 30.1503 
 (1.31) (0.93) 
 (-0.42) (-1.62)  (1.20) (0.73) 
Constant 422.3305*** 216.7986***  239.0739 166.1251  527.2429*** 345.7063*** 
 (3.82) (4.10) 
 (1.33) (0.54)  (7.92) (2.87) 
Day FE Yes No  Yes No  Yes No 
R2 0.0570 0.0372  0.0649 0.0501  0.0547 0.0360 
N 17,080 17,080   16,753 16,753   29,433 29,433 
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Table 8 
Multivariate Analysis on the Time-to-First-Fill 
The sample consists of orders in 390 common stock and ETF option classes during the month of October, 2016.  We 
use Ordinary Least Squares and Quantile Median regressions to analyze the relation between priority rules and the 
time-to-first-fill, defined as the number of seconds between initial order submission and first fill, conditional on at 
least a partial execution. BZX, NOM, and EDGX equal one if the order/update message is sent to that particular 
exchange and zero otherwise. The remaining control variables are defined in Table 6. We report t-stats in parentheses 
obtained from standard errors clustered by option class. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
  EDGX vs BZX   EDGX vs. NOM   EDGX vs. BZX and NOM 
  [1] OLS [2] Median  [3] OLS [4] Median  [5] OLS [6] Median 
BZX 97.8123* 149.6190***       
 (1.65) (4.78)       
NOM    337.0455*** 384.3255***    
    (5.59) (12.03)    
EDGX       -211.7493*** -239.6223*** 
       (-3.65) (-7.68) 
S/X 195.6309*** 171.7132***  355.1159*** 159.6500  233.8146*** 176.1274*** 
 (3.88) (12.41)  (2.72) (0.58)  (6.13) (3.53) 
Days Expire 1.6125*** 0.9078**  1.2037*** 0.7179***  1.1375*** 0.6566*** 
 (2.62) (2.03)  (4.16) (2.60)  (3.95) (2.74) 
Call 89.4316*** 62.2166***  98.2944*** 64.7190***  106.0220*** 81.4350*** 
 (7.67) (7.50)  (7.60) (5.41)  (9.59) (9.42) 
IVOL 83.5256 75.5070*  206.1234** 135.7040**  216.4892*** 152.0064*** 
 (1.15) (1.73)  (2.45) (2.27)  (2.97) (3.39) 
Spread -60.1376 -34.2792  -112.5411** -85.6803***  -77.6253 -50.2613* 
 (-0.99) (-1.16)  (-2.14) (-2.89)  (-1.50) (-1.80) 
Order size 2.6509** 1.9016  -0.0162 -0.1359  1.3372** 1.5524** 
 (2.34) (1.12)  (-0.07) (-1.34)  (2.55) (2.05) 
Volume -28.8765*** -17.5483**  -168.0806*** -91.4352**  -61.4211*** -43.9731*** 
 (-2.82) (-2.01)  (-4.23) (-2.00)  (-2.90) (-2.58) 
Price -17.0106 -33.6626***  -6.1890** -7.3868***  -4.7299* -10.4948* 
 (-0.66) (-2.83)  (-2.41) (-5.81)  (-1.80) (-1.67) 
Pvolt 11.4446 17.1260**  0.4031 0.6321***  0.5387* 2.9664 
 (1.24) (2.37)  (1.47) (5.86)  (1.69) (1.26) 
UVolume -0.0218 -0.0044  0.0096 0.0081  0.0058 0.0115 
 (-1.50) (-0.36)  (0.57) (0.37)  (0.36) (0.77) 
UMCAP -0.2279 0.0798  -0.0384 0.0657  -0.0089 0.1832* 
 (-1.05) (0.57)  (-0.21) (0.72)  (-0.05) (1.84) 
Penny -179.0076*** -257.0193***  -164.9195*** -171.3598***  -187.6488*** -211.5867*** 
 (-3.95) (-8.55)  (-3.86) (-5.75)  (-4.78) (-7.84) 
ETF 112.2673 49.9071  -16.0051 -34.5265  78.9787 46.9507 
 (1.44) (0.85) 
 (-0.26) (-0.73)  (1.43) (1.12) 
Constant 345.1868*** 213.9578***  247.2629 181.4710  505.3233*** 362.2541*** 
 (3.30) (3.94) 
 (1.61) (0.64)  (7.89) (5.51) 
Day FE Yes No  Yes No  Yes No 
R2 0.0642 0.0455  0.0747 0.0608  0.0610 0.0417 
N 17,134 17,134   16,806 16,806   29,487 29,487 
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Table 9 
Multivariate Analysis on Cancellation Rates and Time-to-Cancellation 
The sample consists of orders in 390 common stock and ETF option classes during the month of October, 2016.  We 
use Ordinary Least Squares to analyze the relations between priority rules and both cancellation probability and time-
to-cancellation. Panel A reports average daily cancellation rates, or the number of orders canceled to total orders 
submitted.  Panel B reports the percentage of executed orders that are subsequently canceled.  Panel C reports time-
to-cancellation, or the average number of seconds between order submission and deletion. BZX, NOM, and EDGX 
equal one if the order/update message is sent to that particular exchange and zero otherwise. We include as control 
variables: S/X, Days Expire, Call, IVOL, Spread, Order Size, Volume, Price, Pvolt, UVolume, UMCAP, Penny, and 
ETF whose definitions are found in Table 6. We also include both day and option-class fixed effects. We report t-stats 
in parentheses obtained from standard errors clustered by option class. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A. % Cancellation rate 
  EDGX vs. BZX   EDGX vs. NOM   EDGX vs. BZX and NOM 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6] 
BZX -0.0164 -0.0059       
 (-1.10) (-0.58)       
NOM    -3.4931*** -4.1131***    
    (-8.52) (-8.32)    
EDGX       1.2537*** 1.7750*** 
       (5.46) (6.16) 
Constant 97.0462*** 96.8523***  98.2195*** 92.4550***  95.6376*** 92.0236*** 
 (19.37) (30.79) 
 (61.75) (27.28)  (83.44) (36.45) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Day FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Option class FE No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R2 0.1581 0.0372  0.5450 0.4069  0.4731 0.3984 
N 17,134 17,134   16,806 16,806   29,487 29,487 
Panel B. Time-to-cancellation 
  EDGX vs. BZX   EDGX vs. NOM   EDGX vs. BZX and NOM 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6] 
BZX 155.2912*** 75.6621***       
 (13.41) (8.34)       
NOM    467.0636*** 363.7356***    
    (7.99) (6.04)    
EDGX       -302.2429*** -226.9183*** 
       (-9.79) (-7.61) 
Constant -14.0061 359.8411***  -1089.5288*** -116.2980  -111.7310 505.9822* 
 (-0.26) (3.96) 
 (-4.44) (-0.24)  (-1.11) (1.67) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Day FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Option class FE No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R2 0.4523 0.1537  0.1400 0.0691  0.1043 0.0310 
N 17,134 17,134   16,806 16,806   29,487 29,487          
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Panel C. % of partially filled orders canceled 
  EDGX vs. BZX   EDGX vs. NOM   EDGX vs. BZX and NOM 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6] 
BZX -0.2280*** -0.2310***       
 (-19.23) (-17.11)       
NOM    -0.6347*** -0.6421***    
    (-66.75) (-60.69)    
EDGX       0.4181*** 0.4300*** 
       (40.65) (37.40) 
Constant 0.9452*** 0.9592***  1.0185*** 0.8457***  0.5747*** 0.4681*** 
 (32.88) (16.88) 
 (41.57) (11.83)  (22.12) (6.18) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Day FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Option class FE No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R2 0.2531 0.1474  0.5099 0.4990  0.2455 0.2063 
N 15,740 15,740   14,844 14,844   26,670 26,670 
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Table A.1 
Distribution of Order Executions 
The table summarizes the distribution of over 3.2 million order executions in a sample of 390 options on equities and 
ETFs during October, 2016. 
    Distribution of Executions 
Exchange  Total   Complete   Partial  % complete  % partial 
BZX  1,956,682  1,466,411  490,271  74.94%  25.06% 
EDGX  272,799  174,993  97,806  64.15%  35.85% 
NOM  1,025,047  826,437  198,610  80.62%  19.38% 
Total   3,254,528   2,467,841   786,687   75.83%   24.17% 
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Table A.2 
Multivariate Analysis on Order Size 
The sample consists of orders in 390 common stock and ETF option classes during the month of October, 2016.  We 
use Ordinary Least Squares to analyze the relation between priority rules and order size decisions. EDGX equals one 
if the order/update message is sent to the Bats EDGX and zero otherwise. The remaining control variables are defined 
in Table 6. T-statistics are reported in parentheses obtained from standard errors clustered by option class. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
  EDGX vs. BZX and NOM 
  [1] [2] 
EDGX 4.3743*** 5.2346*** 
 (3.38) (3.92) 
Constant 11.6704*** 18.2004*** 
 (5.01) (4.59) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Day FE Yes Yes 
Option class FE Yes No 
R2 0.1447 0.0082 
N 29,487 29,487 
 
  
 151 
 
PART 3: QUOTE STUFFING AND TRADING SPIKES IN U.S. EQUITY OPTIONS 
 152 
 
 
 
 
PART 3 
INTRODUCTION 
Financial markets are evolving to a more computer controlled environment, relying less on 
direct human interaction (O’Hara, 2015).  Since computer trading algorithms are often triggered 
by a common signal (see Jarrow and Protter, 2012), the speed and simultaneity with which orders 
are submitted may cause temporary spikes in quotations, trades, and order cancellations.44  
Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2015) argue that high-speed algorithmic strategies remove 
the last few contracts at the best bid or ask levels, only to reestablish new best bids and asks at 
improved price levels.  When there is an imbalance in the order book and prices move unilaterally, 
this trading strategy can exacerbate price moves and create additional volatility.  Higher volatility 
further increases the speed at which the best bid and ask are removed from the order book, 
ultimately leading to a spike in quoting and/or trading.  When an event as large as the Flash Crash 
on May 6, 2010 occurs, it captures national attention. What about smaller and less publicized 
liquidity events that occur daily, such as quote stuffing and trading spikes?45  How do these events 
impact market quality?  
Quote stuffing is a practice that involves the submission and almost immediate cancellation 
of a large number of orders, which can affect the supply of and demand for liquidity.  Traders can 
be made worse off if the probability of completing a transaction declines (Colliard and Foucault, 
                                                          
44 Gabaix, Gopikrishnan, Plerou, and Stanley (2007) build a theoretical model showing that spikes in trading volume 
are caused, in part, by very large trades in relatively illiquid markets. Kozhan and Wah Tham (2012) and Stein (2009) 
argue that the high correlation among algorithmic trades cause a crowding effect that push prices away from 
fundamental values. 
45 Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara (2014) state that “understanding the behavior of high frequency markets has 
taken on greater urgency in the wake of repeated liquidity events affecting futures and equity markets.” 
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2012).  Quote stuffing episodes can create confusion and congestion in the market, leading to 
potential arbitrage opportunities for certain market participants, such as high-speed traders.46  
Some market participants criticize quote stuffing, arguing that it creates an illusion of real trading 
sentiment.  For example, on February 18, 2010, T3 Capital Management reported that orders to 
buy or sell stock on the NASDAQ exchange totaled 89.704 billion shares, but executed volume 
totaled only 1.247 billion shares.  Therefore, only 1% of the orders submitted to the NASDAQ 
exchange executed.  Sean Hendelman, chief executive officer at T3, says the practice creates an 
inaccurate picture of the true supply and demand for a stock.47  Orders that are canceled within 
microseconds of submission do not constitute genuine liquidity and are often referred to as “fake 
depth” (Angel, 2014).  
Policy-makers and exchange officials also criticize quote stuffing, as displayed orders 
might not reflect committed trading sentiment, which can shake the confidence of liquidity-seeking 
investors (see Friederich and Payne, 2015).48  Baruch and Glosten (2013) note that some see quote 
stuffing as a manipulative practice by which traders create arbitrage opportunities by causing the 
reporting of quotes to lag behind the reporting of trades.  In fact, the NASDAQ posted a 
disciplinary action against Citadel Securities LLC (CDRG) on June 16, 2014 for sending millions 
of orders to the exchanges with few or no executions.49  The NASDAQ recounts the following 
trading behavior of CDRG on February 13, 2014 between 13:32:53:029 and 13:33:00:998:  
                                                          
46 See NASDAQ’s definition of quote stuffing at http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/q/quote-stuffing. 
47 Egginton, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2015) show that the majority of the quote stuffing episodes identified in their 
sample can be classified into a strategy the involves slowing down other traders in the same stock across exchanges.  
A large number of orders submitted to a particular exchange can cause the quotes on that exchange to lag other 
exchanges, creating arbitrage opportunities.  See also The Wall Street Journal’s, “SEC Probes Canceled Trades,” 
updated on September 1, 2010.         
48 See the purpose section in SEC Release No. 34-65610 
49 The letter of acceptance, waiver and consent no. 20100223345-02 posted on June 16, 2014, page 6.  The letter can 
be found at the following webpage http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/trader.aspx?id=ndisciplinaryactions.   
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“CDRG transmitted to NASDAQ approximately 8-9 orders to buy 100 shares of Penn 
National Gaming, Inc. (Penn) every microsecond for a total of 65,000 orders with zero 
executions.  After receiving an inquiry from NASDAQ concerning an increase in order 
messaging activity in PENN, CDRG disabled the trading strategy.” 
Despite the documented instances of quote stuffing, and the abovementioned concerns regarding 
the practice, the trading strategy has not been extensively examined in the options market.  
In this study, we investigate the market quality implications of both extreme quote stuffing 
episodes and trading spikes in U.S. equity options.  We focus on the options market for the 
following reasons: First, the concern of spikes is not isolated to equities, as market participants 
document abnormal quoting and cancelling activity in options.  For example, on June 5, 2013, the 
quotes for SPY options exceeded one billion, nearly 15 times greater than on the day of the May 
2010 flash crash, and the quote-to-trade ratio increased to 11,254, which sparks the question, how 
prevalent are trading spikes and quote stuffing episodes in the options market?50  Second, trading 
in options is shown to provide price discovery in the underlying equities (see Easley, O’Hara, and 
Srinivas, 1998 and Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew, 2004).51  Therefore, if there is an unexpected 
spike in trading or quoting activity in the options market, it may impact both the options and 
underlying equities.52  Third, we are able to study how trading and quoting spikes differ between 
exchanges with various priority rules, such as price-time and pro-rata. 
We focus on order-level data in three U.S. equity options exchanges, namely the NASDAQ 
Options Market (NOM), BATS BZX Options Market (BZX), and BATS EDGX Options Market 
                                                          
50 See the research analysis posted by Nanex, LLC at http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4308.html  
51 In a frictionless and complete market, options would be redundant securities and options and underlying securities 
move contemporaneously (Black and Scholes, 1973).  However, in a dynamic economy, new information about stock 
prices may be reflected in option prices earlier.  Hu (2014) explains that option market makers hedge using underlying 
securities, thereby transmitting information from the options market to the equities market. 
52 Bessembinder and Seguin (1992) find a positive relation between equity volatility and trading volumes in the equity 
futures and spot markets.  Unexpected trading volume has a greater effect on volatility than expected trading volume.   
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(EDGX).  These three exchanges make up nearly a quarter of all U.S. equity options trading 
volume during the sample period.53  We find that quote stuffing episodes are frequently observed 
in equity options, particularly on exchanges using price-time priority (BZX and NOM).  Over a 21 
day sample period, we find that 319 unique option classes, which account for over 70% of the 
sample trade volume, experience at least one quote stuffing episode.  We identify an extreme quote 
stuffing event as a one-minute period when the number of orders and cancellations exceed the 
daily average one-minute number of orders and cancellations by at least four standard deviations.   
We examine if these option quote stuffing events affect order execution quality and 
liquidity in the options market.  Our multivariate analysis shows that quote stuffing reduces the 
probability of execution, lengthens the time-time-to-execution and increases short-term volatility.  
Specifically, our multivariate tests show the order execution rates decrease between 8.95 and 9.11 
percentage points from the pre-event window to the quote stuffing event.  The average time 
between order submission and execution increases between 84 and 197 seconds from the pre-event 
window to the quote stuffing episode.  Since the welfare of traders depends on the non-execution 
risk faced by liquidity suppliers (Colliard and Foucault, 2012), the results suggest that quote 
stuffing has a negative impact on order execution quality.   
Next, we investigate whether extreme option quote stuffing events affect the liquidity in 
the underlying stocks.  Our tests show that both quoted and effective bid-ask spreads increase, with 
a one-minute delay, following intense option quote stuffing episodes.  The equal-weighted percent 
quoted spread in the underlying stock increases from 0.00071 in the minute prior to the event, to 
0.0011 in the minute after the option quote stuffing event.  The average percentage effective spread 
increases from 0.005 in the minute prior to the event, to 0.007 in the minute after the option quote 
                                                          
53 As of January 27, 2016 according to the Options Price Reporting Authority (OPRA) available at NasdaqTrader.com.  
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stuffing episode, a 20 basis point increase. Consistent with Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) 
and Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004), we provide evidence that option trading provides 
information to the underlying stock market.           
We also analyze how option trading spikes affect execution quality and liquidity in the 
options market.  Consistent with the theoretical predictions of Clark (1973) and Copeland (1976), 
we find a strong positive relation between short-term price volatility and trading spikes.  Our 
results show that limit orders remain on the book for a longer period of time during extreme spikes 
in trading.  For instance, the average number of seconds between order submission and 
cancellation increases by at least 67 seconds during extreme trading spikes, relative to the pre-
event windows. 
Overall, our empirical analysis reveals that quote stuffing episodes and trading spikes are 
pervasive in equity options markets.  Quote stuffing harms order execution quality by reducing the 
probability of execution and lengthening the time-to-execution.  Information contained in the 
option quote stuffing episodes carries over into the underlying securities, as bid-ask spreads 
increase with a one-minute delay.  In addition, both quote stuffing episodes and trading spikes are 
associated with significant increases in short-term volatility, which suggests that frequent liquidity 
events might negatively impact overall market quality.  
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HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Submitting orders and quickly canceling those orders is a common trading practice observed 
in financial markets.  For instance, Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) show that only 6.8% of orders 
entered into the NASDAQ book eventually execute.  The Securities and Exchange Commission 
document that only 3.2% of equity orders execute in the second quarter of 2013.54  High levels of 
order cancellation activity might be a natural byproduct of evolving market structures (Liu, 2009) 
and/or improved trading technology (Gai, Yao, and Ye, 2012).  However, policy-makers seem to 
believe that there must be something inappropriate in the submission of numerous orders that do 
not lead to executions (see Friederich and Payne, 2015).  In fact, former SEC Chairwoman Mary 
Schapiro, in an address given on September 7, 2010, states: 
“A type of trading practice that has received attention involves submitting large volumes of 
orders into the markets, most of which are cancelled… There may, of course, be justifiable 
explanations for many canceled orders to reflect changing market conditions… But we also must 
understand the impact this activity has on price discovery, capital formation and the capital 
markets more generally.”55     
Quote stuffing might temporarily disrupt the matching process between buyers and sellers, 
as it can create a false sense of liquidity in the market (Angel, 2014).  Orders that are added and 
deleted in billionths of a second are not constituting genuine liquidity, or creating “fake depth.”  
                                                          
54 See the SEC market structure research “Trade to Order Volume Ratios” released on October 9, 2013.  The data used 
detailed message feeds from 12 of 13 equity exchanges to compute the metrics.   
55 Speech by SEC Chairwoman: “Strengthening Our Equity Market Structure” by Mary L. Schapiro on September 7, 
2010. 
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Order execution rates depend on the arrival rate of marketable orders and the posted depth on the 
limit order book (see Battalio et al. 2015).  Since orders are deleted almost immediately after 
submission during quote stuffing episodes, the stock of standing limit orders is reduced.  Market 
participants that seek to interact with orders that are canceled before they can execute may 
ultimately achieve less favorable executions, or no executions at all (see SEC Release No. 34-
65610). 
Hypothesis 1a: Quote stuffing episodes are associated with a decrease in order execution 
rates.   
Limit orders are not only exposed to non-execution risk, but also to the risk associated with 
time-to-execution (Blume, 2001 and Boehmer, 2005).  Boehmer, Jennings, and Wei (2007) show 
that trading venues attract more order flow when they shorten the time between order submission 
and execution, and time-to-execution is shown to be a random function of several variables 
including order and stock characteristics, exchange structures, and market conditions (see Lo, 
MacKinlay, and Zhang, 2002).  If traders are less confident in the displayed depth during quote 
stuffing episodes, we might expect a decrease in the arrival rate of marketable orders as the 
perceived risk of achieving a less favorable execution is higher.  A decrease in the arrival rate of 
marketable orders can lengthen the time it takes a limit order to find a countervailing marketable 
order, which leads to the following testable hypothesis.          
Hypothesis 1b: Quote stuffing episodes are associated with a lengthening of the time-to-
execution. 
Quote stuffing, in certain cases, can be considered a manipulative trading strategy through 
which traders cause the reporting of quotes to fall behind the reporting of trades (Baruch and 
Glosten, 2013).  In fact, in 2011, the NYSE adopted the text of FINRA (Financial Industry 
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Regulatory Authority) Rule 5210, which prohibits the publication of manipulative or deceptive 
quotations and transactions, and use quote stuffing as an example.56   
Manipulation can take on various forms, including, but not limited to, insider trading, 
spoofing, and quote stuffing.57  Egginton, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2016) empirically show that 
the most common quote stuffing strategy in a sample of equity securities, involves slowing down 
trading on one exchange to create arbitrage opportunities on another trading venue.  Aggarwal and 
Wu (2006) develop a theoretical model in which market manipulation increases stock volatility.58  
To the extent that quote stuffing is an attempt to manipulate markets, we might expect volatility to 
increase during extreme quote stuffing episodes.  If the order book is thin, less “firm” orders, 
during quote stuffing episodes, the noise may induce short-term volatility (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1991).         
Hypothesis 2: Quote stuffing episodes are associated with an increase in short-term price 
volatility. 
 We next examine the relation between trading spikes and both volatility and limit order 
execution quality.  Several theoretical models predict a positive relation between price volatility 
and trading volume.  For instance, Clark (1973) and Copeland (1976) contend that significant 
trading volume is produced by the sequential arrival of new information, which causes extreme 
movements in security prices.  In addition, Epps and Epps (1976) develop a model in which traders 
                                                          
56 See SEC Release No. 34-65954 for the proposed rule filing of the NYSE and SEC release No. 34-65955 for the rule 
filing of NYSE/Arca.   
57 Lee, Eom, and Park (2013) find that investors strategically place orders on the Korean Exchange with little chance 
of execution, in order to mislead other market participants into thinking that there is an imbalance in the order book.  
Spoofing orders are shown to be extremely profitable when the total quantity on each side of the order book is 
disclosed, but the price of each order is hidden.  Such order-disclosure rules existed on the KRX, and to no surprise, 
have been subsequently changed.   
58 Aggarwal and Wu (2006) collect all SEC litigation releases from 1990 to 2001 that contain the key words 
“manipulation” and “9(a)” or “10(b),” which refer to the articles of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 that 
prohibit market manipulation.   
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elect to trade when markets are most active and indicate that volume and price movements are 
clustered in time.  There are also several empirical studies that find a positive relation between 
price volatility and trading volume.59  Therefore, we expect to find an increase in short-term price 
volatility around trading spikes.        
Hypothesis 3: Trading spikes are associated with an increase in short-term price volatility. 
 The speed and volume of trading in high frequency markets creates concern about toxicity-
induced volatility (Easley, Prado, and O'Hara, 2012).  Order flow is considered toxic when it 
adversely selects market makers who might not be aware that they are supplying liquidity at a loss.  
Since extreme trading volume is often associated with large price moves, the uncertainty in the 
arrival rate of buy and sell orders may force liquidity providers away from their preferred inventory 
positions (see Stoll, 1979, Ho and Stoll, 1981, and O'Hara and Oldfield, 1986) and ultimately, they 
may choose to withdraw from trading.  Large (2004) predicts a positive relation between order 
cancellation activity and market uncertainty.  Thus, we expect to find an increase in order 
cancellation rates during intense short-term trading spikes. 
Hypothesis 4: Trading spikes are associated with an increase in the probability of order 
cancellation. 
Exchanges compete for order flow along many dimensions including, but not limited to, 
liquidity, payment structure, and execution speed.60  Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Pagano (1989), 
and Parlour and Seppi (2003) argue that liquidity is a fundamental variable driving competition 
among exchanges.  Parlour and Seppi (2003) show that trading venues that attract more marketable 
                                                          
59 Karpoff (1987) provides a review of 18 independent articles that examine the relation between price volatility and 
trading volume.     
60 For example, Foucault and Parlour (2000) examine exchange competition in listing fees.  Biais (1993) find that 
spreads are less volatile in fragmented over-the-counter markets, relative to centralized markets.  Bessembinder (2003) 
shows significant evidence of quote-based competition for order flow among seven markets.     
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orders also attract more limit orders.  The increase in limit orders will then attract even more 
marketable orders, thus creating a liquid marketplace.  If limit orders are constantly deleted before 
marketable orders arrive, then traders may choose to submit their marketable orders elsewhere.  
Therefore, frequent quote stuffing episodes on an exchange might encourage traders to route orders 
to a different trading venue.         
Frequent quote stuffing episodes may deter traders from submitting orders to a particular 
venue.61  This concern is evident in a rule change filed by the NASDAQ (SEC Release No. 34-
65610), which states:  
“The more often a market participant pursues displayed liquidity at a particular venue that 
is no longer available by the time its order arrives, the more likely it is that the market 
participant will pursue liquidity at another venue.”   
 Since trading venues are often designed to meet the specific needs of market participants 
(O'Hara, 2015), and certain traders are more inclined to engage in quote stuffing trading strategies, 
certain rules and fee structures can directly affect the frequency with which quote stuffing episodes 
are observed on that venue.  For instance, option trading venues operate using one of two order 
priority allocation models, price-time or pro-rata.62  BATS recently introduced the EDGX Options 
Market, which offers a pro rata allocation model, intended to attract more institutional order flow 
that is less concerned with speed.63  Price-time priority ultimately facilitates a race to the top of 
                                                          
61 Several articles examine order flow competition between exchanges, including Glosten (1994), Arnold, Hersch, 
Mulherin, and Netter (1999), Hendershott and Mendelson (2000), Santos and Scheinkman (2001), Foucault and 
Parlour (2004), and Foucault and Menkveld (2008).   
62 Time priority allocates limit orders in sequence to marketable orders based on time of arrival in the book, whereas 
pro-rata priority allocates limit orders simultaneously to each countervailing marketable order in proportion to order 
size. 
63 In an article entitled “Size Matters” in Marketview magazine, Brian Hyndman, Senior Vice President of NASDAQ 
OMX, explains: “The price-time priority model benefits market participants who have the fastest technology, which 
allows their orders to rapidly reach the front of the line.  With a price-size (pro-rate) priority model, speed is de-
emphasized with the objective of providing incentives for traders to send in sizable orders.” 
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the order book queue as it is a first come first serve model, which may attract high-speed 
algorithmic traders who are known for submitting short-lived orders that are canceled almost 
immediately (Jarrow and Protter, 2012; and Kirilenko et al., 2016).  Therefore, we might expect 
trading venues using price-time to experience more frequent quote stuffing episodes than 
exchanges using pro-rata allocation.         
Hypothesis 5: Quote stuffing episodes are more frequently observed on exchanges using 
price-time priority (BZX and NOM), relative to exchanges using pro-rata 
allocation (EDGX) 
Option contracts generally expire on the third Friday of each month.  Stoll and Whaley (1987) 
and Stephan and Whaley (1990) show that option trading volume and volatility are higher on 
expiration days, relative to non-expiration days.  Expiration day effects are often attributed to the 
unwinding of arbitrage positions, where mispricing between stock options and underlying security 
prices is exploited (Chow, Yung, and Zhang, 2003).  Initial long or short underlying market 
positions must reverse on the expiration day to close out the arbitrage position and realize any 
anticipated profits.  Therefore, arbitrageurs are likely to submit a large amount of buy and sell 
orders on expiration days, which may increase the number of short-term trading spikes.     
In addition, Egginton, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2015) show that a common quote stuffing 
strategy is to create a latency arbitrage opportunity in the same stock across exchanges.  The 
sudden influx of quotes may cause the exchange receiving the quotes to lag other exchanges, as 
market participants are forced to process the onslaught of quotes.  Proprietary traders, such as 
HFTs, might find option expiration days to be a perfect time to capitalize on potential arbitrage 
opportunities.  Thus, we might expect to find more quote stuffing episodes on expiration days, 
relative to non-expiration days.     
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Hypothesis 6: Trading spikes and quote stuffing episodes are more frequently observed on 
option expiration days, relative to non-expiration days.   
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DATA DESCRIPTION 
 The NASDAQ ITCH to Trade Options (ITTO) is a direct data feed that provides a 
nanosecond view of simple equity options on the NASDAQ Options Exchange (NOM).  This 
includes orders added and changes made to orders resting on the NOM limit order book.  We 
download several different message types that are linked by a unique order reference number.  
“Option directory” messages contain information for the security symbol, expiration date, strike 
price, and option type (call or put).  “Add order” messages are time stamped records for new orders 
added to the book, including order time (stamped to the nanosecond), market side (buy or sell), 
order price, and order size (# of contracts).  “Executed order” modification messages are time 
stamped records generated by (partial) executions and report executed contracts and execution 
price (if the execution price differs from the add order price).64  “Order cancel” messages are time 
stamped records generated by partial cancellations and report the number of contracts canceled.  
“Replace” messages are time stamped records that report the new order reference number, new 
order price, and new order size.  “Delete” messages are time stamped records that report when an 
order is deleted from the NOM order book. 
 As the analysis involves examining quote stuffing episodes and trade spikes across 
exchanges, we obtain order data from multiple trading venues.  BATS Multicast PITH provides 
nanosecond depth of book quotations and execution information for simple equity options on the 
BZX options exchange and EDGX options exchange.  BATS uses a symbol mapping mechanism 
                                                          
64 Since the analysis involves examining execution quality around extreme quote stuffing episodes and trade spikes, 
we ignore “trade” messages that report executions involving non-displayed order types.   
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for the options Multicast PITCH to reduce the size of the feed.  The day-specific mappings include 
unique identifiers and information on the option symbol, strike price, expiration date, and option 
type (call or put).  The following messages are time stamped to the nanosecond and linked by a 
day-specific order id number.  “Add order” message represents a new displayed order on the BATS 
book, which includes a side indicator (buy order or sell order), quantity (# of contracts), security 
mapping symbol, and limit order price.  “Order executed” messages are sent when a visible order 
on the BATS book is executed in whole or in part and includes the executed quantity and price (if 
different from the add order price).  “Reduce size” messages are sent when a visible order is 
partially reduced.  “Modify order” message is sent whenever an add order message is visibly (price 
and/or quantity) modified.  “Delete order” message is sent when an open order is completely 
removed from the BATS book. 
 We focus on the 21 trading days from October 3, 2016 to October 31, 2016.65  We eliminate 
orders reported before 9:40 a.m. and after 3:50 p.m. because opening and closing rotations impede 
equity options from trading freely.  Complex orders, such as spreads and straddles, are priced as 
packages, so we remove them from our sample.  Since we are attempting to understand the 
economic impact of quote stuffing and trade spikes, we aggregate the data by option class minute 
and exclude option/minutes with less than one trade.  We merge these data with closing prices and 
shares outstanding from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  Part of the analysis 
seeks to examine the economic impact of option quote stuffing episodes and trade spikes on the 
liquidity in the underlying (equity) securities market.  We obtain NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) 
data that includes information on all issues traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and Regionals. 
                                                          
65 A single underlying stock will have both puts and calls with perhaps ten or more strike prices and five expiration 
dates, giving a total of 100 options per stock.  It is not uncommon for the number of option series to far exceed 100.  
The average file size for a single day of uncompressed orders on the BZX is over 140 GB.      
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
QUOTE STUFFING AND MARKET QUALITY 
 Quote stuffing is often referred to as a practice of placing an excessive number of buy or 
sell orders for a particular security and then immediately canceling them.  Gai, Yao, and Ye (2012) 
argue that it is difficult to identify all potential quote stuffing events.  Similar to Egginton, Van 
Ness, and Van Ness (2012), rather than identifying all events, we isolate extreme episodic spikes 
in quoting activity.  However, we also require a contemporaneous spike in order cancellation 
activity.  We divide the trading day into one-minute segments.  We then calculate the intraday 
variation in quoting and cancelling activity by computing the average standard deviation of the 
number of quotes and cancellations in the one-minute segments over the trading day.  We identify 
a quote stuffing episode when the number of orders submitted and canceled in a one-minute 
segment exceeds the daily one-minute average by more than four standard deviations.66  We 
exclude events that experience above a two standard deviation increase in trading in the minutes 
leading up to the quote stuffing episode.   
 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the 2,585 unique quote stuffing events.  Panel A 
shows that 280 option classes on common stocks experience at least one quote stuffing episode 
during the sample period, relative to only 39 option classes on ETFs.  These 319 option classes 
account for over 70% of trading volume across the three exchanges during our sample period, 
suggesting that quote stuffing is pervasive in active option classes.  The average time-to-expiration 
                                                          
66 We also reduce the hurdle to three standard deviations and our results are robust.   
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is 58 days for options on common stocks and 55 days for options on ETFs.  The median S/X ratio 
for options on both common stocks and ETFs is 1.0, indicating that the trading of options is 
concentrated in near-the-money options.  We find that roughly 66% of option classes have a 
minimum price variation of one cent, while the remaining option classes trade in five-cent 
increments.  The average market capitalization for an underlying stock is $47.06 billion, compared 
to $13.88 billion for an ETF.  The average trade price on an underlying common stock is $79.57, 
relative to $64.58 for an ETF.  
 Panel B of Table 1 reports the order statistics during the one-minute quote stuffing 
episodes.  The average number of orders submitted during a quote stuffing episode is 16,422 for 
482,888 contracts.  The average number of orders canceled during a quote stuffing event is 16,354, 
which implies a cancel-to-order ratio of 99.59%.  Panel C of Table 1 displays the distribution of 
quote stuffing events as the number of standard deviations above the daily average.  We find that 
1,184 events, or 45.8% of the sample quote stuffing episodes, occur between five and six standard 
deviations above the mean.  There are, however, 181 events that occur over eight standard 
deviations above the mean.  Therefore, there is extreme variation in the severity of quote stuffing 
events.  Panel D of Table 1 shows that 56.56% of sample quote stuffing events occur in call options 
and 82.75% occur in option classes trading in pennies.  In support of our fifth hypothesis, we find 
that quote stuffing events are more frequently observed on the BZX and NOM, relative to the 
EDGX.  Panel E of Table 1 shows that over 95% of the sample quote stuffing events occur on 
either the BZX or NOM.  
 Figure 1 provides several examples of the extreme quote stuffing episodes observed in this 
study.  Panel A shows a quote stuffing event for IBM call options on the BZX at 11:39 a.m. on 
October 25th, 2016.  The number of orders submitted to the BZX exchange during the time period 
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11:39:00 a.m. to 11:39:59 a.m. was 21,820.  Panel B displays a quote stuffing event for American 
Airlines Group Inc. (AAL) call options on the EDGX at 12:07 p.m. on October 27th, 2016.  The 
number of orders submitted to the EDGX between 12:07:00 p.m. to 12:07:59 p.m. exceeded 
92,000.  Panel C shows an extreme quote stuffing episode for Delta Air Lines, Inc. (DAL) call 
options on the NOM at 10:33 a.m. on October 13th, 2016.  The number of orders submitted to the 
NOM between 10:33:00 a.m. and 10:33:59 a.m. was nearly 7,000.  In each of these examples, the 
cancel-to-order ratio was well above 99% during the one-minute quote stuffing events.    
 When liquidity is supplied and removed from markets in nanoseconds, it is nearly 
impossible for market participants to identify displayed orders that reflect committed trading 
sentiment.  To examine if order execution quality and/or liquidity deteriorate in option and equity 
markets around option quote stuffing episodes, we estimate three measures in the options market 
and three measures in the equities market.  Similar to Battalio et al. (2015), we focus on the 
following three variables in the options market: order execution rates, time-to-execution, and 
short-term volatility.67  We compute order execution rates as the daily ratio of orders executed to 
total number of orders added to the book (see Foucault, 1999).  Time-to-execution is measured as 
the number of seconds between order submission and execution (see Battalio, Corwin, and 
Jennings, 2015).  For a given minute, we estimate short-term volatility as the difference between 
the log of the high ask price and the log of the low bid price (Kwan et al., 2015).  We also compute 
percent quoted spreads and percent effective spreads in the underlying equities by closely 
following Holden and Jacobsen (2014).  The percent quoted spread is defined as 
% 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 =  
𝐴𝑠𝑘 − 𝐵𝑖𝑑
𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡
, (1) 
                                                          
67 Similar measures of order execution quality are used in Battalio, Corwin, and Jennings (2015). 
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where Ask is the National Best Ask Price, Bid is the National Best Bid Price, and Midpoint is the 
average of the Bid and Ask Prices.  For a given option class, the percent effective spread on the kth 
trade is defined as 
% 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 =  
2𝐷𝑘(𝑃𝑘 − 𝑀𝑘)
𝑀𝑘
, (2) 
where Dk is an indicator variable that equals +1 if the k
th trade is a buy and -1 if the kth trade is a 
sell, Mk is the midpoint of the NBBO quotes assigned to the k
th trade, and Pk is the trade price.  As 
the TAQ data does not provide a buy/sell identifier, we following the Lee and Ready (1991) 
convention to assign trade direction, Dk.  A trade is a buy when Pk > Mk, a sell when Pk < Mk, and 
the tick test, a trade is a buy (sell) if the most recent prior trade at a different price was a lower 
(higher) price than Pk, when Pk = Mk.   
 First, we examine the effect of quote stuffing on the probability of order execution.  Panel 
A of Figure 2 plots average one-minute order execution rates for the 20-minutes before and after 
the quote stuffing episodes.  The light dotted line is the average number of orders submitted for an 
option class during a given minute, while the solid dark line is the average number of orders 
executed.  We show a substantial decline in average order fill rates during extreme quote stuffing 
episodes.  However, there is an immediate rebound in order execution rates in the minutes after 
the events.  Table 2 shows that order execution rates are lowest during the quote stuffing events, 
1.43%, relative to 8.37% in the minute prior to the episodes.   
 Next, we examine if quote stuffing affects order execution speed.  Panel B of Figure 2 
shows a spike in the median time-to-execution during one-minute quote stuffing episodes.  Table 
2 shows that the median time-to-execution increases from roughly 172 seconds in the minute prior 
to the quote stuffing events, to roughly 331 seconds during the events.  This increase in time-to-
execution suggests that orders submitted during quote stuffing episodes take longer to execute, 
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which is consistent with the second part of our first hypothesis that quote stuffing is associated 
with slower executions.   
 We also examine if quote stuffing affects short-term volatility in the options market.  Panel 
C of Figure 2 shows that volatility in options increase substantially during quote stuffing episodes, 
and remains elevated for a short period after the events.  In fact, Table 2 shows that volatility 
increases by over 37% during quote stuffing episodes, relative to the minute preceding the events.  
Therefore, we fail to reject our second hypothesis, which states that quote stuffing episodes are 
associated with an increase in volatility.      
 Since options trading is shown to provide price discovery in the underlying equities (see 
Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas, 1998 and Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew, 2004), we examine if 
option quote stuffing affects the underlying stocks’ liquidity.  Panel D of Figure 2 shows that 
volatility in the underlying equities peaks in the one-minute interval following the option quote 
stuffing episode.  Table 2 shows that short-term volatility in the underlying stocks increases from 
0.0420 in the minute prior to the option quote stuffing event, to 0.0559 in the minute following the 
episode.  Spread measures follow patterns similar to that of volatility.  Panel E of Figure 2 shows 
that average percent quoted spreads increase from 0.00071 in the minute before the option quote 
stuffing episode, to 0.00106 in the minute after the episode.  Panel F of Figure 2 reports that percent 
effective spreads increase from 0.005 in the minute prior to the option quote stuffing event, to 
0.007 in the minute after the event.  Therefore, liquidity in the underlying stocks appears to 
deteriorate around option quote stuffing events, albeit with a slight lag, which suggests that options 
might provide valuable information to the underlying equities during extreme option events.68   
                                                          
68 In an unreported analysis, we examine quoted depth around option quote stuffing events and find relatively little 
change during the event window.  Therefore, it does not appear that the underlying stock is experiencing quote stuffing 
behavior during the identified events.    
 171 
 
 In this section, we examine if the effect of option quote stuffing on market quality survives 
in a multivariate setting.  Presumably, a trader’s limit order placement decisions and trading 
outcomes are conditional on option/stock characteristics and market conditions.  To address this 
concern, we conduct multivariate analyses to estimate the determinants of options market quality.  
 We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to analyze the impact of option quote stuffing on 
order execution quality in the options market.  We analyze three dependent variables: order 
execution rates, time-to-execution, and short-term volatility.  We contend that the relevant 
independent variables are option and stock attributes, order characteristics, venue traits, and 
trading day (see Battalio, Corwin, and Jennings, 2015; and Battalio, Shkilko, and Van Ness, 2016).  
The unit of measurement is option class/minute and the general specification for our models is 
outlined as follows: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜏𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑄𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑍𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐸𝐷𝐺𝑋𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝑆/𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽15𝐸𝑇𝐹𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
(3) 
where Qstuffing equals one during the quote stuffing episode and zero otherwise; Post Qstuffing 
is equal to one for the period following the quote stuffing event and zero otherwise; BZX equals 
one if the option trades on the BZX and zero otherwise; EDGX equals one if the option trades on 
the EDGX and zero otherwise; S/X is the underlying stock price divided by the strike price; Days 
Expire is the number of days between order submission/update to option expiration; Call equals 
one if the option is a call option and zero for a put option; Cancel Speed is the number of seconds 
between order submission and cancellation conditional on a complete order deletion; Option Trade 
Size equals the average one-minute trade size; Option Volume equals the option’s average one-
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minute contract volume; Option Trade Price equals the option’s mean trade price; Underlying 
Volume equals the underlying stock’s average one-minute share volume; Underlying MCAP is the 
underlying stock’s average daily market capitalization, measured in $billions; Penny equals one if 
the option is traded and quoted in pennies and zero otherwise; and ETF equals one if the option 
class is an ETF and zero if it is a common stock.  We also include either day dummy variables, 𝛿𝑡, 
or event fixed effects, 𝜏𝑗.  The event fixed effects prevent us from estimating the coefficients on the 
trading venue indicator variables, Underlying MCAP, and the Penny and ETF dummies, as they 
do not have within-class variation.  We report t-statistics in parentheses obtained from standard 
errors clustered at the option class level.  
 Columns [1] and [2] of Table 3 reports the results of estimating eq. (3) with order execution 
rates as the dependent variable.  We find that order execution rates are between 8.95 and 9.11 
percentage points lower during quote stuffing episodes, relative to the pre-event windows, other 
factors held constant.  This decline is both significant and economically meaningful.  The results 
in Table 3 provide support for the notion that quote stuffing impedes limit order traders from 
finding countervailing marketable orders, and so we fail to reject our first hypothesis that quote 
stuffing episodes are associated with a decrease in order execution rates.  To the extent that limit 
order traders are worse off when the probability of their order executing declines (see Colliard and 
Foucault, 2012), our finding suggests that quote stuffing is detrimental to market quality.  
 Columns [3] and [4] of Table 3 report the results of estimating eq. (3) with time-to-
execution as the dependent variable.  Consistent with our univariate tests, we find that the time 
between order submission and execution is between 84 and 197 seconds slower during quote 
stuffing events, relative pre-event windows.  Our findings support the conjecture that quote 
stuffing might discourage traders from submitting marketable orders, which in turn slows the speed 
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of order execution (Battalio, Corwin, and Jennings, 2014).  Again, we fail to reject the second part 
of our first hypothesis, which states that quote stuffing is associated with slower executions.  If 
speed of order execution is important to limit order traders, our results suggest that quote stuffing 
harms order execution quality.   
 Next, we examine how option quote stuffing impacts short-term volatility.  Columns [5] 
and [6] of Table 3 report the results of estimating eq. (3) with short-term volatility as the dependent 
variable.  We find that volatility increases significantly during extreme quote stuffing episodes.  
For instance, short-term volatility is between 0.1512 and 0.4609 higher during quote stuffing 
events, relative to the pre-event windows, other things held constant.  Our results support the 
argument that quote stuffing creates volatility in the marketplace (Egginton, Van Ness, and Van 
Ness, 2016).  Therefore, we find support for our second hypothesis, which states that quote stuffing 
is associated with an increase in short-term price volatility.          
 We also analyze how option quote stuffing affects liquidity in the underlying stocks in a 
multivariate setting.  We use OLS to examine the impact of option quote stuffing on liquidity in 
the underlying equities market.  We analyze three dependent variables: short-term volatility, 
percent quoted spreads, and percent effective spreads.  Similar to Egginton, Van Ness, and Van 
Ness (2015), we estimate the following regression model: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑄𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5log (𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
(4) 
where Qstuffing Event equals one during the two one-minute segments during and after the option 
quote stuffing episodes and zero otherwise; Post Qstuffing equals one during the post event 
windows and zero otherwise; Underlying Price is the average one-minute stock price; Underlying 
Volatility is the average one-minute stock volatility, measured as the difference in the log of the 
high ask price and log of the low bid price; and Underlying Trades is the average number of trades 
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for the stock during a given minute.  We also include event fixed effects, 𝜏𝑗, and report t-statistics 
in parentheses obtained from standard errors clustered at the stock level.   
 We report the results of estimating eq. (4) in Table 4.  We find that short-term volatility is 
insignificantly different during option quote stuffing events, relative to pre-event windows.  
However, we find that both percent quoted spreads and percent effective spreads are significantly 
higher during option quote stuffing events than in pre-event windows.   
 The results in this section provide evidence that not only do option quote stuffing episodes 
negatively affect the quality of option markets but also negatively impact the liquidity in equity 
markets.  Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and event identification 
strategies.        
TRADING SPIKES AND MARKET QUALITY 
 In this section, we investigate if option trading spikes negatively affect market quality.  To 
identify trade spikes, we calculate the intraday variation in trading activity as the average standard 
deviation of the number of trades in one-minute segments.  Although order volume is high for 
options, executions are far less frequent.  Therefore to be classified as a trading spike, we require 
that the number of trades in a given minute exceed the daily average number of trades by at least 
six standard deviations.69 
 Table 5 provides summary statistics on the 1,619 trading spikes on 217 unique option 
classes.  Panel A of Table 5 shows that 184 of the 217 option classes are on common stocks, while 
33 are on ETFs.  The average S/X ratio is 1.00 for options on common stocks and 1.02 on ETFs, 
suggesting that the average order submitted is for an option near-the-money.  We also show that 
                                                          
69 The results hold if we reduce the cut-off to three standard deviations, although we are less confident that these are 
truly trading spikes, as less frequently trading options may only have a few trades in a given minute.   
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the average market capitalization for options on common stocks (ETFs) with at least one trading 
spike during the sample period is $64.91 ($15.8) billion.  Panel B of Table 5 displays trade statistics 
during intense spikes in order executions.  The mean number of orders executed during a trading 
spike is 27.87 with a maximum of 293.  The average trade size during a spike is 12.77 contracts 
and a median price of $1.26.  Panel C of Table 5 shows that 75% of the sample trading spikes fall 
between seven and eight standard deviations above the daily one-minute average number of trades.  
Similar to quote stuffing episodes, we find that trading spikes are more common in call options 
than put options, and in penny options than non-penny options.  Consistent with our fifth 
hypothesis, we show that trading spikes are more frequently observed on the BZX and NOM, 
relative to the EDGX.   
 Figure 3 provides an example of a trading spike on each sample exchange.  Panel A shows 
a trading spike for Caterpillar Inc. (CAT) call options at 11:22 a.m. on October 25, 2016 on the 
BZX.  The number of executed orders increases to 38 during the event minute.  Panel B shows an 
intense trading spike for Bank of America (BAC) call options at 12:00 p.m. on October 27, 2016 
on the NOM.  Last, Panel C shows a trading spike for Deutsche Bank (DB) put options at 3:38 
p.m. on October 31, 2016 on the EDGX when the number of trades increases to 28.  We examine 
these trading spikes in more detail in the following analysis.   
 To investigate the impact of trading spikes on market quality, we examine the 20 one-
minute trading segments before and after the identified events.  Consistent with the theory of Clark 
(1973) and Copeland (1976) we find a positive relation between volatility and trading volume.  
Panel A of Figure 4 shows a substantial increase in short-term volatility during extreme trading 
spikes.  Specifically, volatility increases from 0.7485 in the minute before the event to 1.4572 
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during the one-minute spike in trading (see Table 6), which provides support for our third 
hypothesis that states trading spikes are associated with an increase in volatility.     
 We also examine the effect of option trading spikes on limit order trading decisions.  Panel 
B of Figure 4 shows that average order cancellation activity decreases during extreme trading 
spikes, although it is relatively volatile over the sample period.  This decline in order cancellation 
activity suggests that limit order traders are more willing to let their orders sit on the book when 
execution rates are increasing.  However, Panel C of Figure 4 shows that the median time-to-
cancellation increases sharply during trading spikes, but then immediately decreases in the minutes 
following the events.  The time-to-cancellation remains relatively low for approximately 10 
minutes after the events.  Table 6 shows that the median time between order submission and 
cancellation increases from 98.62 seconds in the minute prior to the trade spike, to 181.33 seconds 
during the trade spike, and then to 67.14 second in the minute following the event.      
 Next, we analyze the effect of option trading spikes on liquidity in the underlying equities 
market.  Figure 4 and Table 6 show no distinct patterns in volatility or effective spreads around 
option trading spikes.  However, we find an increase in average quoted spreads in the two minutes 
around the trading spikes.  In fact, average percent quoted spreads increase from 0.00051 to 
0.00057 from the minute prior to the trading spike to the minute after the trading spike.   
 In our last set of tests in this section, we examine if the impact of trading spikes on market 
quality hold in a multivariate setting.  We estimate specifications of the following regression 
equation: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜏𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑇𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , (5) 
where the dependent variable is set to either short-term volatility, order cancellation rates, or time-
to-cancellation; Tspike equals one during trading spikes and zero otherwise and Post Tspike equals 
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one during the post-event windows and zero otherwise.  We include the following as control 
variables: exchange identifiers, S/X ratio, days to expiration, call dummy variable, time-to-
cancellation, option trade size, option volume, option trade price, underlying stock volume, 
underlying market capitalization, and dummy variables for penny options and ETFs.  We also 
include either day dummy variables, 𝛿𝑡, or event fixed effects, 𝜏𝑗.  
 Table 7 reports the results of estimating eq. (5).  We find that the BZX and EDGX have 
lower volatility, higher cancellation activity, and faster cancellation speeds than the NOM.  We 
also find that option volume, option trade price, and underlying stock volume are all positively 
related to short-term volatility.  Option classes that trade in pennies have significantly higher order 
cancellation rates and faster cancellation speeds than non-penny option classes. 
 Consistent with theory (Copeland, 1976) and in support of our third hypothesis, we find 
that short-term volatility is significantly higher during trading spikes than during the pre-event 
window, other factors held constant.  In fact, volatility is between 0.5456 and 0.9005 higher during 
trading spikes than during the 20 minute pre-event window.  Columns [3] and [4] report the results 
of estimating eq. (5) with order cancellation rates as the dependent variable.  We reject our fourth 
hypothesis that trading spikes are associated with higher cancellation activity, as we do not find 
significant evidence that order cancellation rates differ during the identified trading spikes.  
Consistent with our univariate tests, we find that limit order traders are more reluctant to cancel 
their orders during trading spikes as the average time-to-cancellation lengthens between 66.82 to 
110 seconds. 
 Next, we analyze if option trade spikes affect liquidity in the underlying equities, holding 
stock characteristics and market conditions constant.  We use OLS to examine the impact of trading 
spikes on liquidity in the underlying equities.  We analyze three dependent variables: short-term 
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volatility, percent quoted spreads, and percent effective spreads.  We estimate the following 
regression model: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑇𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , (6) 
where Tspike equals one for the minute during the option trading spike and the minute after the 
event and zero otherwise; Post Tspike  equals one for the post-event window and zero otherwise.  
Similar to eq. (4) we include the underlying trade price, underlying volatility, and underlying 
number of trades as control variables.  We also include event fixed effects and cluster the standard 
errors by stock.   
 Table 8 reports the results of estimating eq. (6).  In Column [2], we find that the coefficient 
on the event dummy variable, Tspike, is positive and significant at the 0.01 level, which suggests 
that percent quoted spreads appear to increase during option trade spikes, other factors held 
constant.  We do not find significant evidence that either short-term volatility or percent effective 
spreads change during option trading spikes.  Thus, it does not seem that short-lived trading spikes 
in options significantly impact liquidity in the underlying stocks, with the exception of percent 
quoted spreads.                 
QUOTE STUFFING AND TRADING SPIKES ON OPTION EXPIRATION DAYS 
 In our last set of tests, we compare quote stuffing episodes and trading spikes on option 
expiration days and on other trading days.  Figure 5 plots the distribution of quote stuffing episodes 
and trading spikes over the 21 trading days examined in this study.  We show that the most quote 
stuffing events to occur on a single day is on October 26, 2016 (220 episodes).  The number of 
trading spikes in a single day peaks on October, 28, 2016.  In comparison, 142 (87) quote stuffing 
events (trading spikes) occur on option expiration, October 21, 2016. 
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 To control for other factors that might influence the probabilities of quote stuffing episodes 
and trading spikes, we estimate the following logistic regression: 
𝑄𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (7) 
where the dependent variable are binary, Qstuff equals one during a quote stuffing event and zero 
otherwise; Tspike equals one during a trading spike and zero otherwise; and Option Expiration 
equals one on October 21, 2016 and zero otherwise.  We include as control variables: a call dummy 
variable, S/X ratio, time-to-cancellation, option trade size, # of option trades, option trade price, # 
of underlying trades, and underlying market capitalization.   
 Panel A of Table 9 reports the results of estimating eq. (7) with Qstuff as the dependent 
variable.  We find that the S/X ratio, option trade size, and underling market capitalization are 
negative predictors of option quote stuffing episodes.  Also, the probability of quote stuffing is 
higher as trading volume increases.  The coefficient on Option Expiration is negative, indicating 
that the probability of quote stuffing is lower on option expiration, relative to non-option expiration 
days.  However, Panel B of Table 9 shows the results of estimating eq. (7) with Tspike as the 
dependent variable, and we find that a trading spike is 1.76 times more likely to occur on an option 
expiration day, relative to non-option expiration days.  Therefore, we fail to completely reject our 
sixth hypothesis that trading spikes and quote stuffing episodes are more frequently observed on 
option expiration days.                 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 In this study, we examine the market quality implications of quote stuffing and trading 
spikes in equity options markets.  Quote stuffing refers to an order placement strategy whereby 
traders quickly enter and cancel a large number of orders.  When orders are added to the book and 
canceled within nanoseconds, market participants have a more difficult time differentiating 
between genuine liquidity and “fake depth” (Angel, 2014).  Although quote stuffing episodes are 
associated with large increases in order volume, the actual posted depth might actually be less as 
most of the quotes are flickering (Baruch and Glosten, 2013).   
Our empirical analysis provides evidence that quote stuffing reduces order execution rates 
and lengthens time-to-execution.  Therefore, quote stuffing has a negative effect on at least two 
important aspects of limit order execution quality.  In fact, the probability of completing a trade is 
of first-order importance in the SEC’s definition of execution quality (Battalio, Corwin, and 
Jennings, 2015).  Option quote stuffing and trading spikes create temporary frictions in trade 
prices, which has important practical implications.  Analysts and other investment professionals 
use volatility forecast models (Hamid and Iqbal, 2004) and practitioners must account for these 
short-lived frictions in options markets in order to more accurately forecast volatility.  
Our analysis also contributes to the literature that investigates the flow of information 
between the options and underlying equities markets (see Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas, 1998; 
Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew, 2004).  We find that bid-ask spreads in the underlying securities 
increase following extreme quote stuffing episodes.  There appears to be a one-minute lag between 
the option quote stuffing event and the liquidity reaction in the underlying equities, which suggests, 
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but does not prove, that options trading contributes to price discovery in the underlying equities 
market.  Overall, quote stuffing and trading spikes seem to cause temporary disturbances in market 
efficiency as volatility increases and order execution quality deteriorates. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Option Quote Stuffing Episodes 
The sample consists of orders in 319 equity and ETF option classes around 2,585 identified quote stuffing episodes during the 21 trading days of October, 2016.  
Panel A reports statistics on the 319 option classes with at least one quote stuffing episode during the sample period.  Panel B reports order statistics during the 
one-minute quote stuffing events.  Panels C through E report the distribution of trading spikes across magnitudes, exchanges, option type (call or put), and tick 
size. 
 
Panel A. Option Class and Underlying Stock Statistics 
 Common Stocks  ETFs 
  
# of option 
classes   Mean   Median   Std. Dev.  
# of option 
classes   Mean   Median   Std. Dev. 
Strike price 280  78.97  53.16  122.49  39 
 65.00  43.79  58.40 
Days-to-expiration 280  57.55  47.17  35.48  39 
 55.27  49.44  21.65 
Penny Pilot 280  0.58  1.00  0.49  39 
 0.74  1.00  0.44 
Underlying trade price 280  79.57  52.53  124.52  39 
 64.58  39.54  58.45 
Underlying size ($ billions) 280  47.06  19.51  76.90  39 
 13.88  4.25  32.74 
S/X 280   1.01   1.00   0.09  39   1.03   1.01   0.11 
Panel B. Order statistics during option quote stuffing episodes       
 Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max       
Order Volume (# contracts) 482,888  17,988  2,637,709  16  50,646,795       
# of Orders 16,422  1,793  41,523  8  427,284       
# of Canceled Orders 16,354  1,771  41,411  6  427,284       
Order Size (# contracts) 16.26  10.39  34.33  1.00  1,119.67       
Order Price 9.60  4.84  14.85  0.18  187.15       
Panel C. Quote stuffing episodes       
# of standard deviations above mean   # of events   % of sample       
[4,5)  206  7.97%       
[5,6)  1184  45.80%       
[6,7)  762  29.48%       
[7,8)  252  9.75%       
   181   7.00%       
Panel D. Option Quote stuffing episodes by option type       
Exchange   # of events   % of sample       
Call  1,462  56.56%       
Put  1,123  43.44%       
Penny Pilot  2,139  82.75%       
Not Penny Pilot   446   17.25%       
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Panel E. Option Quote stuffing episodes by exchange       
Exchange   # of events   % of sample       
BZX  1,050  40.62%       
EDGX  109  4.22%       
NOM   1,426   55.16%       
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Table 2 
Market Quality around Option Quote Stuffing Episodes 
The sample consists of orders in 319 equity and ETF option classes around 2,585 identified quote stuffing episodes 
during the 21 trading days of October, 2016. We examine three market quality measures in options and three market 
quality measures in the underlying stocks.  Execution Rate equals the average number of orders executed to total 
orders submitted.  Time-to-Execution equals the number of seconds between order submission and execution.  S-T 
Volatility equals the log of the high ask price minus the log of the low bid price. % Quoted Spread equals the difference 
between the ask price and the bid price, scaled by the midpoint. % Effective Spread equals 2𝐷𝑘(𝑃𝑘 − 𝑀𝑘) 𝑀𝑘⁄ , where 
Dk is equal to +1 if the trade is a buy and -1 if the trade is a sell, Pk is the execution price, and Mk is the quote midpoint. 
Panel A reports average market quality statistics for the quote stuffing interval (minute 0) and the ten one-minute 
intervals before and after the event.  Panel B reports a summary of the market quality measures around the quote 
stuffing episodes.  We test for differences in means using simple t-tests. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.          
 
Panel A. Market quality around option quote stuffing episodes 
  Option market quality   Equity market quality 
Minute 
Execution 
Rate 
Time-to- 
Execution 
S-T 
Volatility   
S-T 
Volatility 
% Quoted 
Spread 
% Effective 
Spread 
-10 12.02% 114.669 0.4116  0.0406 0.00071 0.00604 
-9 10.82% 121.386 0.4918  0.0474 0.00071 0.00597 
-8 12.21% 130.108 0.4275  0.0437 0.00073 0.00600 
-7 12.23% 125.327 0.4169  0.0470 0.00073 0.00612 
-6 8.06% 154.167 0.3917  0.0459 0.00072 0.00609 
-5 9.57% 121.039 0.3733  0.0394 0.00071 0.00571 
-4 9.88% 115.131 0.4237  0.0445 0.00072 0.00596 
-3 6.92% 197.198 0.4902  0.0495 0.00071 0.00585 
-2 9.49% 90.071 0.3390  0.0343 0.00068 0.00559 
-1 8.37% 172.236 0.5815  0.0420 0.00071 0.00507 
0 1.43% 331.477 0.7984  0.0538 0.00085 0.00567 
1 7.06% 43.790 0.6395  0.0559 0.00106 0.00700 
2 6.34% 50.562 0.5702  0.0510 0.00081 0.00564 
3 7.27% 58.466 0.5141  0.0528 0.00079 0.00566 
4 7.96% 86.689 0.5164  0.0501 0.00078 0.00622 
5 9.87% 71.160 0.4886  0.0463 0.00077 0.00622 
6 9.76% 72.958 0.5255  0.0392 0.00075 0.00625 
7 8.22% 105.397 0.4456  0.0404 0.00072 0.00643 
8 8.65% 87.416 0.4609  0.0513 0.00074 0.00604 
9 8.76% 68.757 0.4528  0.0374 0.00073 0.00639 
10 8.26% 78.107 0.4398  0.0519 0.00072 0.00583 
Panel B. Summary 
Pre event window 9.96% 134.133 0.4347  0.0434 0.00071 0.00583 
Event window [0,1) 1.43% 331.477 0.7984     
Event window [0,1]     0.0548 0.00095 0.00633 
Post event window 8.22% 72.330 0.5053  0.0467 0.00075 0.00608 
Differences        
Event - Pre -8.53%*** 197.344*** 0.3637***  0.0114*** 0.00024*** 0.00051*** 
Event - Post -6.79%*** 259.147*** 0.2931***   0.0081*** 0.00020*** 0.00026*** 
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Table 3 
Option Market Quality around Option Quote Stuffing Episodes 
The sample consists of orders in 319 equity and ETF option classes around 2,585 identified quote stuffing episodes 
during the 21 trading days of October, 2016.  We use Ordinary Least Squares to examine the impact of quote stuffing 
on order execution quality and liquidity.  Execution Rate equals the average number of canceled orders divided by the 
total number of order submitted.  S-T Volatility equals the average difference in logs of the one-minute high ask price 
and one-minute low bid price.  Time-to-Execution equals the average number of seconds between order submission 
and execution.  Qstuffing equals one during the one-minute quote stuffing event and zero otherwise.  Post Qstuffing 
equals one during the 20 one-minute trading intervals following the quote stuffing episode and zero otherwise.  BZX 
and EDGX equal one if the order/modification message is sent to that particular exchange and zero otherwise. S/X 
equals the underlying stock price divided by the strike price. Days Expire is the number of days between order 
submission and option expiration. Call equals one if the order is for a call option and zero for a put option.  Cancel 
Speed is the number of seconds between order submission and cancellation conditional on a complete order deletion.  
Option Trade Size is the average number of contracts attached to a particular execution order. Option Volume equals 
the option’s average one-minute contract volume. Option Trade Price equals the option’s mean one-minute execution 
price. Underlying Volume equal the underlying stock’s average one-minute share volume. Underlying MCAP is the 
underlying stock’s average daily market capitalization, measured in $billions. Penny equals one if the option is traded 
and quoted in pennies and zero otherwise. ETF equals one if the option class is an ETF and zero if it is a common 
stock.  We include either day or event fixed effects.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses obtained from standard 
errors clustered by option class. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
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  Execution Rate   Time-to-Execution (seconds)   S-T Volatility 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6] 
Qstuffing -0.0895*** -0.0911***  197.2748*** 83.5441**  0.1512*** 0.4609*** 
 (-11.96) (-11.84)  (4.90) (2.37)  (3.51) (9.99) 
Post Qstuffing 0.0007 0.0021  -47.5607** -79.6201***  -0.0219 -0.0068 
 (0.21) (0.68)  (-2.31) (-3.54)  (-0.97) (-0.28) 
BZX -0.1493***   -147.0375***   -0.0734  
 (-11.92)   (-4.37)   (-0.99)  
EDGX -0.1388***   -256.1034***   -0.3957**  
 (-10.02)   (-4.12)   (-2.33)  
S/X -0.0232 -0.0439  -1.2647 168.7779  -0.2008 -0.1412 
 (-0.70) (-0.91)  (-0.01) (1.29)  (-0.99) (-1.44) 
Days-to-Expiration -0.0001 -0.0001*  0.6002*** 0.3871  0.0001 0.0003 
 (-1.64) (-1.68)  (2.65) (1.27)  (0.10) (0.83) 
Call 0.0098**   43.3001**   0.0931*  
 (2.12)   (2.05)   (1.87)  
Cancel Speed 0.0000*** 0.0000**  0.0542*** -0.0029  -0.0000 0.0000 
 (3.19) (2.50)  (2.99) (-0.26)  (-1.40) (0.78) 
Option Trade Size -0.0001*** -0.0001*  0.1297 -0.0925  -0.0032*** -0.0019*** 
 (-2.82) (-1.91)  (0.92) (-0.79)  (-3.31) (-3.29) 
Option Volume 0.0000*** 0.0000*  -0.1347** -0.0153  0.0019*** 0.0012*** 
 (3.14) (1.66)  (-2.20) (-0.59)  (3.49) (3.18) 
Option Trade Price 0.0000 -0.0001  -0.8142*** -0.6107***  0.0062*** 0.0054*** 
 (0.14) (-1.18)  (-3.18) (-2.97)  (3.45) (3.45) 
Underlying Volume -0.0000 0.0000**  0.0006*** 0.0008***  0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 (-0.71) (2.13)  (3.12) (3.75)  (6.32) (9.21) 
Underlying MCAP -0.0001   -0.1490**   0.0019***  
 (-1.26)   (-2.02)   (4.18)  
Penny -0.0698***   -160.9540***   0.2386  
 (-5.20)   (-3.87)   (1.61)  
ETF -0.0327***   -136.8089**   0.1209  
 (-2.84) 
  (-2.12)   (0.50)  
Constant 0.3020*** 0.1281***  623.7562*** 171.1943  0.5103* 0.9575*** 
 (6.57) (2.66) 
 (4.54) (1.22)  (1.81) (9.10) 
Day FE Yes No  Yes No  Yes No 
Event FE No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R2 0.1640 0.0204  0.0195 0.0073  0.1926 0.0775 
N  41,542 41,542   41,542 41,542   41,542 41,542 
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Table 4 
Equity Market Quality around Option Quote Stuffing Episodes 
The sample consists of orders in 319 equity and ETF option classes around 2,585 identified quote stuffing episodes 
during the 21 trading days of October, 2016.  We use Ordinary Least Squares to examine the impact of quote stuffing 
on market quality in the underlying equities. Qstuffing Event equals one during the two one-minute segments during 
and after the option quote stuffing episodes and zero otherwise. Post Qstuffing equals one during the 14 one-minute 
trading intervals following the quote stuffing event and zero otherwise. Underlying Price is the average one-minute 
stock price. Underlying Volatility is the average one-minute stock volatility, measured as the difference in the log of 
the high ask price and log of the low bid price. Underlying Trades is the average one-minute number of trades in a 
given stock.  We include event fixed effects, 𝜏𝑗, and report t-statistics in parentheses obtained from standard errors 
clustered at the stock level.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
 
Equity market quality around option quote stuffing episodes 
  S-T Volatility   % Quoted Spread   % Effective Spread 
  [1]   [2]   [3] 
Qstuffing 0.0054  0.0001***  0.0004** 
 (1.320)  (6.983)  (1.996) 
Post Qstuffing 0.0009  -0.0000  0.0001 
 (0.435)  (-0.494)  (1.128) 
Underlying Price 0.0150***  -0.0000***  -0.0005*** 
 (34.961)  (-5.689)  (-20.112) 
log(Underlying Trades) 0.0038***  0.0000***  -0.0004*** 
 (2.759)  (2.999)  (-5.649) 
Underlying Volatility   0.0001***  0.0196*** 
 
  (7.227)  (96.548) 
Constant -1.8596***  0.0016***  0.0666*** 
 (-34.101) 
 (7.876)  (22.350) 
Event FE   
 
 
 
R2 0.0170  0.0021  0.1162 
N  73,901   73,846   73,901 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics of Option Trading Spikes 
The sample consists of order executions in 217 equity and ETF option classes around 1,619 identified trading spikes during the 21 trading days of October, 2016.  
Panel A reports statistics on the 217 option classes with at least one trading spike during the sample period.  Panel B reports trade statistics during the one-minute 
trading spikes.  Panels C through E report the distribution of trading spikes across spike magnitudes, exchanges, option type (call or put), and tick size.    
 
Panel A. Option class and underlying stock characteristics 
 Common Stocks  ETFs 
  
# of option 
classes   Mean   Median   Std. Dev.  
# of option 
classes   Mean   Median   Std. Dev. 
Strike price 184  86.96  54.33  143.00  33 
 71.99  48.12  62.06 
Days-to-expiration 184  51.98  44.83  30.19  33 
 48.93  45.03  19.35 
Penny Pilot 184  0.78  1.00  0.42  33 
 0.76  1.00  0.44 
Underlying trade price 184  88.18  55.66  147.00  33 
 71.41  47.78  60.90 
Underlying size ($ billions) 184  64.91  29.51  89.70  33 
 15.80  4.74  35.28 
S/X 184   1.00   0.99   0.05   33   1.02   1.00   0.07 
Panel B. Trade Statistics during option trade spikes       
 Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max       
Trade Volume (# contracts) 361.00  157.00  644.82  7.00  8,188.00       
# of Trades 27.87  20.00  24.88  5.00  293.00       
Trade Size (# contracts) 12.77  7.50  17.47  1.00  191.11       
Trade Price 5.58  1.26  77.92  0.02  3,046.47       
Panel C. Distribution of option trade spikes       
# of standard deviations above mean   # of events   % of sample       
[6,7)  97  5.99%       
[7,8)  825  50.96%       
[8,9)  406  25.08%       
[9,10)  151  9.33%       
[10,11)  74  4.57%       
[11,)   66   4.08%       
Panel D. Trade spikes by exchange       
Exchange   # of events   % of sample       
BZX  1,122  69.30%       
EDGX  34  2.10%       
NOM   463   28.60%       
  
 
2
00 
Panel E. Trade spikes by option type       
Exchange   # of events   % of sample       
Call  908  56.08%       
Put  711  43.92%       
Penny Pilot  1,438  88.82%       
Not Penny Pilot   181   11.18%       
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Table 6 
Market Quality around Option Trading Spikes 
The sample consists of orders in 217 equity and ETF option classes around 1,619 identified trading spikes 
during the 21 trading days of October, 2016. We examine three market quality measures in options and three market 
quality measures in the underlying stocks.  S-T Volatility equals the log of the high ask price minus the log of the low 
bid price.  Cancel Rate equals the average number of orders canceled to total orders submitted.  Time-to-Cancel equals 
the number of seconds between order submission and cancellation.  % Quoted Spread equals the difference between 
the ask price and the bid price, scaled by the midpoint.  % Effective Spread equals 2𝐷𝑘(𝑃𝑘 − 𝑀𝑘) 𝑀𝑘⁄ , where Dk is 
equal to +1 if the trade is a buy and -1 if the trade is a sell, Pk is the execution price, and Mk is the quote midpoint. 
Panel A reports average market quality statistics for the quote stuffing interval (minute 0) and the ten one-minute 
intervals before and after the event.  Panel B reports a summary of the market quality measures around the quote 
stuffing episodes.  We test for differences in means using simple t-tests. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.          
 
Panel A. Market quality around option trade spikes 
 Option market quality  Equity market quality 
Minute 
S-T 
Volatility 
Cancel     
Rate 
Time-to-
Cancel   
S-T 
Volatility 
% Quoted 
Spread 
% Effective 
Spread 
-10 0.4255 94.34% 72.83  0.03111 0.00051 0.00524 
-9 0.5442 94.23% 68.00  0.05837 0.00052 0.00590 
-8 0.6064 94.81% 72.18  0.03844 0.00051 0.00480 
-7 0.5128 95.13% 70.50  0.04015 0.00052 0.00505 
-6 0.5801 94.63% 73.25  0.04515 0.00060 0.00479 
-5 0.5323 95.22% 77.87  0.04010 0.00051 0.00494 
-4 0.5369 96.28% 80.99  0.04681 0.00051 0.00505 
-3 0.6144 95.60% 80.24  0.05106 0.00051 0.00513 
-2 0.5674 94.75% 90.50  0.03808 0.00051 0.00516 
-1 0.7485 93.67% 98.62  0.04134 0.00051 0.00464 
0 1.4572 93.27% 181.33  0.04442 0.00055 0.00501 
1 0.8231 92.82% 67.14  0.04365 0.00057 0.00530 
2 0.7015 95.10% 60.19  0.05084 0.00055 0.00485 
3 0.6726 94.63% 61.00  0.04871 0.00053 0.00557 
4 0.6773 93.77% 56.82  0.03822 0.00052 0.00507 
5 0.5993 95.00% 62.91  0.06154 0.00053 0.00565 
6 0.4999 95.10% 65.16  0.03665 0.00053 0.00510 
7 0.5727 95.18% 62.60  0.04739 0.00052 0.00541 
8 0.5664 94.61% 66.18  0.04873 0.00054 0.00547 
9 0.6314 94.84% 63.21  0.04768 0.00052 0.00476 
10 0.6281 94.63% 57.98  0.03448 0.00051 0.00475 
Panel B. Summary 
Pre event window 0.5668 94.86% 78.50  0.04306 0.00052 0.00507 
Event window [0,1) 1.4572 93.27% 181.33     
Event window [0,1]     0.04403 0.00056 0.00516 
Post event window 0.6372 94.57% 62.32  0.04602 0.00053 0.00518 
Differences        
Event - Pre 0.8904*** -1.60% 102.83***  0.00097 0.00004*** 0.00009 
Event - Post 0.8200*** -1.30% 119.01***   -0.00199 0.00003*** -0.00002 
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Table 7 
Option Market Quality around Option Trading Spikes 
The sample consists of orders in 217 equity and ETF option classes around 1,619 identified trading spikes 
during the 21 trading days of October, 2016.  We use Ordinary Least Squares to examine the impact of trading spikes 
on market quality.  S-T Volatility equals the average difference in logs of the one-minute high ask price and one-
minute low bid price.  Cancel Rate equals the average one-minute number of canceled orders divided by the total 
number of order submitted.  Time-to-Cancel equals the average number of seconds between order submission and 
cancellation.  Tspike equals one during the one-minute trading spike and zero otherwise.  Post Tspike equals one 
during the 20 one-minute trading intervals following the trading spike and zero otherwise.  BZX and EDGX equal one 
if the order/modification message is sent to that particular exchange and zero otherwise. S/X equals the underlying 
stock price divided by the strike price. Days Expire is the number of days between order submission and option 
expiration. Call equals one if the order is for a call option and zero for a put option.  Cancel Speed is the number of 
seconds between order submission and cancellation conditional on a complete order deletion.  Option Trade Size is 
the average number of contracts attached to a particular execution order. Option Volume equals the option’s average 
one-minute contract volume. Option Trade Price equals the option’s mean one-minute execution price. Underlying 
Volume equal the underlying stock’s average one-minute share volume. Underlying MCAP is the underlying stock’s 
average daily market capitalization, measured in $billions. Penny equals one if the option is traded and quoted in 
pennies and zero otherwise. ETF equals one if the option class is an ETF and zero if it is a common stock.  We include 
either day or event fixed effects.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses obtained from standard errors clustered by 
option class. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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  S-T Volatility   Cancel Rate   Time-to-Cancel 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6] 
Tspike 0.5456*** 0.9005***  0.0052 -0.0036  109.7216*** 66.8153*** 
 (8.91) (16.11)  (1.02) (-0.85)  (6.77) (4.68) 
Post Tspike 0.0025 0.0001  0.0035** 0.0028  -5.0778 -11.9460** 
 (0.15) (0.01)  (2.08) (1.55)  (-0.84) (-2.33) 
BZX -0.2722***   0.1801***   -119.3373***  
 (-3.20)   (21.28)   (-3.57)  
EDGX -0.8065***   0.1854***   -139.2034***  
 (-6.66)   (14.90)   (-4.15)  
SX -0.1285 -0.2071  0.0276 0.0465  112.6322 134.3720 
 (-0.49) (-1.41)  (0.88) (0.88)  (1.64) (1.31) 
Days-to-Expiration 0.0004 0.0015***  0.0000 -0.0000  -0.1488 -0.3311 
 (0.57) (2.99)  (0.20) (-0.11)  (-0.85) (-1.30) 
Call -0.0056   -0.0057*   22.7015*  
 (-0.10)   (-1.67)   (1.87)  
Cancel Speed -0.0001*** 0.0000  -0.0000*** -0.0000    
 (-3.53) (0.24)  (-5.32) (-1.23)    
Option Trade Size -0.0043*** -0.0019***  0.0001*** 0.0000  0.3207* 0.2151* 
 (-4.91) (-5.24)  (2.63) (1.02)  (1.77) (1.81) 
Option Volume 0.0011*** 0.0006***  -0.0000 0.0000  -0.0216 0.0160 
 (4.64) (4.05)  (-0.30) (0.41)  (-1.23) (1.33) 
Option Trade Price 0.0067*** 0.0057***  -0.0000 0.0000  -0.0921 -0.0982 
 (2.80) (2.98)  (-0.25) (1.20)  (-0.49) (-0.52) 
Underlying Volume 0.0000*** 0.0000***  -0.0000 -0.0000  -0.0000 0.0000 
 (4.94) (7.68)  (-1.40) (-0.73)  (-0.26) (0.24) 
Underlying MCAP 0.0024***   -0.0000   -0.1504**  
 (3.19)   (-0.25)   (-2.08)  
Penny 0.1225   0.0167**   -81.6288***  
 (0.92)   (2.00)   (-2.61)  
ETF 0.1998   -0.0034   24.0597  
 (0.98) 
  (-0.56)   (0.57)  
Constant 0.6167** 0.9297***  0.7393*** 0.8935***  199.3051** 21.2721 
 (2.34) (6.14) 
 (18.63) (21.32)  (2.58) (0.21) 
Day FE Yes No  Yes No  Yes No 
Event FE No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R2 0.1989 0.1044  0.2924 0.0034  0.0227 0.0023 
N (all specifications) 30,452 30,452   30,452 30,452   30,452 30,452 
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Table 8 
Equity Market Quality around Option Trading Spikes 
The sample consists of orders in 217 equity and ETF option classes around 1,619 identified trading spikes during the 
21 trading days of October, 2016.  We use Ordinary Least Squares to examine the impact of trading spikes on market 
quality in the underlying equities. Tspike equals one during the two one-minute segments during and after the option 
trading spike and zero otherwise. Post Tspike equals one during the 14 one-minute trading intervals following the 
option trading spike and zero otherwise. Underlying Price is the average one-minute stock price. Underlying Volatility 
is the average one-minute stock volatility, measured as the difference in the log of the high ask price and log of the 
low bid price. Underlying Trades is the average one-minute number of trades in a given stock.  We include event fixed 
effects, 𝜏𝑗, and report t-statistics in parentheses obtained from standard errors clustered at the stock level.  ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
 
Equity market quality around Option Trading Spikes 
  S-T Volatility   % Quoted Spread   % Effective Spread 
  [1]   [2]   [3] 
Tspike 0.00307  0.00002***  0.00026 
 (0.566)  (3.295)  (0.906) 
Post Tspike 0.00235  -0.00001***  0.00010 
 (0.890)  (-2.616)  (0.703) 
Underlying Price 0.02612***  -0.00000***  -0.00027*** 
 (49.783)  (-4.894)  (-9.239) 
log(Underlying Trades) 0.00305  0.00001***  -0.00091*** 
 (1.446)  (4.700)  (-8.009) 
Underlying Volatility   0.00004***  0.01887*** 
 
  (10.189)  (80.818) 
Constant -2.79851***  0.00058***  0.03936*** 
 (-48.023) 
 (11.629)  (12.260) 
Event FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 0.04443  0.00308  0.10940 
N 55,163   55,163   55,163 
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Table 9 
Quote Stuffing and Trading Spikes on Option Expiration Days 
We use logistic regression to examine the likelihood of a quote stuffing event and/or trading spike occurring 
on the option expiration day (October 21, 2016).  The dependent variable in Panel A is an indicator variable equal to 
one during an option quote stuffing episode and zero otherwise.  The dependent variable in Panel B is an indicator 
variable equal to one during an option trading spike and zero otherwise.    Expire is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the order is submitted/modified on October 21, 2016 (option expiration) and zero otherwise.  The remaining control 
variables are defined in the test.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
 
Panel A. Probability of Quote Stuffing Episodes 
Independent Variable   b   se   z ratio   prob.   Odds Ratio 
Expire  -0.2419**  0.0974  -2.48  0.013  0.7851 
Call  -0.0220  0.0424  -0.52  0.604  0.9782 
SX  -0.4851**  0.2139  -2.27  0.023  0.6156 
Cancel Speed  0.0003***  0.0000  12.23  0.000  1.0003 
Option Trade Size  -0.0036**  0.0016  -2.31  0.021  0.9964 
# of Option Trades  0.0235***  0.0032  7.41  0.000  1.0238 
Option Trade Price  0.0012**  0.0005  2.38  0.018  1.0012 
# of Underlying Trades  0.0007***  0.0000  18.22  0.000  1.0007 
Underlying MCAP  -0.0024***  0.0002  -14.77  0.000  0.9976 
Constant  -2.3442***  0.2199  -10.66  0.000  0.0959 
           
Pseudo R2  0.0569         
N   41,542                 
           
Panel B. Probability of Trading Spikes 
Independent Variable   b   se   z ratio   prob.   Odds Ratio 
Expire  0.5673***  0.1229  4.62  0.000  1.7635 
Call  0.1653**  0.0699  2.37  0.018  1.1798 
SX  0.4459  0.3017  1.48  0.139  1.5619 
Cancel Speed  0.0002***  0.0000  8.14  0.000  1.0002 
Option Trade Size  -0.0052**  0.0023  -2.27  0.023  0.9948 
# of Option Trades  0.1662***  0.0069  24.26  0.000  1.1808 
Option Trade Price  0.0014***  0.0004  3.53  0.000  1.0014 
# of Underlying Trades  -0.0007***  0.0002  -3.93  0.000  0.9993 
Underlying MCAP  -0.0033***  0.0003  -9.60  0.000  0.9967 
Constant  -4.4839***  0.3206  -13.99  0.000  0.0113 
           
Pseudo R2  0.3821         
N   30,452                 
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FIGURE 1: EXAMPLES OF OPTION QUOTE STUFFING EPISODES
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Figure 1 
Examples of Option Quote Stuffing Episodes 
This figure provides several examples of the extreme quote stuffing episodes observed in this study.  Panel A 
shows a quote stuffing event for IBM call options at 11:39 a.m. on October 25th, 2016.  Panel B displays a quote 
stuffing event for American Airlines Group Inc. (AAL) on the EDGX from 12:08 p.m. on October 27 th, 2016.  Panel 
C shows an extreme quote stuffing episode for Delta Air Lines, Inc. (DAL) call options on the NOM at 10:33 on 
October 13th, 2016. 
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Figure 2 
Market Quality around Option Quote Stuffing Episodes 
This figure plots average one-minute market quality for the 20-minutes before and after the quote stuffing episodes.  The light 
dotted line is the average number of orders submitted for an option class during a specified minute, while the solid dark line is the 
average market quality measure. 
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FIGURE 3: EXAMPLES OF OPTION TRADING SPIKES
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Figure 3 
Examples of Option Trading Spikes 
This figure provides several examples of the option trading spikes examined in this study.  Panel A shows a 
trading spike for Caterpillar Inc. (CAT) call options at 11:22 a.m. on October 25, 2016 on the BZX.  Panel B shows 
an intense trading spike for Bank of America (BAC) call options at 12:00 p.m. on October 27, 2016 on the NOM.  
Panel C shows a trading spike for Deutsche Bank (DB) put options at 3:38 p.m. on October 31, 2016 on the EDGX. 
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Figure 4 
Market Quality around Option Trading Spikes 
This figure plots market quality measures in options and equities markets for the 20-minutes before and after 
extreme trading spikes in options.  The light dotted line is the average number of executed orders for an option class 
during a specified minute, while the solid dark line is the average market quality measure during that same one-minute 
interval. 
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FIGURE 5: DISTRIBUTION OF QUOTE STUFFING AND TRADING SPIKES OVER 
SAMPLE PERIOD
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Figure 5 
Distribution of Quote Stuffing and Trading Spikes over Sample Period 
This figure plots the distribution of both quote stuffing episodes and trading spikes across the 21 sample days in 
October, 2016. 
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